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ABSTRACT
Beyond "Detached Concern": The Cognitive
and Ethical Function o f Emotions in M edical Practice
Jodi Lauren Halpem
Yale University
1993

This dissertation analyzes the ideal o f "detached concern" in medical practice.
T his ideal arises as an attempt to bridge the gap in medicine between managing
diseases and recognizing patients "as persons."

First, physicians take their

emotions to interfere with making objective diagnoses and making every aspect o f
their practice "scientific." Second, physicians idealize detachment as the stance o f
the impartial moral agent who is able to care for all types o f patients out o f a sense
o f duty. Third, physicians also recognize the need to be empathic; however they
conceive o f empathy as a purely cognitive capacity that is com patible with
detachment.
Chapter one analyzes the features o f emotions that contribute to and also
threaten rational agency. Chapter two analyzes Descartes' theory o f the emotions,
w hich is the outcome o f his "scientific" method for understanding reality.
D escartes' legacy to physicians is not only the capacity to build powerful
m echanistic models o f diseases, but the failure to account for human experience
via such models.
Chapter three considers the turn to Kantian ethics to restore respect for
patients "as persons" to the practice o f medicine. Kantian impartiality is shown not
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to require detachment.

Further, the practice o f Kantian ethics in m edicine is

impoverished when physicians are not affectively engaged.
W hereas chapters two and three show the limitations o f the argum ents for
emotional detachment, chapters four and five give positive arguments for the role
o f emotions in medical practice. Chapter four examines the cognitive and affective
aspects o f clinical empathy, and argues that emotions are essential for directing the
em pathizer to imagine what the patient is experiencing. The final chapter argues
that given the importance o f emotional engagement and the fact that emotions can
obstruct rational and moral agency, physicians need to regulate their emotions
w ithout detaching themselves from patients. Physicians can best m eet the goals
o f medicine by cultivating overarching emotional attitudes like curiosity and
courage to effectively m ove themselves towards a more realistic and respectful
appreciation o f patients.
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1

Introduction

The increasing interest in medical ethics in the United States over the past
twenty years arises in the context o f widespread public dissatisfaction with
physicians. The effective treatm ents that are the fruits o f m edical science do not
assuage patients' unprecedented concern that physicians will not talk to or listen
to them. Patients fear that their suffering will go unrecognized and their dignity
will not be respected.
The prevalent ideal that guides physicians in their conduct tow ards patients is
the ideal o f "detached concern."

"Detached concern" is a com plex concept that

posits that physicians can detach themselves from their personal emotions, while
maintaining a professional concern for patients.1 Physicians believe that detaching
them selves emotionally best meets the special cognitive and moral demands that
distinguish medicine from other helping professions.
Twentieth century physicians take the ideals o f scientific objectivity and
technological reliability as overarching principles for every aspect o f medical
practice. The current AMA Code o f Ethics emphasizes science as the basis o f
appropriate medical conduct: "A physician should practice a m ethod o f healing
founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate professionally
with anyone who violates this principle."2 Physicians have interpreted the goal o f
practicing m edicine "scientifically" to require that they turn them selves into reliable
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instrum ents for diagnosing and treating disease, by purifying themselves from the
influence o f any personal emotions.3
In contrast, therapists, social workers and nurses, who rarely view themselves
as applied scientists or technicians, have models o f professional conduct that allow
an im portant place for sympathetic emotions. Yet the goal o f medicine is the same
as th e goal o f these other professions —to alleviate the suffering o f human beings.
In th e current environment o f medicine, physicians translate this obligation to
understand and care for the patient as a sufferer into an obligation to have an
im partial respect for the patients rights and a cognitive awareness o f the patient's
feelings.
The ideal o f "detached concern" is well-suited to the current climate o f medical
care. M ost physicians today are trained in hospitals that are like factories trying
to m ass produce "health" in the limited sense o f repairing body parts.4 The
institutional em phasis on technological reliability and economic efficiency are
extended to every aspect o f the physician's conduct.

If the physician hesitates

during a cardiac arrest she may lose the precious moments necessary to save
som eone's life. I f she takes time to grieve afterwards, she will not be reliably fresh
and available for the next patient whose body is in need o f repair. During surgery
and other invasive procedures physicians avoid looking at the faces o f their
patients. And every physician in training is regularly "on call" during which she
gives up not only sleep and food, but her fam iliar personal environment and
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relationships, for endless hours o f treating one "case" after another.

In this

environm ent, emotional interactions seem extraneous and even threatening to the
physician's usefulness.
The increasing anonymity and compartmentalization o f medical care has
coincided with an increasing emphasis in medical journals on the moral obligation
to respect the rights o f patients. The AMA Principles o f M edical Ethics say that
"The principal objective o f the medical profession is to render service to humanity
w ith full respect for the dignity o f man."5 The American Hospital Association
provides a "Patient's Bill o f Rights," beginning with the statement that "The patient
has the right to considerate and respectful care."6 N ote the tension in using the
language o f rights, which arises in contracts between atomistic "entities" where the
prim ary obligation is non-interference, in the realm o f considerate and respectful
care.
This focus on rights contrasts with a long tradition o f em phasizing the
physician's beneficent guardianship o f the patient's best interests.

The ideal of

respecting patients as persons has become popular in part out o f a rejection o f the
idea that the physician knows better than the patient what is best for the patient.
T he recent movement in medical ethics has been inspired by cases in which
physicians believed they were making decisions in the patient's best interest, but
did som ething invasive that was tragically at odds with the patient's own wishes.7
T here has also been an increasing concern about the mistreatment o f human
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subjects.

Such concerns, thematized by the increasing involvement o f the legal

profession in medicine, have contributed to the erosion o f the ideal o f beneficent
guardianship and to the increased emphasis on patient autonomy.
Yet, it is conceivable that respect for the autonomy o f patients could be based
in an emotionally engaged relationship in which the physician is genuinely moved
to respect the patient as a person. It is in the context o f a fragmenting physicianpatient relationship that respecting patients has been reduced to not interfering with
patients' rights. H. Tristam Engelhardt argues that the physician's responsibility to
respect patients could not spring from anything but a bare com mitment to rational
procedure, given the anonymity o f current medical practice.

W hat Engelhardt

actually shows is not that respecting patients' rights is adequate for recognizing and
valuing suffering persons, but rather that such "respect" is the m ost appropriate
moral standard given the detachment that informs institutionalized m edicine.8
Just as the pressures of institutional medicine have reduced the richness o f the
ideal o f respecting patients as persons, they have reduced the concept o f clinical
empathy. Physicians believe that they can understand the subjective experiences
o f their patients empathically while remaining emotionally detached. In their essay
"Training for Detached Concern," Renee Fox and Howard L ief describe the
transform ation o f the physician in medical training.9 Their thesis is that only after
medical students go through a period o f alienation in which they overcome all their
personal responses to patients (in the same way that they overcame their fear and
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disgust at dissecting a cadaver) can they develop the special medical skill to listen
em pathically without becoming emotionally involved.
The ideal o f "detached concern" presupposes that, at least theoretically, the
basic dem ands o f medical practice for objectivity and impartiality on the one hand,
and for a respectful and empathic approach to patients on the other hand, are
compatible with the current structure o f medical care. The key presupposition is
that the physician could recognize and respond appropriately to suffering patients
w ithout becoming emotionally engaged. This "could" refers to a conceptual rather
than an empirical possibility. Physicians are aware that as hum an beings they can
never actually rid them selves o f all emotional responses to patients; the point of
such an ideal, like the ideal o f objectivity in science, is to provide a standard for
which the physician ought to aim.

Yet this ideal has important consequences,

because physicians take their inevitable personal feelings o f g rief and affection as
marks o f failure, and do not question themselves when they are unmoved by the
suffering o f their patients.

I The Ideal o f Objectivity

T he physician's first task is to make an accurate diagnosis o f the patient's
problem.

The ideal o f accuracy arises in medicine for pragmatic reasons.

The

efficacy o f the physician depends upon "diagnosing," (literally, distinguishing
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betw een) those complaints and symptoms that are relevant to and those that are not
relevant to the health o f the patient. This goal requires that the physician be wary
o f judging the importance o f things inappropriately, or o f missing valuable
information.
Physicians have long observed that their emotions can, at times, disrupt the
diagnostic process.

One need not point to the extreme examples o f an anxiety

attack or o f profound depression making concentration impossible. The physician
m ay be quite able to think, and yet misperceive or misjudge something because o f
her em otional responses to the patient. For example, she may miss a breast lump
out o f her own fear o f breast cancer, or underestimate the significance o f rectal
bleeding out o f terror at losing a patient to colon cancer. And not only negative
em otions but positive emotions can lead one to miss aspects o f the patient's
situation that less emotionally engaged people would perceive.

For example, a

physician w ho admires a patient may be slow to recognize that the patient has a
drug problem.
The claim that emotions influence how the world is perceived rests on several
interdependent assumptions that I consider in chapter one. First, emotions are not
only physiological occurrences or bodily "feelings" on the model o f an itch, but
intentional attitudes that imbue the world with certain qualities. One is afraid o f
som ething fearful, and one is sad about something, even if that includes everything
in one's current situation. Second, emotions involve partial depictions o f reality.
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Like lighting that casts shadows, emotions reveal some aspects o f a situation and
conceal others. Third, emotions express motives o f the agent, so that they may at
tim es be wish-fulfilling.
Because emotions are partial and can be wish-fulfilling, physicians have
traditionally been aware o f the need to regulate their ordinary emotional responses
to people. However, prior to the scientific era in medicine, such regulation was
not yet equated with detaching oneself from all emotions. Rather, the physician
w as to rise "above" selfish and petty emotions out o f a compassion that transcends
self-interest.
For example, the Hippocratic writings portray the physician as overcoming the
lust and greed that interfere with the practice o f medicine by developing a special
"philia" for all patients. This "friendliness" was not based on an erotic bond with
the patient, but on "'physiophilia' or love o f universal nature, in its special form
o f human nature1."10 Yet, however lofty, this philia was an actual emotional
experience in which the physician found him self moved.

The writer o f the

H ippocratic work "On Breaths" notes that there are some arts "which to those that
possess them are painful, but to those that use them are helpful," and medicine is
one o f these. The physician "sees terrible sights, touches unpleasant things, and
the m isfortunes o f others bring a harvest o f sorrows that are peculiarly his."11
Later, under the influence o f Christianity, physicians modeled themselves on
priests, who were to care for patients out o f agape, a transcending, non-erotic love
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for hum anity. The priestly ideal still lingers in the language o f the guidelines of
the A m erican Association o f Internal Medicine, which refer to medicine as a
"calling."12 The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw the rise
o f the gentlem an physician, who cared for patients out of benevolent emotions
inspired by a sense o f "noblesse oblige." The common theme in these views o f the
physician as vessel o f natural healing forces, priest, or gentleman, is the idea that
the physician's special compassionate understanding o f human nature allows him
to overcome ordinary feelings o f resentment, lust, anger, etc. in order to care for
all patients appropriately.
In the H ippocratic writings, the physician struggles to tame his hubris, lust, and
greed because o f his overarching interest in phvsiologia. an understanding o f nature
based on logos, or "true reason."13 By the nineteenth century, this interest includes
understanding human nature as it really is, a goal that echoes the Hippocratic view
but adds a psychological emphasis.

For example, in his tract on the physician-

patient relationship w ritten in 1849, W orthington H ooker says o f the physician:
He sees them [the patients] in their unguarded moments and when suffering
and trials of every variety ...are acting upon them as tests, searching and
sure. He sees m uch that glitters before the world become the merest dross
in the sick chamber; and he sees too the gold shining bright in the crucible
o f affliction. H e sees human passion in every form and condition...thought
and feeling are often revealed to him [the physician] unconsciously, and the
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very fountains from which they rise are almost open and naked to his view,
and I may add to his influence also.14
H ooker portrays the physician as a non-judgmental w itness to the variety o f
human passions. The physician's openness and clarity presuppose emotional self
regulation. He neither idealizes patients out o f romantic affection, nor denigrates
them out o f anger or bitter disappointment upon witnessing their transition from
gold to dross. Instead, this "disillusioning'' exposure to human w eakness leads the
physician to a certain emotional skepticism.

He will not believe too easily his

immediate emotional judgm ents about other persons. A fter all, he sees apparent
bravery and kindness evaporate under the stress o f illness, and cannot help but
question his initial responses o f respect or affection for such persons.

Yet the

physician does not question the validity o f the emotions o f respect o r affection in
general; for as Hooker immediately points out, there will be tim es when such
judgm ents will be borne out, when the gold shines bright in the crucible o f
affliction. The physician cannot see the gold without feeling respect or affection;
hence a necessary price for appreciating the valuable aspects o f hum an experience
is suffering disappointment.
According to Hooker, the capacity o f the physician to understand human nature
as it really is, is based on his heartfelt appreciation o f the patient's position, as well
as his wide exposure to human emotion. Hooker emphasizes that the physician
could not influence the patient therapeutically if he were r.ot genuinely moved by
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the patient's suffering. But given that Hooker is also aware that the physician is
an ordinary human being, whose emotions can mislead him into confusing dross
for gold, w hat is to prevent the physician from being mislead? Hooker implies that
the physician's exposure to a wide range o f human emotion is an educational
process that transforms the physician's own emotional reactions.

For example,

living through various situations with patients educates the physician to overcome
ordinary prejudices about what types o f persons will respond with courage or fear
in the face o f illness. However, Hooker never explicitly addresses the issue o f how
the physician is to guard against being led astray by his emotions.
T he very force o f our concern about whether the physician can be certain that
her em otions have not mislead her from an accurate understanding o f the patient's
illness was probably inaccessible to Hooker.

For this insistence on certainty is

distinct to the practice o f medicine in the twentieth century. The modern physician
has becom e much more effective than her predecessors by basing her interventions
on an understanding o f the body mechanism that conforms to the standards of
scientific certainty. From a twentieth century perspective, the history o f medicine
is predominately an account o f how wrong conceptions o f the functioning o f the
sick body left physicians impotent in the face o f disease and death. The incentive
o f the m odern physician to purify every aspect o f her practice from anything that
is not testable by scientific methods can only be understood with respect to this
history o f impotence and failure.
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Sir W illiam Osier, "father" o f modern medicine, addresses the topic o f the
physician-patient relationship only seventy years after Hooker, but with the new
m antle o f the scientific physician. In "Aequanimitas"15 Osier emphasizes that the
physician m ust strive to control all o f his bodily emotions towards patients. His
goal is not only to neutralize all outward show o f emotion, such as blushing or
sweating, but to control the interaction o f his mind and his body so that his blood
vessels will not constrict, his heart rate not go up when he sees terrible sights.
O sier takes the physical state of "imperturbability" to be a necessary condition for
the mental state o f "equanimity." In addition, "equanimity" requires a reflective
understanding o f human nature that aims for "clear knowledge" o f what human
beings are. This clarity requires seeing through the illusory emotional attitudes
tow ards life that ordinary people have.

Osier describes a three step process

through which the physician is able to achieve "equanimity" by transcending his
emotions:
The more closely we [the physicians] study their [the patients] little foibles,
o f one sort or another in the inner life which we see, the more surely is the
conviction borne in upon us o f the likeness o f their weakness to our own.
This similarity would be intolerable if a happy egotism did not often render
us forgetful o f it. Hence the need o f an infinite patience and o f an evertender charity toward these fellow-creatures.16
A t first glance, Osier's idea that the physician needs to overcome ordinary
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em otions to have special access to the "inner life" o f patients seem s closely related
to H ooker's conception. The ideal physician "detaches" him self from sentimental
attitudes in order to see persons unmasked by suffering.

And the special

experience o f the physician involves witnessing not only the hidden "weakness"
o f others, but also his own hidden "weakness." The physician sees human frailties
that m ost people never see, even on introspection.
But consider the difference between Osier and Hooker's pictures o f what
understanding the patient involves. O sier speaks o f "seeing" into the "inner lives"
o f patients. H ooker speaks of "seeing" human passion, but instead o f referring to
the "inner" w orkings of the patient, he speaks o f seeing the fountains from which
thought and feeling rise. The image o f rising from a w ell-spring refers to origins
rather than to mechanisms. Hooker's physician seems to have special insight into
the psychological roots o f his patients' feelings: their emotional characters, as
rooted in their histories.
H ooker does not take the physician to have a theoretical understanding of
hum an nature that is independent o f his experiential responses to patients. Rather,
he pictures the physician's understanding o f the patient as practical: the physician
"knows how" the patient feels because o f his capacity to imaginatively grasp a
variety o f affective attitudes. The physician develops a special ability to recognize
the expressions o f hum an feeling.

He learns to grasp what the patient shows

indirectly in gestures and words, even when the patient him self is "unconscious,"

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

13

in the sense o f unaware, o f his own emotion.

This emphasis on a practical

understanding correlates with Hooker’s statement that the fountain o f thought and
feeling is "alm ost” open to the physician's view.

Hooker's ideal physician seems

to have an approximate understanding of, rather than certain knowledge of, his
patient's thoughts and feelings.
In contrast, O sier is interested in knowing the m echanisms o f his patients'
"inner lives."

O sier uses the term 'inner life' to refer to a hidden reality that only

som eone who had achieved a kind o f imperturbability could see. He emphasizes
that the physician's special knowledge o f human nature is not merely a result o f
his extensive exposure to personal feelings and suffering.

Rather, it is because

physicians are trained to neutralize all o f their own em otions that they can
understand human nature objectively.

Osier does not trust ordinary feelings o f

compassion any more than he trusts lust or greed: it is false to see a patient as
really heroic, pitiable, or lovable, and hence w rong to be moved by feelings o f
respect, sympathy or affection. This is because the em otions that disclose such
qualities are necessarily transient and tied to the body and social life.
Osier's view is still prevalent. Consider how physicians focus most o f their
efforts on "objective" disease processes that can be measured and observed by
anyone, rather than on "subjective" complaints that do not fit into mechanical
models o f disease.

W hereas the term "health" m eans flourishing, the patient's

"health" is taken to be an empirically knowable condition that is defined as the
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w ell-functioning o f the body parts. To say that someone is healthy is to say that
she has a healthy cardiovascular system, and a healthy renal system, and so on, but
not to imply anything more about her personal condition. A healthy cardiovascular
system is a clear descriptive concept based on the m easurem ent o f various
physiological and biochemical parameters.

In circular fashion, equating the

patient's condition with measurable physical occurrences justifies the picture o f the
ideal diagnostician as the observer who will be omniscient about the workings of
things.
O sier view s the diagnostic process as detective work in which the physician
attem pts to "see through" both the patient's illusory subjective complaints and the
physician's own misleading reactions to the patient17. This reflects the Cartesian
assum ption18 that there is an objectively real disease process behind these
subjective experiences that can be modeled mechanically and thus changed through
technological interventions. Osier presupposes that whatever really influences the
patient's sickness can be known in the same wav that the objects o f physical
science can be known; the model o f observing and measuring entities is taken to
be adequate for observing and measuring illness in human beings.
One cannot help but think here o f the influence on Osier o f the daily autopsies
that w ere a routine part o f medical practice in his day. The disillusioned tone of
his reference to the real "inner" lives o f persons echoes the common experience o f
physicians who not only see their patients die, but then dissect their bodies. This
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access to the "inside" o f patients, the blood and guts, reveals that human beings are
actually physical objects through and through. As living organisms, humans are
bound to die and decay. The personal features are lost, and the 'inner' material
rem ains are all that is left o f the person.
For Osier, a truthful understanding o f human nature requires getting "behind"
the veil o f all emotional qualities.

Emotions in general are false "projections"

rather than genuine perceptions o f reality. And Osier's concern is not ju st with the
w orkings of the patient's body, but with the patient's "inner life," which includes
necessarily subjective phenomena. He says that the physician can "see into" the
patient's "inner life."

This presupposes that the physician can set before his

"mind's eye" a representation o f the patient's psychological life that is entirely
independent o f the physician's emotions towards the patient. Osier thus extends
the ideal o f "objectivity," which has shown its utility in the understanding o f
disease processes, to the overall approach to ill persons.
But O sier's confidence that the psyche could be observed from a detached
standpoint is an unwarranted extension o f the Cartesian wish to make every aspect
o f nature transparent. In chapter two I show how Descartes' work on the emotions
leads him to

see the inadequacy o f mechanical models for representing

psychological experience.

Ironically, Descartes him self is less "Cartesian" than

O sier and modern physicians in that he recognizes the limits o f detached
observation for apprehending all aspects o f reality.
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II The Ideal o f Impartiality

One way o f explaining patients' increasing dissatisfaction with physicians as
well as the rise o f interest in medical ethics is that the Oslerian perspective leaves
no room for patients as "persons" in two senses — as affective selves or
personalities, and as centers o f initiative and value. In chapter three I consider the
turn to Kantian ethics as an attempt to provide this missing acknow ledgm ent o f
patients as "persons." Kantian views are well suited to medicine since K ant faces
a challenge similar to the physician's: to explain how human beings can be free
moral agents without disturbing a mechanistic causal explanation o f nature
(including human nature). However, I show how the traditional reading o f Kant
favored by medical ethicists perpetuates impersonal interactions between physicians
and patients.
Kant envisions moral relations independently o f affective ties by em phasizing
the moral agent's impartiality. There are good reasons for physicians to strive for
"impartiality" in two senses that derive from Kant. First, the physician is expected
to value all patients as persons, ie. because they are persons, regardless o f her
inclination to like or dislike them. She is expected to overcome prejudices towards
certain "types" o f people that might prevent her from responding with appropriate
"concern" to the needs o f all patients.19
Second, the physician needs to be like the Kantian moral agent in striving to
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overcom e not only narrow prejudices, but all motives that lead her to treat some
persons differently from others when their situations have similar moral features.
K ant's ideal moral agent is independent o f all influences except that o f her own
reason in committing herself to action. Kant argues that to recognize one's moral
obligation, one must consider one's acts from a standpoint that creates an
equivalence o f value among the needs o f all persons.20 To act impartially is
precisely to act from motives endorsed from this disinterested point o f view.
This more radical notion o f impartiality is well suited to the doctor-patient
relationship.

The physician needs to be impartial in the sense o f transcending

narrow self-interest.

Consider the example o f a physician m otivated by lust or

greed, who responds attentively to all patients, and hence meets the standard of
overcom ing prejudice. She is still not impartial in the moral sense. The ideal of
an "impartial concern" rules out the physician's manipulative use o f the patient as
a m eans to the physician's own gratification, narrowly construed. Such a use of
others is partial to one's own interests. The physician is expected to value the
patient as a subject in her own right, without ulterior motives.

This ideal is

expressed by Kant as the obligation to treat other persons as ends and not as
means.
H owever, the idea that one could appropriately respond to the moral features
o f patient's situations from the detached position is o f a piece with the idea that
one could understand and effectively act on the medical features o f the patient's
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situation from the detached position. Both ideas are based on the notion that what
is im portant is a state o f affairs that is independent o f one's relationship to the
patient.

The K antian agent's allegiance to others derives from his allegiance to

reason.

B ut respecting patients as persons in medical practice requires an

appreciation o f the "weal and woe" o f such persons, and an "appropriate" response
to such emotionally laden events as suffering, dying, recovery, and grief.

The

problem with fitting the ideal o f pure practical reason to medical practice is that
it does not account for the moral significance o f recognizing and responding to the
concrete human situation o f patients. Recall Sir W illiam Osier's idea that from the
position o f equanim ity, the physician could have an "infinite patience" and an
"ever-tender" charity towards his "fellow-creatures." W e have already questioned
w hether Osier's ideal physician would be equipped to understand how his fellowcreatures felt about anything.

It is also questionable whether Osier's physician

could value, and hence recognize the relative importance of, the personal
experiences o f his patients from the position o f equanimity? How could he respect
them, in any concrete sense?

Ordinarily, respect involves perceiving another as

courageous in the face o f suffering, honest despite the painful facts, etc. Respect
also involves particular motives; these show in the physician's attempts to reassure
the patient w ithout deceiving her, to help her retain as much dignity as possible
while inserting tubes in her body, and not to abandon her in the face o f her
im pending death. These perceptual and motivational attitudes ordinarily are rooted
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in the physician's compassionate emotions for the patient.
Given the importance o f compassionate emotions for respecting patients as
persons, I rethink the linkage o f impartial respect and detachment in chapter three.
K ant's contention that a moral agent must be independent o f all influences except
her reason is inherently ambiguous. According to a traditional interpretation of
Kant, the independence o f the moral agent characterizes her as she acts morally.
That is, she m ust not be moved by anything but her sense o f duty in doing what
she does.

Hence, to be moved by ordinary feelings o f compassion is as

problem atic as being moved by greed. Both lead to actions based on empirical
interests, rather than on the independence o f pure reason, and hence lack moral
worth. In contrast to this traditional reading, recent Kant scholars argue that it is
the moral justification for one's actions that must be independent o f one's personal
feelings; but in acting one can be moved by emotion, so long as what one does
receives the endorsem ent o f one's disinterested reason.

Building from this

revisionist reading, I argue that acting from duty requires acting in accordance with
rules that hold regardless o f one's transient emotions, but that these rules
them selves involve lasting emotional commitments.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

20

Ill Em otional Engagement and Self-Regulation

Having argued that physicians need not detach themselves emotionally to
diagnose diseases "objectively" and to respect patients impartially, I then turn in
chapter four to the question o f what role emotions play in understanding patients.
It is not only a moral imperative, but a practical imperative that physicians
understand the "weal and woe" o f their patients. Patients do not usually display
observable disease processes to the physician, but present a story about how they
are feeling. The capacity to understand how the patient is feeling is crucial for
m aking a correct diagnosis.

For example, the physician needs to be able to

differentiate between lassitude and exhaustion unaccompanied by pessimism and
guilt, which m ight indicate anemia, from the same exhaustion with pessimism and
guilt, which might indicate depression. And in order to know how to ask questions
to gain more accurate information about patients, physicians need to understand a
great deal about how individual patients see the world.

As twentieth century

physicians have become increasingly occupied with seeing diseases objectively,
they have started to describe explicitly what used to be taken for granted — that
physicians need to listen to patients to understand and treat them successfully. A
substantial number o f pages in clinical texts since the turn o f the century describe
w hat being a good listener involves.21 In the past thirty years there has been
increasing medical use o f the more "specialized" concept o f "empathy" where
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"feeling into" the patient refers to understanding (via listening and other means)
how the patient is feeling.22
In addition to the diagnostic role o f empathy, physicians are beginning to
come up with scientific evidence that understanding how the patient feels promotes
healing.

For example, emotions have been shown to be causally efficacious

com ponents o f illness: grief suppresses the immune system; anxiety exacerbates
chronic illness; certain personality traits predispose one to bowel disease. Research
has also shown the importance o f good physician-patient com m unication for
prom oting patient adherence to medications, diet and exercise.23
The view that clinical empathy is compatible with detachment is m otivated by
the observation that sympathy can obscure physicians' understanding o f and
effective treatm ent o f patients.24 In chapter four I take seriously the difference
between empathy and sympathetic merging, and show why physicians w ho take on
their patients' problem s as their own may fail to be empathic.

Nevertheless, I

argue that "sympathetic" or resonance feelings are essential for directing the
physician's imaginative grasp o f the patient's situation.
However, there is nothing inherently truth-seeking or respectful about
resonance feelings, which are also the basis o f mob hysteria, etc.

Given that

em otions can be concealing and wish-fulfilling, physicians do need a way to
regulate their emotions in order to meet their goals o f objectivity and impartiality.
Yet, what is needed is not a way o f detaching themselves from all their emotions,
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but a way o f using their emotions in the service o f the goals o f medicine.

In

chapter five I give an account o f emotional self-regulation that does not reinvoke
the need for detachment at any level.

Instead, physicians can use reflective

em otions like curiosity to loosen the hold o f emotions like anger and fear that
constrict their understanding o f patients. They can also use curiosity when they
are too disengaged, to better focus their attention on patients' stories. In addition,
physician's can cultivate emotions like courage to help themselves endure loss
w ithout abandoning their obligation to genuinely care for patients. In doing so,
they develop their own moral character rather than divorce their affective selves
from their professional roles.
In summary, "detached concern" is medicine's attempt both to bridge and to
hide the gap in medicine between managing diseases and recognizing patients "as
persons." In chapter one I analyze the features o f emotions that contribute to and
also threaten rational agency. In chapter two I take seriously Descartes' theory of
the em otions, because it is the direct outcome o f his project o f making nature
transparent and hence modifiable. Descartes' legacy to physicians is not only the
m echanistic management o f disease, but the problem o f fitting human beings into
this world-picture.
In chapter three I consider the turn to Kantian ethics to restore respect for
persons to the practice o f medicine.

I argue that Kantian impartiality does not

require that physicians detach themselves from patients, and that the practice of
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K antian ethics in medicine is impoverished when physicians are not affectively
engaged.
W hereas chapters two and three consider the arguments for "detached concern"
and show their limitations, chapters four and five give positive arguments for the
role o f em otions in medical practice.

In chapter four, I offer a conception o f

clinical empathy as a unique form o f cognition, in which emotions are used to
im agine the "weal and woe" of others. In the final chapter I argue that given the
im portance o f emotional engagement with patients and also the fact that emotions
can obstruct rational agency, physicians need to regulate their emotions without
detaching them selves from patients.

Physicians need to develop their own

emotional characters in order to move themselves towards a more realistic and
respectful appreciation o f patients, thus meeting the goals o f medicine.
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Chapter One: The Intentional Character o f Emotions

In this chapter I consider the features o f emotions that have implications for
their role in rational agency. I begin with the claim that emotions are intentional,
and then consider some attempts to assimilate emotions to intentional acts —
autonom ous beliefs, desires and choices. In contrast to these views, I argue that
em otions essentially involve being moved by circumstances and have a temporal
structure and generality o f focus that distinguishes them from these mental acts.
By arguing that emotions do not spring from an agent's autonomous reason or will,
I em phasize the passivity o f emotions, thus aligning with the view that motivates
the ideal o f "detached concern." But in contrast to this position, I argue here and
in the following chapters that the passivity, inertia, and generality o f emotions are
com patible with an essential role for emotions in providing knowledge o f reality.

I The Cognitive Aspects o f Emotion

My most basic premise is that emotions are intentional, they are about
som ething o f which the agent has at least potential awareness.

In contrast,

philosophers have argued that emotions are reducible to non-relational feeling
states.25

For example, W illiam James equates emotions with the sensory

experience o f the physiological changes one undergoes in emotion, so that anger
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is aw areness o f one's accelerated heart beat, etc.

In opposition to the Jamesian

view , Cannon points out that we cannot identify emotions based merely on the
consciousness o f any bodily feelings. The same bodily feelings may occur with
anger, grief, disappointment, or frustration.

Further, if em otions were simply non

relational feelings, like itches, than they would only be contingently connected to
intentional objects.

But to be afraid is necessarily to be afraid o f something

frightful, to be angry is necessarily to be angry at something infuriating.

Also, if

em otions were m ere consciousness of bodily feelings, than they w ould only be
contingently related to one's motives and actions.

But, the relation between

wanting to flee and fear is not contingent. To be in fear includes being disposed
tow ards certain actions and thoughts, rather than others. Em otions are essentially,
rather than contingently, related to mental objects and ends.26
H ow are emotions, which are experiences an agent endures, like the
"intentional acts" that have been well characterized by philosophers: beliefs, desires
and choices? First, are emotions assimilable to beliefs?

Let us consider three

properties that differentiate emotions from beliefs in general. First, although some
em otions are like beliefs in having propositional objects, other em otions do not
have such objects. For example, my being angry implies that I am angry at x for
doing (or not doing) y, which entails that I believe that x did (or did not do) y.
But my sadness may be much more non-specific. I may be sad about moving far
from my home o f many years, missing friends and familiar places.

Thus a first
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difference between emotions like sadness and beliefs is that although sadness is
about som ething, it is not about a matter o f fact. Rather, sadness is about an entire
situation — it is a generalized attitude that colors the whole o f an experience, like
lighting.
Em otions like sadness are less like beliefs than they are like Heideggerian
"moods."

H eidegger conceives o f "mood" as a generalized orientation o f one's

attention, that unites specific objects and circumstances out o f an infinite range o f
possible objects, into one's own "situation."27 This leads us to further specify the
sense in which emotions differ from other intentional mental processes. The idea
o f intentionality brings to mind the picture o f an arrow with a sharp focus: one
believes that the Pope is Catholic. This picture fits certain emotions, like anger:
one is angry about a certain rebuff. But other emotions, like sadness or anxiety,
may lack a sharp focus, and be about a large field o f one's experience, or even
one's entire situation in the world.
A m ood can be thought of metaphorically as the space one carves out in the
world as one's own. A mood is a kind o f "mattering map"28 that relates events and
objects by how they weigh on one.

Ronald de Sousa captures this notion o f

em otions as creating a context o f interest by drawing an analogy between emotions
and a com m ittee chairperson.29 Emotions create the opportunity for certain beliefs
and desires to come to the fore in the way the committee chair steers the agenda
by asking certain questions that guide the work o f the committee.
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I f we use de Sousa's image o f the committee chair to begin to imagine the
cognitive function o f the emotions, then it seems that while emotions may not be
assim ilable to beliefs, they interact causally with beliefs.

This leads us to the

second issue in our comparison o f emotions and beliefs, which is whether emotions
interact causally with beliefs in the wav beliefs interact with other beliefs?
W e expect beliefs to influence other beliefs according to their explicit
conceptual relations. There are two aspects o f this expectation. First, we expect
that the connections between the beliefs that one holds will be logical. That is, if
I believe that people swim in the ocean only on warm days, and I believe that
people are swimming in the ocean now, I believe that it is warm outside.

If I

change my belief about it being warm, I then question one o f my two previous
beliefs. Second, we expect believers to hold onto or reject beliefs insofar as their
know ledge rem ains static or changes. That is, we expect that if one changes one's
beliefs, it will be because one has changed other, supporting beliefs.
B ut em otions do not function vis a vis beliefs in the way other beliefs do.
Em otions often persist despite relevant changes in one's beliefs, showing what
D escartes calls "inertia."30

For example, imagine that I feel sad about the

m isfortunes o f other people. I focus on poor Smith, who really got screwed by his
corporation. B ut the belief about Smith is not itself essential to the sadness; if I
find out that actually Smith made a fortune out o f his run in with his employer, I
may either stop focusing on Smith altogether, or think about how Smith's children
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have taken advantage o f him, thus maintaining my generalized focus on the
pathetic. O r consider the example o f anger that persists despite changes in belief.
My anger may not fade upon my hearing that the harm you did me was completely
accidental; I may believe it was an accident, and yet still feel angry at you, for
your failure to feel genuinely apologetic. The fact that certain emotional attitudes
involve us in seeking out new, relevant beliefs, when the original beliefs no longer
merit the emotion, implies that emotions cannot ju st be beliefs, but rather must be
something else that influences beliefs.
Further, em otions not only show inertia with respect to beliefs; they also can
subside without any adequate explanatory changes in one's beliefs about the object
of the em otion.31 For example, consider how one can just stop loving or resenting
som eone w ithout a prior change in one's beliefs about that person. Such shifts do
not necessarily suggest that the agent is an irrational or disturbed person. They
may be explainable in psychological terms that show that the person is acting in
an understandable way. Perhaps the person stopped needing to be dependent on
a parental figure, and the object o f her erotic love was a parental type.

Such

psychological explanations help us understand how shifts in emotion make sense
in the life o f the agent. But such explanations are importantly different from the
explanations we expect for a change in one's beliefs. One changes one's beliefs
because one obtains new information that undermines the justification o f an earlier
point o f view .32 B ut one can stop loving or resenting someone without such a shift
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in one's information about the loved or resented person.

The tragic aspect o f

som eone asking her lover why he has stopped loving her w ould certainly be
underm ined if the answer were as simple as citing a new belief.
Thus em otions like sadness, resentment, some types o f anger, erotic love, etc.
are relatively independent in their temporal course from changes in belief. This
fact is significant for our model o f emotions. For we cannot simply take emotions
to follow from beliefs, as for example, Joseph Fell does.33

Fell argues

compellingly that emotions are not reducible to beliefs because they have an
essential passive, embodied aspect. But he goes on to assert that em otions are the
bodily response to changes in belief. But this view does not account for the inertia
and transience that are typical o f many emotions.
Fell's idea is that where there is an emotion, there is a belief that caused it.
H e has in mind emotion instances like the occurrence o f grief on hearing o f the
death o f a loved one, in which the emotion would not have occurred if a particular
belief had not been formed.

But emotions can occur without beliefs as causes.

Em otions are often occasioned only by the occurrence o f an emotion in another
person: for example if someone addresses one in an angry voice, one will often
become instantaneously irritated and angry, prior to judging the other person as
rude, pushy or "just like my brother." Fell might argue that in such cases there is
a hidden or unconscious change in belief that occurs prior to the responsive anger,
w hich occasions the anger.

But, as I discuss in chapter four, experiences o f
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emotional resonance with other people, such as "contagious" jo y , sadness or fear,
need not be mediated by belief formation.
So far we have argued that emotions may differ from beliefs in the generality
(versus specificity) o f their objects, and in the relation o f their temporal shifts to
shifts in beliefs.

A third way in which emotions differ from beliefs is that we

assess the appropriateness o f emotions in a different way than w e assess the
appropriateness o f beliefs. Patricia Greenspan34 argues that an emotion may be
appropriate when there is insufficient evidence for a justified belief.

Her view is

that emotions differ from beliefs in that they play a motivational role in rational
agency. Em otions allow agents to keep their focus on certain evaluations. They
do so by virtue o f their essential impact on the agent's level o f com fort or
discom fort. She defines emotions as affective states o f com fort or discom fort that
are about evaluative propositions.

For example, fear involves discom fort at the

thought that danger looms. There are thus two layers involved in any emotion: an
evaluative layer that involves a thought like: danger looms; and an affective state
that takes as its intentional object the evaluative thought. Thus, in contrast to Fell's
view o f the affective element o f emotion as following the cognitive element,
G reenspan's view o f the affect as intentionally related to the evaluative judgm ent
entails their temporal unity.
Greenspan argues that because o f their essential motivational role, it is proper
for em otions to rest on lesser evidence than would be necessary for a belief. She
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m akes this point through examples, including the following example o f wary
suspicion in regard for one's own self-interest. She imagines being involved in a
business transaction in which the salesman's (X's) body language — especially the
darting o f his eyes — leads her to become uncomfortable at the thought that X is
involving her in a bad deal. Yet she has reason to believe, and no good reason not
to believe, from other people's testimony, and from X's work, that X is entirely
trustworthy.

Greenspan's claim is that even if there is nothing about X that

explicitly justifies the belief that X is untrustworthy, the suspicion may be
appropriate, so long as it is...
'controlled by' some relevant features o f the perceptual situation. I might
have at least prim a facie evidence for belief, if I were able to specify these
features at least roughly; but as things stand now, I do not know enough
about the 'sublim inal' sources o f my emotion even to attribute them to its
object.

I am reacting to something about X's eye movements, say

something whose relevance to untrustworthiness could be explained by a
developed science o f "body language" if there were one.35
So some aspects o f the situation are sufficient to merit suspicious feeling even
though they are insufficient to justify the corresponding belief that the salesman
is untrustworthy. Greenspan thus concludes that "the emotion may be appropriate
in a case where its corresponding belief is neither warranted nor held."36
G reenspan's point is not that the emotion is appropriate if it is triggered by any
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perceivable aspect o f the situation. Rather the emotion must rest on some pertinent
perceptual cues that begin to form a pattern that would, if further information
followed in an expectable way, be sufficient to substantiate a belief. Greenspan
argues that it is essential for emotions to require a lesser, or more partial evidential
basis than belief in order for emotions to sustain our focus on what is salient, and
to m otivate us to do the kind o f further exploration that is needed to form pertinent
beliefs, and engage in appropriate actions. The key differences for the evidential
basis o f an appropriate emotion versus a justified belief are that the evidence may
steer the agent w ithout the agent recognizing it, and the evidence need not be so
com plete as to rule out competing views.
Thus Greenspan's view helps explain the common phenomenon o f emotional
ambiguity in an apparently rational agent. One situation may offer perceptual
warrant for 'opposing' affective responses. For example in the above case o f wary
suspicion it is also conceivable that Greenspan might feel a sense o f affectionate
gratitude tow ards X in virtue o f his consistently responsible behavior in the
business deal, even as she struggles with her sense o f wary suspicion. According
to G reenspan's view both o f these emotions would be appropriate because o f their
perceptual w arrant in X's conduct, even though to hold the relevant beliefs that X
w as untrustworthy and that X was trustworthy simultaneously would be irrational.
I would go beyond Greenspan in distinguishing the criteria by which we judge
the appropriateness o f emotions from the criteria by which we judge the
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appropriateness o f beliefs. It is not just that the propositional content o f emotions
properly rests on lesser, more partial, or non-verbal sources o f evidence. Rather,
I take it that the appropriateness o f em otions is not something that can be
ascertained by looking at the evidence on which the propositional content o f the
emotion rests.

For example, consider a case in which som eone becomes

overwhelmed with grief because her goldfish dies.37 O ur concern w hether this
response is appropriate is not about whether this person is correct in judging the
goldfish to be dead.

Rather w e are concerned about w hether the target o f the

emotional judgm ent is worthy o f the response. In describing what is awry we use
evaluative term s like "ov.erreaction" that weigh and m easure the suitability o f the
emotional response to its object.

W hen we imagine cases o f inappropriate

emotional responses, we think o f such grief, or fear or anger as overreactions, or
o f exam ples o f failing to be moved by suffering or threat as underreactions. The
evaluative elem ent o f our thought here is apparent: the agent is not giving the
situation its due. These judgm ents are like the judgm ents involved in noting the
failure o f a person to help another person, or seeing someone as being unduly
preoccupied with herself. They are about the value o f the agents response rather
then about the truth o f the proposition embedded in the emotion.
Greenspan's point that em otions properly rest on more partial evidence than is
required for true beliefs is correct but incomplete; she leaves out the characteristic
evaluative, non-evidential basis o f our assessments o f emotional appropriateness.
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C onsider for example someone who feels intense fear on spotting a schizophrenic
person on the street talking to herself. Is this an inappropriate reaction? W e could
ju st say with Greenspan that it is not inappropriate, for the same reasons the
suspicion o f the salesman is not inappropriate.

The schizophrenic person's

behavior suggests psychosis, and people who are psychotic from street drugs like
PCP can be dangerous, so that even though the belief that this person is dangerous
is unwarranted, the feeling o f fear has perceptual warrant. But such an assessment
sidesteps the more central question o f whether the agent is overreacting to the
schizophrenic person because something is awry in her own attitude towards
mental disorder/ nonconformity, etc. To assess this question we would want to
know much more about the agent's beliefs and their connection to her reactivity to
this street person. Is the agent simply ignorant about schizophrenia, so that with
some education she would recognize the patient's disorder and no longer be afraid?
I f so there seems to be nothing inappropriate about her emotional response.

Or

w ould she respond this way regardless o f understanding fully that this person
presents a relatively low risk to her safety. If so, then it seems that her intense fear
w ould be inappropriate in the sense that the intense grief over the goldfish is
inappropriate.

I would apply the same questioning to Greenspan's salesman

exam ple to tease out whether her suspicious focus on the non-verbal messages
given o ff by the apparently trustworthy salesman represents an unduly vigilant
approach to other persons and is therefore inappropriate.
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Em otions disclose reality but they do not do so in the way that propositions do.
Rather, they allow happenings in the agent's world to weigh on her to different
degrees, and thus determine the openness o f the agent to various aspects o f her
situation.

In assessing the appropriateness o f emotions versus beliefs, we ask

som ething more o f the agent, not just something less. W e do not ask w hether she
is able to step out o f her partializing perspective, but rather whether her partializing
perspective is an adequate approach to the world. For example, we are not asking
a man w ho is angry at (or loves) a woman to justify his anger (or love) in terms
o f her qualities, as if he could provide evidence that she is worthy o f his anger (or
love). Rather, w e are asking, as in the case o f the person who grieves inconsolably
over her goldfish, whether we feel that this person is losing proper perspective on
w hat matters in the world. In assessing the appropriateness o f an emotion, we are
thus m aking an evaluative judgement, rather than a judgm ent about the truth or
falsity o f a proposition.
In summary, emotions considered qua judgments, still differ from beliefs in at
least three senses: the generality of their objects; the way they interact causally
with beliefs; and the criteria by which w e assess the appropriateness o f emotions.
This is sufficient argument to reject strict judgm entalist accounts o f emotions that
reduce em otions to beliefs, or accounts like Fell's that portray emotions as bodily
responses to changes in belief. Greenspan's picture o f emotions as affective states
that are about evaluative thoughts but that rest on a lesser evidential basis than that
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required for b elief is compatible with all the above properties o f emotions.
Further, Greenspan takes emotions to play a special extra-judgmental role in
m otivating the rational agent precisely because o f their inertia and partiality. Let
us now consider the extra-judgmental or motivational aspect o f emotions in order
to fully credit em otions for their role in rational agency.

II The Volitional Aspects o f Emotion

In w hat sense are emotions related to behavior, desires, and strategic actions?
Em otions have a sense of purposefulness that is not captured by comparing them
w ith beliefs. I f we accept that emotions involve dispositions to act, as for example
fear involves the disposition to flee, than we have committed ourselves to
accounting for emotions in terms o f practical as well as theoretical reason. And
in characterizing emotions as directing attention like a committee chairperson, I
already imply that emotions straddle our usual conceptions o f practical and
theoretical reason.
Since I cannot fully consider here the range o f conative theories o f emotion,
I turn to tw o thinkers who represent the boundaries o f these theories, Ryle and
Sartre. R yle38 represents the extreme behaviorist tradition, arguing that emotions
are nothing but dispositions to behave. Ryle's claim is that a necessary condition
for ascribing emotions to persons is that they behave in discernible patterns. But
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w hile some emotions lead directly to behavior o f some kind, others do not. The
sadness described above need not show up as behavior. Perhaps the subject tends
not to cry or to express sadness in gestures. In that case, if w e want to m ake out
a dispositional structure inherent in such an emotion, it will be a disposition to feel
badly when the old home town is m entioned, etc. But if the disposition defining
the emotion is a disposition to feel a certain way, then the behaviorist goal of
defining a non-observable attitude in term s o f patterns o f behavior is undermined.
Thus, the fact that em otions can be analyzed into dispositional attitudes does not
support the idea that emotions can be analyzed into behaviors.
Other analytic philosophers attem pt to reduce emotions to basic pro-attitudes
or functional desires. But de Sousa points out that an essential structural feature
o f such desires is absent from emotions. W hen one has a functional desire, one
is focused on an immediate goal o f some sort. But if one cannot achieve that goal,
one can regress through a hierarchy o f m ore general wants, to focus one's desire
on another concrete object. For example, if I want to take a walk in order to relax
and refresh myself, and I cannot take a walk, I may take a shower for the sam e
general purpose.
em otions.39

D e Sousa says that such a hierarchy does not arise with

I think this is not quite right.

Em otions do transfer from less

accessible to more accessible "objects" all the time — for exam ple, we learn to love
in spouses what we once loved in our parents. But in such cases, it does not quite
m ake sense to speak about the new object satisfying the emotion in the way the
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new object may satisfy the desire.

The transferred love is still haunted by the

earlier object. This is because emotions are essentially rather than contingently tied
to their targets — to what they are about. Emotions cannot fit into the construct
o f "functional desires," which are ahistorical "functions" that are satisfied, emptied
out, and open for the next variable.
In the continental tradition, Sartre offers a distinct and influential conative
theory o f em otion.40 His view is that emotions occur because o f the agent's freely
chosen desire to preserve her self-esteem.

In emotions one does not act

efficaciously in the world. One acts "magically," by changing one's embodied state
to transform an intolerable situation.

For example, one faints in fear and thus

"magically" escapes the situation without being effective in the world.41 Sartre's
view is that emotions can only effect the agent's situation through such distortion.
H e posits a radical dichotomy between the world o f efficient causality, through
which work gets done in the world, and the world o f emotion, which only has
"magical" or non-causally efficacious impact on the world.
In support o f Sartre, there are common examples o f "magical" transform ations
via emotions.

For example, one can idealize through admiration or love,

overlooking flaw s in another, or seeing reciprocal feelings where there are none.
Such em otions are wish-fulfilling at the expense o f enhancing the agent's realistic
appraisal o f her circumstances.

But this does not show that emotions have no

place in the nexus o f efficient causes o f action in the world.

Behind Sartre's
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division o f reality into efficient causal relations and magical relations is the
assumption that the emotion's own occurrence is unconditioned by any causal
events implicating the body or the person qua psychologically determined agent.
This assumption is essential for equating emotions, as Sartre does all other mental
acts, with radical choice.

But how can emotions be understood as the chosen

actions o f an autonomous will, independent o f the causal nexus o f conventional,
embodied beings?
Consider an example given by Robert Solomon,42 following Sartre:

a wife

picks a fight with her husband by accusing him o f spending too much tim e with
a co-worker she is jealous of; in picking the fight she creates distance between
them that prevents them from going out to a party she does not want to go to. So
her emotion functions strategically. Is it plausible to understand her jealousy as
a radical act o f will, undetermined by her embodied/social situation?
First o f all, to see emotions as strategic does not require seeing emotions as
uncaused.

W e can make strategic use o f illnesses that have obvious physical

causes. Secondly, and more importantly, for an emotion like the wife's anger to
be operate successfully, there m ust be a pre-defined context to establish the
correspondence between the emotion and the situation she is in.

That is, there

m ust be a convention that allows anger to mean what it does and thus to work
strategically.

Anger serves a purpose in this example because it fits with the

evidential basis at hand: a neglected wife responding to her husband's close
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relationship with a co-worker.

This evidence o f a possible betrayal serves as

perceptual warrant, in Greenspan's terms, for anger, but not for terror or joy,
because o f what anger means to embodied conventional beings like us. But it is
im possible to see how any situation could offer perceptual warrant for one affect
rather than another without relying on bodily/conventional determinants for human
behavior.
W hat we can say after considering Sartre and Solomon, is that em otions are
overdeterm ined. The occurrence o f a particular affect now may serve a strategic
purpose. But in order to explain how an emotion instance can serve a purpose, we
still need to explain how the agent's situation has typical features that warrant that
emotion. For we cannot choose unrestrictedly which aspects o f life m erit anger,
joy, fear, etc.

Rather, it is only because we learn through social, embodied

experience w hat type o f events merit anger that w e can use anger in an appropriate
way. So for emotions to work strategically, they need to be part o f the nexus o f
causation in the real world.

I ll Em otions Determine Salience

D e Sousa offers a developmental account o f emotions that serves as an
excellent response to what is missing in the Sartrean account, and also in the
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previously discussed attempts to equate emotional judgm ents with beliefs.

De

Sousa starts by focusing on how we learn emotions: his view is that people are
biologically programmed to have basic proto-affective responses to certain stimuli;
but the fact that there are heritable emotional dispositions does not entail that there
are full-fledged emotional prim itives (as Descartes, for example, presupposes). De
Sousa says that "we do need a repertoire o f primitive instinctual responses, but
em otions are not mere responses."43 Rather, it is possible for infants and children
to learn how to have full-fledged emotions from other persons because their protoaffective responses are triggered by typical situations.

Children learn that certain

responses are related to certain scenarios: for example, normally children learn that
affection is related to being lovingly held; but in pathological cases, affection may
relate to disturbed ways o f being attended to, including being hurt. De Sousa's...
hypothesis is this: W e are made familiar with the vocabulary o f emotion by
association with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first from our daily
life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to
which we are exposed.

Later still, in literate cultures, they

supplemented and refined by literature.

are

Paradigm scenarios involve two

aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects o f the
specific emotion-type [what the emotion is about], and second, a set o f
characteristic or 'norm al' responses to the situation, where normality is first
a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. It is in
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large part in virtue o f the response component o f the scenarios that emotions
are commonly held to m otivate. But this is, in a way, back-to-front: for the
em otion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only
afterward assumed to cause it.44
This passage makes two important points. First, de Sousa's claim is not only
that w e learn what emotions are about, but that w e also learn how to respond
em otionally, from these proto-typical situations o f childhood.

De Sousa

sum m arizes his view by saying that "the role o f paradigm scenarios in relation to
em otions is analogous to the ostensive definition o f the common noun."45 But it
m ight seem that the ostensive definition o f a noun only gives a name to some
experience, w ithout teaching one what it is like to experience the thing named. I
take it that de Sousa is presupposing here a contextualist view o f ostensive
definition (he calls him self a contextualist elsewhere). That is, he seems to view
the social nam ing o f an experience as o f a piece with the differentiating o f the
experience within the stream o f consciousness: to recognize how it feels to be
angry is already to recognize some experiential features o f anger that tag this
experience as the same one that has occurred on other occasions.
Second, de Sousa says that the emotion takes its name from the response
disposition, "and is only afterward assumed to cause it."

I think de Sousa is right,

because emotions could never be learned as they are, if they w ere divisible into a
prior cognitive event and a responsive bodily feeling.

For infants and children
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w ould then need to make inferences from their fear about the bogeyman, to the
affect associated with fright. But we can find no rules of thought to appropriately
ground such inferences (the reasons behind this claim are put forth in chapter four
in my argument against an inferential mechanism for empathic imagining).
Rather, de Sousa's point is that emotions can be learned via paradigm scenarios
because they are bodily attitudes that inherently portray situations.
close to Greenspan here.

De Sousa is

As noted above, she argues that an emotion is

distinguished from a collection o f thoughts and bodily sensations by the relation
o f the bodily sensations to the thoughts: the affective aspect o f the emotion is
about the evaluative aspect o f the emotion.
In summary, I agree with de Sousa and Greenspan that although em otions have
essential cognitive and volitional significance that likens em otions to beliefs,
desires and choices, the act model o f emotion is incorrect. Em otions do not
originate in a spontaneous act o f theoretical reason or in an independent act o f will.
Rather, emotions are embodied, learned responses to situations.
In contrast to Descartes, who views emotion as the intrusion o f anim al nature
on rational agency, de Sousa and Greenspan see emotions as essential for rational
agency. De Sousa takes the inertia o f some emotions to changes in belief, and the
generality o f focus o f emotions like sadness, to show that emotions are
conceptually prior to beliefs, rather than physiological responses to beliefs.

De

Sousa's point is not that emotions happen to direct one's attention but rather that

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

44

em otions are necessary for focusing one's attention on a limited set o f objects out
o f an infinite array o f possible objects.

He says that emotions are needed to

"determ ine salience."
Greenspan makes a similar point with regard to the special motivational role
o f affect.

She says that emotions "'register' evaluations in positive or negative

affect,"46 thus exerting an ongoing motivational influence on the agent. An agent
in a state o f discomfort at an action requirement will have a compelling extrajudgm ental reason to act. The physician who feels moved by the patient's suffering
will have her own discomfort as an immediate reason to focus on helping the
patient, in addition to her other reasons for helping the patient.

As em bodied

responses to one's situation, emotions direct one's attention and sustain one's
m otivation, and therefore determine a pattern o f interests in, rather than a chaotic
response to, one's circumstances in the world.

W ithout such focusing, one would

lack the capacity to form relevant concrete beliefs in the first place.
Follow ing de Sousa and Greenspan, I take the inertia, partiality, generality and
passivity o f emotions to indicate their primacy in directing attention prior to any
act o f judgm ent or volition. Em otions "give us frameworks in term s o f which we
perceive, desire, act and explain."47 Emotions can direct our attention only because
their efficacy is somehow independent of, and thus deeper than, and irreducible to
the rules o f thought. This independence from rule governed behavior shows itself
in the inertia and partiality o f emotions. This depth shows itself in the passivity
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and generality o f emotions: one's entire situation in the w orld can "weigh" on one
in emotion prior to any activity o f deliberating. I now turn to Descartes to argue
against the conception o f emotions as disrupting rational agency that is still
prevalent in medical practice today.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

46

Chapter Two: The Rationality o f the Emotions

In this chapter I challenge the Cartesian picture o f emotions as irrational that
is central to the ideal o f "detached concern." I first show that although Descartes
account o f emotions as rooted in the interaction o f mind and body in the pineal
gland is often caricatured, it thematizes issues that are still problematic today,
particularly in medicine. I consider sympathetically Descartes view o f emotions
as essentially passive, bodily, conventional responses that cannot be about "things
as they are in themselves" in the way scientific judgm ents can; but I argue against
the assumptions, rooted in Cartesian ontology, that these aspects o f emotions entail
that they are therefore "projections" o f imaginary objects into an otherwise clearly
given human world.
In his work Passions o f the Soul.48 Descartes describes emotions in terms o f
the interaction o f the soul with the tiny physical "animal spirits" at the locus o f the
pineal gland. Descartes uses the term "soul" to refer to the quality o f being mental
or conscious; the em otions straddle the realm o f physical interactions (res extensa)
and conscious experience (res cogitans). Descartes says that the "animal spirits"
are "nothing but material bodies and their one peculiarity is that they are bodies
o f extrem e m inuteness."49

Descartes conceives o f "passion" and "action" in

anim als as entirely lacking intentionality. An approaching tiger causes a movement
in another anim al's visual receptors that travels to the pineal gland, moving the
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"animal spirits," which then cause a muscle movement causing the animal to flee.
And D escartes describes pre-reflective "passion" and "action" in human beings as
equally mechanistic:
I f someone quickly thrusts his hand against our eyes as if to strike us, even
though we know him to be our friend...that he will take great care not to
hurt us, we have all the same trouble in preventing ourselves from closing
them ; and this shows that it is not by the intervention of our soul that they
close, seeing that it is against our will, which is its only, or at least its
principal activity; but it is because the m achine o f our body is so formed
th at the m ovem ent of the hand toward our eyes excites another m ovem ent
in our brain, which conducts the animal spirits into the muscles which cause
th e eyelids to close.50
D escartes' mechanistic account is based on his assumptions that human reflexes are
like anim al motion, and that animals are no more conscious than machines.
H ow ever, in human beings, in non-reflexive reactions, there is an additional
step in w hich the movements o f the tiny animal spirits lead to the conscious
experience o f emotion, prior to mechanistically causing further movem ents. And
this conscious experience is not simply a flashing moment o f intuiting a discrete
quality, like a flash o f color, but involves an interpretation o f states o f affairs. This
is apparent in D escartes' teleological explanation o f typical emotional attitudes.
Fear is accounted for by the tendency to avoid danger, anger by the tendency to
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protect oneself from harm. The explanation o f revulsion is that phenom ena related
to death produce an agitation of the pineal gland "which causes the soul to employ
all its forces in order to avoid an evil so present."

A nd Descartes says that the

soul is moved to feel joy when it sees the brain pattern that is associated with
pleasurable sensations so long as it knows the body is healthy, much the way a
theater-goer assured o f her own safety enjoys w hat goes on in a show.51 The idea
that the soul's pleasure is a fitting response to the condition o f the body entails that
em otions have a meaning structure that involves the depiction o f situations in the
world.
This intentional aspect of emotions subjects them to appraisals o f their
adequacy as ways o f recognizing reality.

The reasons why D escartes takes

em otions to be falsifying projections can, for the purposes o f our project, be
distinguished into two different problems. First, there is the problem o f emotions
overcom ing reason by clouding and distorting the perceptions and thoughts o f the
agent, on the model o f hallucinations and delusions.

I turn to this problem of

"irrationality" next. Second, there is the problem o f "projection" as an ontological
state o f affairs arising from the unbridgeable gap between the causes o f emotion
(res extensa) and the objects o f emotion (res cogitans).

Because o f their

am phibious nature, emotions cannot fit into the form o f explanation that gives
everything its place in Descartes scientific world-picture.

I consider the

implications o f this opacity or "arationality" o f emotions in the second part o f this
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chapter.

I T he Problem o f Irrationality: Emotions as Pathogens

F or Descartes it is not simply because emotions are caused by bodily events
that they cannot be trustworthy sources o f knowledge o f reality.

Perceptions,

which are caused by bodily events, can be sources o f true know ledge o f reality
when there is a correspondence between the cause and the formal object o f the
perception. This is not just because the causes o f perception are observable in the
public realm; for Descartes describes proprioception, in which the bodily events
causing the information are initiated inside someone's body, as a trustworthy source
o f know ledge as long as there is a correspondence between the cause and the
formal object o f the proprioception.

In the case o f normal proprioception, for

exam ple, aw areness o f the location o f one's arm with respect to the rest o f one's
body, the object o f proprioception is the same inner body parts that originate the
m ovem ents that cause the proprioception. That is, there are tiny m ovem ents in the
m uscles o f the arm that, according to Descartes, cause a chain o f movement
through the blood, into the pineal gland, resulting in awareness o f the arm. Hence,
there is a reliability and correctness inherent in perception and proprioception in
a healthy body.
D escartes takes those cases in which the relational object o f perception or
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proprioception does not correspond to the cause o f the information to raise the
possibility

o f doubting

even

the

most

apparently

indubitable,

first-hand

"knowledge."
is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? And yet I have
learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they
som etim es seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which
made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member
w hich pained me. even although I felt pain in it.52
This exam ple o f pain in a phantom limb, in contrast to the example o f reliable
proprioception in a healthy body, illustrates Descartes picture o f "projection" as an
epistem ological problem: to attribute the pain to the phantom limb is to mistakenly
im pute physical reality to a limb that has no spatial being but only a subjective
presence. T he cause o f the pain imputed to the limb is not the real limb, which
no longer exists, but the body's dependence on already entrenched information.
T he exam ple o f the phantom limb shows that Descartes sees error as arising from
dependency on pre-reflective, experiential knowledge or "common sense."

To

grasp and locate each new pain, indeed to use one's body reliably, depends upon
a history o f associations o f bodily sensations with navigating one's body in the
w orld.53 A nd such body-knowledge is vulnerable to error because o f the influence
o f past bodily experience on present bodily experience. The "projection" o f the
phantom limb is possible because body-knowledge has inertia: the old body

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

51

experiences persist even when they are unwarranted by the objective world. The
agent is fooled by her dependence on her own subjective history o f bodily
experiences, m istaking a subjective limb-experience for evidence o f the objective
being o f the limb.
According to Descartes, all emotions fit the paradigm o f pathological perception
illustrated in the phantom limb example. First, just as there is a gap between the
experience o f pain in a phantom lim b, and knowledge o f the existence o f the limb,
there is a gap between the experience o f emotion and know ledge o f the existence
o f the objects o f the emotion. The objects o f emotions are propositions that the
person holds in mind, but their causes are the movements o f the animal spirits. In
contrast, Descartes takes not only beliefs but even "pure" desires to be potentially
rational because they are caused by the same mental events that they are about.
That is, in the case o f pure desires, the agent's own will is both the source o f and
the object o f the desire. This m akes it possible for the agent to use introspection
to have veridical first hand knowledge o f her desires according to Descartes. But
in the case of emotions the cause is not mental, even though the object is, so the
agent cannot use introspection to verify the attunement o f cause and object.
Second, emotions differ from perceptions in that their occurrences do not
correspond in a linear fashion to shifts in the external environment or in the beliefs
o f the agent. Rather emotions im pose a structure on situations that is rooted in the
prior history o f the person.

Descartes argues that the inertia o f emotions is
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essential for their pragmatic role as reflexive behaviors that allow the agent to
escape harm; but this inertia also entails that emotions lack the sensitivity and
flexibility to modify themselves as the agent's environment changes. This factor
leads to the idea that emotions impede perception by causing the agent to view the
world in certain ways; and that emotions disrupt reflective thought by causing the
agent to posit relationships in the world that have no present em pirical basis, like
the phantom limb.
D escartes interprets the phenomenon o f emotional inertia to signify the
passivity o f reason with respect to emotion. For example, in his descriptions o f the
interaction o f the soul and body in the cases o f joy and revulsion,

Descartes

pictures the m ovem ents o f the animal spirits in the pineal gland as projecting an
im age that acts on the respectively passive soul. Thus, if the animal spirits portray
the body as healthy and give the message for "pleasure," the soul will respond with
joy, even if the body is not really healthy, and the source o f pleasure not really
good for the body. This case is analogous to the man w ith pathological thirst in
the sixth meditation, who feels pleasure at quenching his thirst, even if the
ingestion o f w ater is terribly dangerous for his body. The source o f such deception
is the arationality o f the animal spirits, which cannot correct their m ovem ents to
insure a correspondence with objective reality, and the passivity o f the soul with
regard to the animal spirits.

Thus the observed property o f emotional inertia

prompts the view o f the passions as akin to a disease that distorts consciousness,
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leading one to falsely "project" situations into the w orld that have no objective
reality, and thus to act in ways that are irrational; I will refer to this view as the
m odel o f the "pathogenicity of the emotions."
According to the Cartesian picture, the very "projection" o f res extensa into res
cogitans that is essential to emotion leads to an analogy between emotions as a
class and faulty perception: em otions are like delusions and hallucinations in their
unwarranted amplification o f the products o f consciousness.

But in the case o f

faulty perception what is illegitimate is the content o f the "projection", ie. the
phantom limb. In the case o f emotions what is illegitimate is the process by which
som ething that originates in res extensa takes on a propositional object, thus
insinuating itself in the agent's reasoning but not originating in thought.

This

seam less imposition o f a surd mental process into the agent's consciousness is at
the core of D escartes picture o f the "pathogenicity" of emotions and o f subsequent
versions o f this view in medicine and psychiatry.

D escartes views thought as

passive with respect to emotions because emotions do not obey reason, yet they
becom e a part o f the agent's reasoning.
To sum m arize the problem o f irrationality: Descartes' view o f emotions as
falsifying "projections" on the model of human error includes a fundamental
assum ption about the passivity o f reason with respect to emotions.

Descartes

pictures emotions as diseases o f reason in which "ideas" are imposed upon reason
by foreign forces. The pathogenicity o f emotions does not follow from the fact
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that emotions are caused by physical events, for such passivity characterizes
healthy perception. Rather, because the "ideas" imposed upon consciousness via
em otions are not o f thought they do not obey the rules o f thought. But because
these unruly "ideas" have a propositional structure, they engage with and influence
beliefs that have their proper origin in reason. Therefore emotions categorically
involve "projection" not only because their genuine causal origins (the movements
o f the animal spirits) are elided from their intentional objects, but also because they
amplify reality without sufficient material cause.
The idea that a surd pathogen could intrude on reason, thus disrupting one's
judgm ent, occurs throughout the M editations.

For example in the "First

M editation" Descartes describes delusions, hallucinations and illusions as the result
o f black bile acting on the cerebella.

In these cases o f human error, the mind is

caused by surd events to portray the world as it does. And for D escartes these
exam ples o f the influence o f a surd cause on mental life pose a serious threat to
knowledge and action: the delusions occasioned by the black bile then continue
to disrupt the agent's judgment. The mental effect o f the black bile becomes a
model for all human error; the background presupposition is that our thinking is
always vulnerable to the mental effects o f pathogens given the vulnerability
inherent in our embodiment and our reliance on habit/convention. Descartes uses
the example o f the influence o f black bile in the "First Meditation" to justify the
skeptical questioning o f all common sense knowledge that will lead to a new basis
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for knowledge. And the exam ple o f the phantom limb in the "Sixth Meditation"
is used to illustrate the dangerous tendency to mistake common sense for a true
understanding o f reality.

II Rethinking the Pathogenicity of Emotions

Let us now leave our analysis of Descartes to rethink the assumptions that lead
him to picture emotions as pathogens. Let us grant that there are certain emotional
experiences that can lead to errors o f judgm ent and misperceptions. The fact that
em otions can lead one astray does not prove that it is the nature o f emotional
experience in general to overcome or misdirect reason.

The Cartesian error, as

embodied in the Oslerian view o f "detached concern," is to presuppose that the
passivity o f emotions with respect to external events is perpetuated within the
emotion occurrence so that the state o f emotion itself exerts a foreign influence on
reason.

According to Descartes, the tiger causes the fear, and the fear "comes

over" or "overcomes" reason.

Because the emotion has as its real cause some

physical event that follows the rule o f res extensa and not res cogitans, the emotion
im parts into the agent's mental life the unruliness (from the standpoint o f the
m ental) o f res extensa.54
I think that Descartes arrived at this picture o f em otions as "pathogens" by
conflating two different types o f irrationality that em otions are subject to: first,
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because em otions are psychological occurrences partially determ ined by arational
causes (the m ovements o f the pineal gland) they can come over the agent like
states o f drunkenness imposed by an intoxicant; second, because em otions have
inertia, they can involve a kind o f boot-strapping in which they create their own
w ished-for objects. Let us consider these two types o f irrationality in turn. First
consider, for example, alcohol induced rage. One may be enraged about one's job,
one's spouse or the price o f tea in China. But the real cause o f one's rage is the
alcohol.

Such an example shows that a physical event can cause an affect which

then "takes on" a focus in the world, thus becoming an emotion. So even if one's
rage is then about one's job, this rage was not originally caused by one's thoughts
about one's job. This suggests that surd physical causes can occasion emotions that
w ould not otherwise be occasioned by the person's appraisal o f her situation. Yet
this exam ple does not demonstrate that emotions themselves have pathogenicity,
since it only shows that an organic cause can occasion an emotion and not that an
em otion itself causes the agent to make unwarranted evaluations. Certainly organic
causes can induce beliefs and perceptions as well as emotions, so the fact that
em otions can be so induced is insufficient for supporting the model o f emotions
as pathogens. Rather, the picture o f emotions as pathogens requires showing that
it is the em otion itself that acts on the agent as the alcohol does in the case o f
intoxication.
A second type o f irrationality, the boot-strapping that follows from the inertia
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of em otions, appears to provide an example o f emotions them selves functioning as
intoxicants. Consider for example emotional transference, in which one is drawn
or repelled by situations that would not otherwise m erit such responses.

For

examples, consider an erotic love for someone who rem inds one o f an abandoning
parent, or a fearful apprehension o f a non-threatening situation that rekindles a past
trauma.

These examples show that in the absence o f som e physical aberrancy,

em otions can involve "bootstrapping," or the creation o f their own foci, and thus
their own self-perpetuation. Does the fact that emotions create their own foci in
such cases show that emotions operate like intoxicants, or pathogens, imposing
surd influences on consciousness?
I f we consider the basis o f neurotic transference, we see that emotions do not
operate like intoxicants in such cases. In transference it is not the case that past
em otions act like surd physical influences perturbing the sensorium o f the agent
in the way that the agent is perturbed by alcohol.

Rather, older, more remote

aspects o f one's personality operate like independent agents that exert a persuasive
influence on one's here and now functioning self. For example, a fearful attitude
that one learned as a child has such occurrent psychological force that it moves one
in the here and now to fear what might not otherwise be frightening. One is not
invaded by transference emotions, one is moved by transference emotions. The
irrationality involved in transference is like the error involved in being persuaded
by another person to accept their opinions about a situation rather than relying on
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inform ation that has primary perceptual warrant. But this type o f irrationality, in
w hich one is persuaded by the charisma o f another rather than by one's own senses
or rational argument, occurs just as easily for beliefs and actions as for emotions.
Certainly one can be persuaded to believe that a skin cream w ill take away
wrinkles, and one can be persuaded to break a rule by a charismatic other, even
when one's here and now belief system and code o f action would have otherwise
inhibited such belienaction.
The irrationality emotions can be subject to because o f their inertia is similar
to akrasia, in which a person acts on reasons that are not her all considered reasons
for action. In both cases the agent's attitudes appear to lack som ething in the way
o f rationality.

In chapter five I compare Davidson's account o f akrasia with

emotional self-persuasion to show how in both cases there is a division in mental
life, so that the person fails one important standard for rationality — internal
coherence.

But in such cases it is absurd to characterize such attitudes as

anom alous from the standpoint o f the mental since such divisions instantiate
psychological "laws," for example the "rules" o f persuasion on which rhetoric is
based.
In summary, transference emotions do not involve reason being overcome by
som ething surd, but rather one aspect o f a person being seduced by another,
hauntingly fam iliar aspect o f her psychological life. Transference emotions involve
irrationality in that they create their own foci, but they do so in a way that cannot
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be incorporated into the pathogenicity model.
H ow ever, before we reject the pathogenicity model entirely, it might be argued
that a better example than transference for emotions invading reason comes from
overw helm ing states o f emotionality. Descartes uses the example o f the onrushing
tiger to illustrate the way an external cause might set o ff a chain o f events that
intrude upon reason.

I f an overwhelming emotion is caused by a particular

external determinant, can we necessarily infer that the agent is acted upon by her
em otion?
R obert Gordon considers precisely this issue, and argues that even in the case
o f em otions like focused fear and embarrassment, which result from something
having acted on the agent, the agent is not acted upon by her emotion:
It is a fallacy to infer, from the assumption that the term 'em barrassm ent'
characterizes a person's state as a product o f something's having acted on
him, that the resulting state - embarrassment - also acts on (much less
'com es over' or 'overcom es') the person. It is similarly fallacious to infer
that a second state of affairs, namely that o f his being embarrassed by S.
also acts on or comes over him. One cannot properly draw the conclusion
X [X=state o f being embarrassed] is a state that acts on (a person)
from either o f the following:
X is a state o f being acted on in a certain way
X is a state produced by being acted on in a certain way.55
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This is a consistent argument showing that even when an approaching tiger
scares an agent, this does not entail that the state o f fear then acts upon the agent.
H ow ever, the pathogenicity model depends upon the idea that there is a
physical cause o f the emotion which sets into motion a chain o f physical events
that disturb reason. So a Cartesian argum ent against Gordon w ould be as follows:
the 'S ' that is invoiced here refers to the focus o f the emotion —the m eaning o f the
tiger-as-scary. But this 'S ' is not the real cause o f the emotion. The real cause is
the tiger itself, w hose movements set in motion a chain o f physical events that has
as its m ost proxim al element the tiny movements o f the animal spirits in the pineal
gland. And this chain o f causes has no place for 'S', the agent's grasp o f the tigeras-frightening.
And w hile the Cartesian idea that the meaning o f the emotion is an
epiphenom enon seems wrong, it turns out to be problematic to assert the opposite - that the meaning o f the event plays an essential causal role in the emotion
occurrence.

For to say that 'S ' is an efficient cause o f the emotion occurrence

requires separating out the focus o f the emotion as a distinct event from the
experience o f the emotion. But this contradicts our picture o f an emotion as an
affect that is about an evaluative thought.

That is, the evaluative thought registers

by w eighing on one in a particular way through an affective experience.

Thus,

w hile w e do not have difficulty saying that certain intentional events cause other
related events — for example, beliefs and desires cause actions, we cannot apply
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this model to the relation between evaluative judgm ent and affect within an
em otion occurrence.56
It is clarifying to consider here a less focused emotion than em barrassm ent or
fear, like feeling sad.

T he focus o f one's sadness, which might include all the

heavy, disappointing aspects o f one's current life, registers a certain way via one's
sad feelings.

But if we try to impose the language o f efficient causality on the

relationship o f the evaluation 'S ', where 'S ' is "the disappointing world" to the
em otion event o f sadness occurring,'X', we fall into error.

For there is no

independent event o f evaluating the world as disappointing that interacts causally
with one's sadness in the w ay an event o f believing interacts causally with an event
o f acting.
However, if we return to Descartes' pineal gland account we see that it is
equally problematic to elide 'S' from the causal explanation o f the emotion. For
to divide an emotion into a distinct event o f detached perception — ie. the tiger
approaching moves the animal spirits — and then an affective response, makes it
im possible to characterize the experience as an emotion. W hereas a belief and a
desire are sufficient to explain an action, no simple addition o f belief, desire, and
bodily feeling is sufficient to explain an emotion.

I f one believes a tiger is

approaching, and that tigers are dangerous, and if one desires to avoid harm, then
one w ill, barring other conflicting desires or beliefs, run away from the tiger. In
such a case, one may also experience physiological symptoms that indicate a
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generalized state o f arousal. But one need not be afraid o f the tiger. What, in
addition to "nonevaluative" perception is needed to account for the occurrence o f
the fear event is a statement about how the perception weighs on the agent. To
characterize the experience as fear, entails that one's focus 'S' on the tiger-as-scary
registers in terms o f feelings o f displeasure (including bodily feelings) in the face
o f the tiger.

Thus, while we cannot argue that 'S ' is the cause o f emotion 'X ,'

if we elide 'S ' from our causal account we cannot characterize the agent's reaction
to an event o f tiger-approaching as fear.
This account of the grammatical structure o f em otions leads us to question how
the pathogenicity model ever took hold in the first place: for i f ' X ' emotion event,
is not an independent event from 'S ', than the passivity o f emotions cannot be
pictured as the projection of an unruly idea, caused by the animal spirits, into
reason: for neither 'S ', nor some detached movement which "projects" itself as 'S '
can be the efficient cause o f 'X ' on the mechanical model. But once this model
is rejected it becomes impossible to understand what sense the very notion o f
pathogenicity makes: how can we understand any physical cause as explaining an
emotion? And this unclarity in the notion o f 'cause' cannot be solved by saying
that mental events that interact causally with physical events are also physical
events, so that the real reason for mental event 'Y 's' occurrence will be the same
event as the physical event causing 'Y .'57

For, as w e showed above, the

motivating mental event that is essential to the explanation o f the occurrence o f an
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em otion is not an independent event from the occurrence o f the emotion.

And

there is no way to capture the idea o f the person being acted on by 'S' in the
language o f efficient causality alone.
In summary, the passivity o f emotions is an essential grammatical feature that
differentiates the way w e explain emotions from the way we explain other mental
events like beliefs and actions. A unique and defining feature o f emotions is that
they involve the experience o f being acted on by the something that they are about.
Y et if one tries to translate this experience into a mechanistic causal claim, one
falls into error, because the focus o f the emotion is not an independent event from
the emotion occurrence.
Let us reject the Cartesian counterargument to Gordon, which depends upon
divorcing the focus o f the emotion 'S ' from the cause o f the emotion, because
ultimately it cannot ground itself in a comprehensible account o f the causal
structure o f emotions. So we can accept Gordon's argument as it stands. Thus the
Cartesian assumption that the passivity o f the emotions entails the passivity o f
reason with respect to emotions is false.

And we have already rejected the

Cartesian picture o f emotions as intoxicants that perpetuate the anomalousness o f
res extensa in the realm o f res cogitans. We can therefore put to rest the Cartesian
worry that emotions act upon/overcome reason, that is at the core o f the ideal o f
"detached concern."
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III The Problem o f Arationality: Do Em otions Disclose Reality?

Let us now address the second Cartesian worry: that em otions are essentially
arational because they cannot conform to the ideal o f objectivity. Descartes gold
standard for knowledge is the "clear and distinct" ideas o f the cogito and
m athem atical principles. These two very different types o f ideas are both nonem pirical intuitions; they are standards o f truth because they can be held free from
doubt given the thinkers direct access both to his own thinking and to mathematical
propositions. The direct apprehension o f the truth o f mathematical principles for
us qua thinking substance cannot be achieved for knowledge o f nature.
K now ledge o f nature is based upon putting mathem atics to work to build
m echanical models.

W e can build models o f nature because there is, divinely

guaranteed, a correspondence between our intuition o f extension (mathematical
know ledge), and the form o f nature, insofar as all o f nature has extension, or
spatial being. In order to ensure that such models are trustworthy we need to build
these models from irreducible building blocks, invoking only efficient causal
connections.

Only mechanistic models will allow for certainty, because only

predictions that are based on mathematical principles alone will be unassailable
from later vantage points in time and will allow our knowledge o f reality to
progress. However, even so, Descartes says that the divine guarantee is not one
o f an absolute correspondence between our mechanistic models o f reality and
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reality.

Rather, our models o f nature can only allow us to m ake accurate

predictions about the workings o f nature.
Thus, D escartes envisions two kinds o f knowledge o f reality, direct intuitive
know ledge o f res cogitans and res extensa, and indirect knowledge o f nature via
m echanical models. The goal o f fitting the workings o f nature into the form o f
thought (pure mathematical intuition), and the inevitable gap between intuitive and
em pirical knowledge gives rise to the ideal o f objectivity. The ideal o f objectivity
is an extension o f the ideal o f indubitability that replaces the coincidence o f
know er and known with the ideal o f an aperspectival grasp o f nature secured by
the coincidence of the method o f applying mathematical models and the
m easurability o f nature. Note that the conception o f an aperspectival apprehension
o f reality is unnecessary for intuitive knowledge; it makes no sense to think of
ideas like the cogito in which the object o f thought is fully given to itself, as
aperspectival or perspectival.

Rather, the ideal o f the aperspectival observer

presupposes a gap between the knower and the known so that a correct approach
for apprehending reality fully is needed in the first place.

Thus the idea o f an

aperspectival grasp o f reality already presupposes the problem o f alternative
perspectives, o f seeing things otherwise, which does not arise for the indubitable
clear and distinct ideas.58
The transition from the intuitive knowledge o f the clear and distinct ideas to
building m odels o f nature therefore involves a subtle shift from secure knowledge
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o f reality to secure knowledge o f our models o f reality.

This shift becomes

apparent in Descartes' later writings as he points out the problem that the indefinite
complexity o f nature poses for the human knower. Karsten Harries uses Descartes
exam ple o f two clocks to make the point that for Descartes our ability to build
models that predict natural occurrences "need not mean that the real causes have
been understood; indeed, given the infinite divisibility o f matter it is very unlikely
that our finite models will ever allow us to duplicate nature's processes."59
D escartes writes...
For just as the same artisan can make two clocks which indicate the hours
equally well and are exactly similar externally, but are internally composed
o f an entirely dissimilar combination o f small wheels; so there is no doubt
that the greatest artificer o f things could have made all those things which
w e see in many diverse ways. And indeed I most willingly concede this to
be true, and will think that I have achieved enough if those things which I
have written are only such that they correspond accurately to all phenomena
o f nature.60
Descartes' awareness that the being o f nature somehow escapes our
mechanical models is revealed most o f all in his discussion o f the emotions. We
have already pointed out that emotions involve propositions about our experience
in the w orld as part o f nature, and thus cannot be composed only o f clear and
distinct ideas, which are non-empirical intuitions. But neither is Descartes' account
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o f emotion occurrences in terms o f the workings o f the pineal gland a mechanical
model o f emotion, as is often supposed.

Descartes' choice o f terms here - the

animal spirits are bodies o f "extreme minuteness" that are "indefinitely" small recalls his language in discussing the related problem o f saying that God is his own
efficient cause. In a response to Arnauld's objections to his conception o f God,
Descartes says that "intermediate between efficient cause in the proper sense, and
no cause, there is something else, viz. the positive essence o f a thing, to which the
concept o f efficient cause can be extended in the way in which ... the concept o f
a rectilinear polygon with an infinite number o f sides [can be extended] to that o f
a circle."61 Just as the indeterminacy o f the model o f the infinite polygon invites
us to think o f the coincidence o f the polygon and the circle, God as in existence,
and as the creator o f God's existence, the indeterminacy o f the movements o f the
animal spirits as bodies moving the soul, invites us to think of the coincidence o f
body and soul.

But while we are free to think this coincidence, we cannot

adequately conceptualize it, ie. build a mechanical model o f this interaction.
This inadequacy poses a major threat to Descartes' ontology, which moves
beyond the threat to his epistemology posed by the example o f the two clocks. It
m ight appear that as science progresses one could develop more sensitive ways o f
ascertaining the real causes o f the workings o f the clock. But the very concept o f
cause cannot be understood as connecting res cogitans and res extensa, as their
interaction in the pineal gland demands.

So the pineal gland account, far from
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explaining the workings o f emotions in nature, points to the inadequacy o f any
m echanical explanations for accounting for the existence o f emotions.
D escartes

thus faces the dilemma o f failing to explain

emotions or

acknow ledging the inadequacy either o f his method for objective knowledge o f
reality, or o f his ontology. His solution is to preserve his conception o f objectivity
but to challenge his own ontology by affirming the subjective reality o f emotional
experience w hile denying that emotions represent things as they really are. In a
letter written in 1643, he modifies the list o f the basic building blocks of
know ledge he had defined in The Rules (1628). In The Rules he argued that only
notions that could be grasped with certainty by the reflective thinker could be the
basis o f true knowledge: number, extension, and the cogito are examples o f such
transparent sources o f information. But in 1643 he adds to this list a new simple,
w hich is rooted in embodied experience:
Finally, as regards soul and body together, we have only the notion o f their
union on which depends our notion o f the soul's power to move the body,
and the body's power to act on the soul and cause sensations and passions.62
As a direct challenge to a strictly dualist ontology, Descartes says that it is
unscientific to attempt to explain the experiential union o f soul and body in
extensional or cognitive terms.
Yet, Descartes is forced by his attribution o f reality to emotions and his
conviction that w e can only know those aspects o f nature that can be modeled
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m echanically to acknowledge the finitude o f human knowledge o f reality. He says
that even though this experiential knowledge o f the passions is "fully" given to us
in a dependable fashion, such experiences:
do not have an objective reality to which a formal reality must correspond.
Real as modifications of consciousness, they are not otherwise res. A part
o f my composite nature, outside o f which they have no reality, for they are
the result o f it. the divine guarantee works only in the sense that as
teachings o f nature they constitute a pragmatic guide to the needs o f the
composite being, If the union were not real or substantial this role could
not be efficaciously fulfilled.63
H ere we see that even when Descartes fully acknowledges the reality o f emotional
experience for human beings, he rejects the idea that emotions are sources o f
knowledge o f things as they really are. Rather, he argues that the modifications
o f consciousness involved in emotion are merely the result o f the composite nature
o f human beings. The implicit thought here is that knowing things as they really
are requires approximating a divine standpoint, free o f all bodily and social
determinants. Descartes adherence to the ideal o f objectivity here causes a rupture
in his ontology between 'subjective' and 'objective' reality.
W e can now explain the generalized Cartesian claim that the arationality o f
emotions is based on their "subjectivity." The kind o f "subjectivity" that Descartes
takes to exclude rationality is not based simply on agent-relativity. The problem
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with emotions is not that they m ust be experienced by someone; for all perception
is subject-relative in this sense: seeing presupposes eyes, hearing presupposes ears,
etc.

And perception is not only contingently agent-relative in the sense that all

thoughts, including thoughts about mathematics, must be had by someone. Rather,
the information involved in perception is relative to the experiencing subject. That
is, whereas the thinking that contributes to mathematics is unrelated to the situation
o f the thinker, perceptual information always incorporates this situation: seeing is
from an angle, at a certain distance, static or changing with the agent's movements.
A nd touch and taste and smell are even more agent-relative. Yet D escartes takes
perception to provide true knowledge o f reality, when it conform s to certain
criteria. This is because, the validity o f the information derived from perception
and proprioception is based on a correspondence between the cause o f the
perception and the object o f the perception.

And this correspondence can be

ensured by evaluating perception according to a standard or measure that is itself
aperspectival.

That is, true knowledge o f the location o f body parts, and o f the

dim ensions o f physical objects, is available through scientific measurement. We
can build mechanical models to predict the interactions o f body parts and other
physical objects. Thus, while perception can be faulty and proprioception can lead
one astray, these sources o f information are always testable and correctable by
scientific reasoning, and thus need not be taken to be impediments to knowledge.
But there could be no such standard to serve as a measure for emotional
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information.

There is no entity that transcends temporal, embodied human

experience that corresponds to the intentional object o f emotional experience.
In sum m ary, Descartes' claim that emotions provide a pragmatic guide to the
needs o f com posite human beings does not imply that emotions contribute to
rational agency.

For D escartes rational propositions are those that an objective

know er w ould assent to. By attributing to emotional experience only a 'subjective'
reality D escartes is affirming the reality o f emotional experience while denying that
em otional propositions have representational rationality. Em otions are real effects
o f our com posite being; but qua evaluations they are epiphenom ena that have no
genuine objects in the real world.

Thus, although emotions have adaptive

rationality in th a t they are useful for our com posite beings, they are inessential for
rational agency in the full-blooded sense.

IV The Essential Role o f Em otions in Rational Agency

In this last section I will argue that although emotional judgm ents cannot
provide objective knowledge o f reality, emotions are essential for apprehending
reality. First, I show that Descartes goal o f securing knowledge o f reality against
the arbitrariness of the human knower cannot succeed;

I then show that his

reduction o f reality to w hat can be objectively known elides the representation o f
hum an beings.

Given the Cartesian equation o f rationality with the ideal o f
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openness to all further evidence, it is therefore irrational to overlook the
representational rationality o f emotions.64
The goal o f securing knowledge o f reality from the arbitrariness o f human
interests is at the heart o f the ideal o f "detached concern."

Physicians worry that

if their rational understanding o f the patient is guided by their emotions, then they
will be arbitrary in what they attend to. For example, the doctor w hose insights
into th e patient's attitudes are guided by empathy may very well miss the forest for
the trees because o f a preoccupation with some irrelevant part o f the patient's story,
or a blindness to the significance o f some other part o f the story. The paradigm
o f "detached concern" posits that such arbitrariness must be eliminated by adhering
to a method o f inquiry that does not depend upon the attitudes o f the observer in
any way.
A Cartesian (and as we soon discuss, a Kantian) views reason as self-sufficient
not in the sense o f providing its own content but in the sense o f directing itself.
T hat is, reason may need to make use o f other faculties, most notably sensation,
but it alone directs inquiry. To the degree that emotions direct one's attention, they
enforce an arbitrary order on reason, which cannot be trusted to provide the proper
access to reality.

One hears echoed in this view the Platonic notion o f desires

projecting their ends onto practical reason from below, from the animal part o f
one's nature. The idea is that emotions seek their own ends, and these ends are
inessential to reason, and thus untrustworthy paths to information about reality.
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The rationalistic assumption o f the Cartesian view is that our very attention to
reality could be determined by logical rules alone. But this assumption is called
into question by philosophers as different as de Sousa and Heidegger, who show
that the so-called arbitrariness o f emotion is a feature o f human inquiry in general.
D e Sousa does not dispute the Cartesian observation that emotions introduce nonrational determinants into human inquiry, but rather views this phenomenon in light
o f a different anthropology than that o f Descartes. De Sousa takes emotions to
play an essential role within the economy o f higher cognitive beings, rather than
to be a carry over o f the "animal" part o f our being. In fact, de Sousa argues that
less cognitively complex beings, call them ant-machines, could get along perfectly
well w ithout emotions, because they have a finite range o f concrete interests/ a
finite 'w orld' in which their beliefs, desires and actions could be utterly determined
by external rules.65
In contrast to ant-machines, beings o f our cognitive complexity, who have an
infinite range o f possible interests, must determine what is salient to their situation
am ong an infinite set o f inferences they could be making. According to de Sousa
it w ould be impossible for such beings to think or act efficaciously unless there
w as something guiding and maintaining their attention appropriately.

D e Sousa

takes the role o f emotions in rational agency to be the focusing and maintenance
o f m otivated attention.

He says that emotions "determine salience," they

encapsulate experience into organized patterns o f importance for the agent.
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Sousa argues that there is no non-affective mental activity that can substitute for
em otions in this regard. His argument is based on a version o f the "philosopher's
fram e problem," as described in an example by Daniel Dennett:

a robot knows

everything about bombs and airplanes, and has all the appropriate intentions to
preserve itself, when it is informed that it is in an airplane that has a bomb on it
that is about to blow up. The robot decides to leave the airplane, but in fact the
bom b is on the robot's own wagon, a fact the robot had stored away, but "it had
not 'thought' to draw the inference."66 W hen the robot's designers then instruct it
to draw the consequences o f what it knows, it is busy deducing that "pulling the
w agon out o f the room would not change the price o f tea in China" when the
bom b explodes. W hen the designers tell the robot only to deduce what is relevant
to it, the robot is busy ignoring thousands o f irrelevant implications when the bomb
again explodes.67 W ithout fear the robot would have no non-random reason to
organize its approach in such a way as to prioritize and act on the relevant
know ledge needed to serve its given goal o f preserving itself.
D e Sousa emphasizes that the "philosopher's frame problem" is not the problem
o f induction; the issue is not which inferences are valid, but rather, before making
any inferences, w hat clusters o f information will be relevant in the first place. He
argues that for cognitively complex beings, knowledge o f reality presupposes
selectively attending to some things rather than others; but "no logic determines
salience: what to notice, what to attend to, what to inquire about."68 And de Sousa
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points out that this problem o f w hat to pay attention to is a problem both for
factual knowledge and for choosing strategies o f action given one's complex set o f
existing desires. De Sousa points out, for example, the insufficiency o f Bayesian
decision theory for directing action. Bayesian theory dictates "maximize expected
gain."

Thus, according to this theory, "a fair bet is equivalent to no bet at all."

B ut there is a meaningful difference between minimizing one's losses (by not
betting) and maxim izing one's gains (by betting). D e Sousa acknow ledges that an
additional principle could describe this difference;

but his point is that this

additional principle could not "be dictated by rationality alone."69
In contrast to the robot and the Bayesian gambler, affective beings have
resources to handle dilem m as o f this sort.

Fear will certainly give one the

directedness to flee a life-threatening situation; and attitudes like boldness and
timidity will influence one to gamble or not to gamble. This leads de Sousa to put
forth the hypothesis that "emotions are species o f determ inate patterns o f salience
among objects o f attention, lines o f inquiry, and inferential strategies."70
De Sousa's view o f em otions as encapsulating reality into quanta in the way
perceptions encapsulate

sensory

experience

problem atic language o f mechanisms.

is appealing, but invokes the

But de Sousa is using perception as a

metaphor. He says that em otions imitate the encapsulation o f perceptual modes.
I turn to H eidegger for a deeper and more radical account o f em otions as
determ ining attention , w hich allows us to understand the m etaphor o f perception
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non-mechanistically.
H eidegger argues that all knowing presupposes attending, and that attention
originates in being in a 'm ood'.71 Second, Heidegger challenges the Cartesian
reliance on the visual model o f the knower as a subject observing an object that
is before her. These two developments in Heidegger's thought make it possible for
H eidegger to offer a radical critique o f the Cartesian project o f purifying
know ledge o f reality from the arbitrariness o f human existence.
H eidegger emphasizes that affectivity, which he refers to as being-in-a-mood
or having a state-of-mind, is a constitutive feature o f human being in the world.
In direct opposition to the Cartesian premise that thought is independent o f
affectivity, he states that even "undisturbed equanimity" is an affective attitude, or
mood. H eidegger also notes that apparently "pallid" states in which one seems to
lack feelings for anything are in fact conditions in which one feels burdened by,
or uncom fortable about the oppressive details o f one's day to say existence; such
a mood is the basis o f the possibility o f experiencing the opposing mood o f joy
w hen one feels free o f the burdensome character o f existence.72 H eidegger's point
here is well supported by the common observation that depressed persons do not
alw ays feel sad or anxious, but often feel "flat," with an aw areness o f the
burdensom eness o f getting through the moments o f the day; recovery is often noted
by the observation that the events o f the day are flowing together again, without
the awful weightiness o f time on one's hands.
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Heidegger's general claim is that "when we master a mood, we do so by way
o f a counter-mood; we are never free o f moods."73 In contrast to the Cartesian
picture o f the passions as disrupting consciousness, Heidegger view s the continuity
o f consciousness as the ebbing and flowing o f one mood into another; the cessation
o f mood altogether is the cessation o f consciousness.

"The fact that moods can

deteriorate and change over means simply that in every case Dasein always has
some mood."74
Heidegger's conception o f the function o f moods in human existence is close
to de Sousa's. Both take moods/emotions to be the primary basis o f encountering
oneself-in-a-world, where "world" has the significance o f an organized field o f
interests, as in the ordinary language use o f the term "world" to refer for example
to the world o f baseball. Heidegger says that "mood is a primordial kind o f Being
for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition,
and beyond their range o f disclosure 75
Let us consider what Heidegger means by the priority o f mood, and contrast
this notion with de Sousa's idea that human beings would lack direction for thought
and action without emotional attitudes steering their attention. W hereas de Sousa
com es to his notion o f emotions as encapsulating reality by way o f the analogy o f
perception, and especially the analogy o f vision, Heidegger makes it clear that he
does not see the disclosive function o f moods as comparable to the perceiving o f
reality by a subject beholding an object. The metaphor o f the subject looking at
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an object, s— o, is entirely misleading when applied to the role o f moods in
determ ining conscious life; in fact, it is to avoid and undermine this metaphor that
H eidegger explores the phenomenon o f affectivity.
There are several aspects o f the s— o metaphor that H eidegger challenges in
his discussion o f mood.

First, there is the idea that a mood is equivalent to a

psychical condition o f the subject. De Sousa moves beyond the view that emotions
are inside som eone's head, by integrating the embodied aspect o f emotion with the
intentional aspect o f emotion.

However he still takes the significance o f the

emotion to derive from the experiences o f a particular historic, embodied subject.
For de Sousa the possibility o f emotional communication presupposes that the
affective meaning residing in one individual conveys messages to other individuals
who then may or may not take on embodied affects o f their own. This Cartesian
atomism is hard to overcome insofar as physiological occurrences are essential to
emotional occurrences, and individual bodies underlie physiological events. But
as we have seen, there is an insufficiency in pointing to the occurrence o f
physiological events to explain the occurrence o f the emotion.

And most

importantly the resonance between persons manifested in "shared" emotions in
clinical empathy, the effects o f rhetoric, the placebo affect, love poetry, etc. cannot
be explained using an atomistic event model o f emotion. This suggests that it is
one-sided to see emotional experience as originating in the psychical or even
psychophysical condition of a subject.
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R ather than taking emotions to reside in the subject, H eidegger views the
subjectivity o f the person as residing in the emotion, or mood. That is, Heidegger
first rejects the idea that a person exists in the world in the way that an entity
exists inside a room. Human beings are not mere things, and no thing could be
equivalent to a human world. Rather, the very possibility o f consciousness, of a
reality for a subject, undermines the possibility o f understanding the world as a
m ere collection o f things. For the mode o f disclosure o f reality for human beings
presupposes the problem that human beings are not only here in the world, present
in the way that entities are present; for reality to be disclosed presupposes that
hum an beings are also there, ahead o f themselves, directed outward spatially and
tow ards the future. And the very spatial and temporal structure o f experience, the
gap between near and far others, and the temporal gap tow ards near and far
projects, changes with changes in mood. For example, in fear, the scary thing is
both very near, and yet not certain to occur, ie., it has essential spatial and
tem poral significance.
By taking mood to be prior to cognition and action, H eidegger is equating the
experience o f mood with the basic structure o f human existence as being "there"
in the w orld.76 First and foremost, human beings find them selves in a world o f
near and far others and things, which draw them in and repel them. Certainly, an
aspect o f the world one is "thrown" into from the start is one's own vital body.
B ut ju st as one's own physical pain and pleasure is o f im m ediate significance to
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one, so is the smile o f another person, the threatening thunder and lightening o f a
storm.

The key notion is that these things are given to us at a similar level of

proximity.

The world is disclosed expressively, and the different styles o f

expression are what Heidegger means by mood. Thus H eidegger posits that prior
to any act o f perception or standing over and against the world, being-in-the-world,
ie. occupying certain configurations o f relations with others and projects, with a
certain style, is w hat is involved in being-in-a-mood.
Heidegger's conception o f mood undermines the Cartesian visual m etaphor s—
o for emotion, and with it the equation o f em otion in general with "projection."
The Cartesian s— o model o f cognition presupposes that intuitive knowledge o f our
own ideas is independent o f our knowledge o f the world. One builds from one's
intuitions, mathematical models o f the external world qua extended substance. As
the example o f the clockmaker shows, Descartes holds a correspondence theory.
The way we build our models may not be the way God has actually produced the
external world, but we can know without doubt the contents o f our own mind and
thus our mentally constructed models o f nature. This presupposes that there are
indubitable subjective experiences, ie. clear and distinct perceptions, which are
transparent to the subject, and thus provide a basis for penetrating the opacity o f
the external world.
Heidegger's model undermines the primacy o f introspection for encountering
reality.

H eidegger points out that "only because the 'there' has already been
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disclosed in a state-of-mind [mood] can immanent reflection come across
[psychical] 'experiences' at all."77 Heidegger’s claim that mood is a style o f beingin-the-world means precisely that mood cannot be originally a psychical state o f
a subject standing apart from, and looking at, a world.
The strength o f Heidegger's account resides not only in rethinking the notion
o f subjectivity but even more in rethinking the notion of the world as an affective
world. Heidegger says:
Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not
an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatic way and puts
its mark on things and persons.78
H eidegger's use o f the term "enigmatic" is especially important here. The affective
significance o f things in the world remains mysterious when affects are understood
according to the s— o model. That is, the Cartesian s—o model presupposes that
there is a human structural configuration in the world — a practical reality o f being
"there" that is independent o f affectivity. This assumption, which plays a crucial
role in the Sartrean account of emotions, given Sartre's adherence to the Cartesian
s— o visual paradigm, has been labeled by Joseph

Fell

"the two-world

hypothesis."79 The idea is that one could negotiate the social world independently
o f affectivity.80 For Sartre, emotions are "magical" precisely because they are
subjective projections in which one remakes the world in one's own terms, rather
than negotiating the world in a strictly rational, efficacious fashion. Consider the
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background assumption o f a typical Sartrean account o f an emotion: in fear o f a
scary face in the window one may faint, thus "removing" the scary threat. The
background assumption is that whereas one has "acted" in one's emotional "world,"
in the world o f efficacious relations with objects, one has done nothing to protect
oneself from the potential assailant. There is a radical discontinuity between the
tw o worlds o f affectivity and efficacy.81
W e have already indicated a major weakness o f the "two-world hypothesis" in
our criticism o f the Sartrean account o f emotions.

I f emotional qualities are

subjective projections onto situations that could be viewed in some non-affective
way, than it seems there are no reasons for certain qualities to be attributed to
certain situations. But then how can we account for the typicality o f emotion, for
the fact that human beings have typical responses to being touched, falling ill,
having children, etc.?

How can we account for the style o f a thunder-storm as

characteristically scary, and the style o f an infant as characteristically adorable (a
problem Sartre sought to explain)?

If one retains the Cartesian s— o visual

m etaphor for emotional apperception o f reality, one cannot help but attribute to the
subject the activity o f bestowing affective meaning on the world. But Heidegger
contrasts this notion o f bestowing affective qualities onto reality with the notion
o f an originally affective world structure, prior to egological affectivity.

The

Heideggerian notion that affectivity arises first in the actual style o f human beingin-the-world, the way human beings move and respond to each other and things,
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rather than in subjective ideas, helps us escape the "projection" metaphor that is
at the heart of Descartes' view o f emotions.
In using H eidegger to deepen our understanding o f de Sousa's idea that
em otions determ ine salience we face the follow ing gaps between the two
conceptions. D e Sousa's analogy o f perception for emotion brings us to envision
persons as depending upon their em otions to sense the humanly relevant features
of situations. Heidegger leaves us with the more radical idea that affectivity is the
m aterial out o f which relevance is built in the first place. H eidegger emphasizes
that the possibility o f anything m attering at all depends upon the condition o f
human being as being-in-a-mood. This point is often m isunderstood as an overly
idealistic claim about human experience that ignores the material, bodily facts o f
hum an life.

But such an interpretation misses the point that H eidegger's argument

is operating at a very different level from an account like de Sousa's. De Sousa's
claim is a teleological claim about the actual species, human being. Heidegger's
claim is an analytic claim about what is essential to Being, rather than what is
characteristic o f human beings.

Heidegger is not m aking the unpalatable claim

that all the material configurations o f beings in the w orld depend upon affectivity.
Rather, H eidegger's point is that it is only because hum an beings find themselves
in a w orld rich with expressive meaning that anything can m atter at all. The world
m oves us, and w e can therefore express em otion.82
H eidegger offers a radical critique o f the Cartesian ideal o f eliding arbitrariness

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

84

from knowledge o f reality.

Heidegger's claim is that the very possibility o f

conceptual knowledge presupposes an affective way o f being towards things that
involves directing one's attention. But this should not be interpreted simplistically
to mean that any singular emotion occurrence could determine salience, as de
Sousa seems to imply in his account. Rather, determ ining salience involves not
only directing one's attention, but maintaining possibilities beyond one's given
direction, that will be the basis o f future directions. An auditory m etaphor is more
useful than a visual one here: one must not only attend to the them e at hand but
m ust anticipate future themes as they are foreshadow ed, and must recognize
patterns o f recurrence.

Far from viewing mood as a mechanistic way o f

encapsulating information, Heidegger views mood as an indication o f the human
condition.

The problem o f having to determine salience prior to being able to

define things ostensivelv and know things as matters o f fact reveals the fact o f
human freedom . Heidegger says that man is the being w hose being is in question.
He m eans that human beings must determine what m atters in the world by what
they attend to, and what they do.
Thus, while the occurrence o f emotions may be considered arbitrary in the
sense that such occurrences are prior to deliberation, they are not arbitrary in the
sense o f meaningless. Rather the very arbitrariness or openness of human attention
and the necessity o f affect for responding to this openness by "clearing" a space
for particular projects are necessary conditions for the possibility o f human

0
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k n ow ledge.

O ur detour into Heidegger was meant to deepen and substantiate the idea that
em otions are essential for determining salience, and to undermine the Cartesian
hope that human knowers could ever overcome the "arbitrariness" o f human
knowledge. By linking knowledge to interested activity in the world, Heidegger
underm ines the divorce o f representational from adaptive rationality that is the
basis o f Descartes view o f emotions as arational.83
W e have rejected the Cartesian goals o f eliminating the arbitrariness o f the
human knower from knowledge o f reality, and o f divorcing representational from
adaptive rationality. But this does not entail that emotions yield knowledge o f an
objective state o f affairs.

Descartes correctly saw that unlike non-affective

perception and reasoning, emotional "judgments" could not fit into his scientific
world-picture.

This problem is very significant for physicians, because the

essential elem ents o f Descartes world-picture remain the pillars o f current medical
science -- the assumption that all events can be explained within an efficient causal
fram ew ork, and the assumption that these interactions could be modeled
mathematically. Now, as then, the scariness o f a tiger cannot be captured by any
aperspectival representation. Even the most universalizable affective objects, like
the warmth and security represented by a mother and child, the erotic feelings
represented by two lovers, the threat represented by an angry face are concepts that
cannot be divorced from their social origins. Bernard Williams calls moral notions
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like honesty and courage that are semantically embedded in their social origins
"thick concepts."84 Their meaning cannot be divorced from the specificity of
hum an cultures and human values, even though such representations are so
essential to the idea o f humanity that we cannot think "human being" without
apprehending these emotional objects. The point is that we cannot speak sensibly
o f an aperspectival view o f such objects, precisely because in a world without
hum an values, these emotional objects are meaningless.
If, as Descartes claims, we cannot speak sensibly o f an aperspectival view of
the objects o f emotional experience, is it rational to exclude emotional evaluations
as trustworthy sources of knowledge o f reality?

I argue in chapter four on

empathy that our own emotions are essential for revealing other people's emotions
to us.

Descartes' account allows a place for empathy as a kind o f pragmatic

experience, but excludes the possibility that empathy is genuinely revealing. Thus
D escartes forces us into a peculiar affective solipsism. Instead o f accepting this
bizarre conclusion, w e might say that it is because our empathic emotions reveal
the affective lives o f others that they help us function adaptively in the human
world.

The essential role o f our own emotions in revealing the existence and

nature o f emotions in others entails that emotions are essential to rationality in the
full-blooded sense o f openness to things as they really are.
The problem o f explaining emotions reveals a tension between the concepts o f
rationality and objectivity that Descartes bequeathed us. For Descartes, the only
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w ay to judge our perceptions o f reality as rational is to give objective explanations
o f why we see things as we do.

For example, the perspectival phenom ena o f

vision becom e trustworthy insofar as there can be an aperspectival account o f
vision that includes an explanation o f perspective and its limits -- the science o f
optics.85
We have opposed this tight linkage o f rationality with objectivity by arguing
that all knowing presupposes human interests/ being-in-a-mood. But this does not
m ean that we can give an alternative conception o f rationality that does not include
som e notion o f transparency — o f openness to all further evidence. Although, as
I discussed in chapter one, we appraise emotions to some degree the way we
appraise values, w e cannot judge the rationality o f emotions w ithout also
considering w hether the agent's perspective in the emotion is sufficiently open to
things as they really are. So for example we cannot assess w hether X's fear o f Y
is rational w ithout considering whether, from some alternative perspective, free o f
X 's biases, there is independent evidence that Y is dangerous. Thus even though
the representational rationality o f an emotion cannot be grounded in the ideal o f
objectivity, it is still guided by an ideal o f openness to further evidence that is
haunted by the wish for transparency.
In summary, the picture o f emotions as pathogens is still influential in medical
practice today because Descartes' basic assumptions are largely unchallenged: the
b elief that human nature can be understood scientifically and the b elief that a
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scientific explanation could be framed in the language o f efficient causality alone.
Thus the wish to make knowledge o f reality transparent exerts a totalitarian force
that excludes important aspects o f reality, like the emotional lives o f other persons.
But w e have seen that this picture o f rationality fails to be guided by an ideal o f
openness to further evidence, and is thus itself irrational. W e can therefore reject
D escartes' reduction o f our knowledge o f reality to what can be modeled
m echanistically, and with it his conception o f emotions as inessential to rationality.
I turn now to the other pillar o f the ideal o f "detached concern," the Kantian
conception o f the impartial moral agent.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

89

Chapter Three: On Kantian Impartiality

In response to the reductionistic approach to patients in current medical
practice, physicians and patients have turned to ethics to restore what is missing.
The prevalent ideal in medical ethics discussions is the Kantian concept o f an
impartial duty to respect patients "as persons," to treat them as "ends-inthem selves."86 The idea is that the physician is to have a duty-based commitment
to act in light o f the patient's "subjective" ends as well as a commitment to the
objective task o f repairing the body.87
The ideal o f respecting patients' own choices and preferences contrasts with the
possibility o f using patients for projects that are not their own, ie. treating them
manipulatively.

The suitability o f this ideal for concrete medical practice is

apparent when one considers the opportunity physicians have to treat patients as
m eans to other ends. Physicians are keepers o f esoteric, sought after knowledge
and skills that give them power in society. And they are trusted to invade bodies
and minds, and to make life and death decisions for other people. The ideal o f
respecting patients as "ends-in-themselves" directs physicians to promote the
concrete ends o f patients, and not merely to use patients as "material" for
physicians' own projects. Given that such projects can range from selfish financial
gain, to attaining scientific knowledge, to promoting the health o f society, as the
physician sees it. the ideal o f respecting the ends o f the patient curbs not only
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greed but also benevolent paternalism.
K ant's emphasis on the impartiality o f the moral agent, w hose duty to respect
patients is not based in personal ties, has made his views particularly relevant to
physicians today.

However, in equating impartiality with affective detachment,

physicians both oversimplify Kant's conception o f moral agency and overlook the
particular duties physicians have to recognize and respond to suffering persons.
In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the Kantian conception in order to
distinguish the concept o f acting from an impartial sense o f duty from the picture
o f the detached or impersonal moral agent.88
A ccording to a traditional reading o f Kant, acting from duty requires detaching
oneself from all affective motives.

The commitment to respecting persons as

persons is taken to follow from principles o f reason, rather than from affective
responses to particular persons. The traditional Kantian conception supports the
ideal o f "detached concern" because detachment from affective, historical
relationships to other persons is taken to be both necessary and sufficient for
respecting persons as "ends in themselves."

But I will show that the idea that

respect for others is duty-based, hence impartial, does not entail the detachment o f
the moral agent.
The traditional reading o f Kant is currently being challenged by revisionists
who aim to show that sympathetic emotions are compatible with, and even valued
within, K antian moral theory. In the second part o f this chapter I turn to Barbara
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H erm an, Onora O'Neil and M arcia Baron to challenge the traditional idea that
acting from duty, in a Kantian sense, requires detachm ent from sympathetic
emotions.

However, the revisionists do not fully overcome the equation o f

im partiality with impersonality insofar as they retain the idea that rational reflection
alone is "sufficient" for morality. I argue that to the degree that the revisionist
account retains this idea o f reason's "sufficiency," it loses its appeal as an account
o f how moral motivation can be an integrated aspect o f the agent's overall
personality. But to the degree the revisionists take the agent's formal comm itment
to other persons to be derived from her affective, historical relationships with
others, they leave behind the core Kantian idea o f pure practical reason: the idea
that there is one reason with one sets o f ends (universality and consistency) that
rules in both the theoretical and practical sphere. I therefore argue that the Kantian
ideal o f impartiality is separable from the Kantian notion o f pure practical reason,
and that the former but not the latter is useful for medical practice.

I The Conflation o f Impartiality and Impersonality in M edicine

T he Kantian conception of respect for persons is well-suited to the medical
profession because it expresses the ideal o f an impartial or duty-based response to
all persons. Physicians are expected to have a role-related com m itm ent to respect
anyone who is their patient, even if they do not approve o f his or her behavior or
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attitudes.

There are two aspects of this expectation: first, it is presupposed that

there is some formal property o f persons as persons, or as suffering persons
(patients) that can merit this respect; second, the physician's respect for patients
is taken to be duty-based, and thus required, rather than an optional, though
fortunate, occurrence.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "impartiality" as "freedom from
prejudice or bias; fairness."

This definition does not refer to detachment. W hile

the ideal o f an impartial judge brings to mind the picture o f a detached thinker, this
follows from certain assumptions of legal theory, rather than from the definition
o f impartiality.

The concept o f impartiality is also used in contexts w here a

detached attitude would be inappropriate. For example, a parent can strive to be
impartial in the treatm ent o f all o f her children. She may be free o f bias, and fair,
yet passionately concerned about each o f them. The parent can be understood as
caring for her children because they are her children, and thus in virtue o f a
form al, duty-based commitment to them.

(However, we would have concerns

about the adequacy o f the moral perspective o f a parent w hose care fo r her
children was only out o f a sense o f duty; I address a case o f a spouse having this
perspective at the end o f this chapter).
Y et in medical practice, the Kantian ideal o f impartial respect for persons is
equated with detachment because o f the additional Cartesian assumption that
em otions are sources o f prejudice and compulsion. The kernel o f truth in this view
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is the fact that overwhelming passions, like lust, greed, and fear o f death can
interfere with the physician's capacity to care for all o f her patients impartially.
For example, a physician may perform overly invasive life-extending procedures
on a dying patient because she identifies with the patient and is very afraid o f her
own death. She may fail to act respectfully towards a patient who has committed
an act she finds morally reprehensible, out o f hatred for a parent who did
som ething similar. Or she may spend too much time with a patient she is attracted
to, to the detriment o f other patients.
However, as I discussed in the introduction, it is the fact that physicians are
increasingly estranged from, rather than too involved with, patients, that makes an
ethical view that minimizes personal ties so appealing.

Physicians narrowly

construe the ideal o f impartial respect for the "ends" o f the patient to mean respect
for the legal "rights" o f the patient.89 However, there are three problems with this
reduction o f valuing the patient's ends to not interfering with the patient's rights.
First, whereas the obligation to respect someone's "rights" is definable in terms o f
permissible and impermissible behavior, respect for ends cannot be so defined.
Physicians show respect for the ends o f patients not only when they give informed
consent, and share decision-making, but also when they strive to be sensitive to the
patient in delivering bad news, and when they are careful not to embarrass the
patient on medical rounds. But it is a poor use o f the term "rights" to speak o f the
patient's right to be touched and comforted, listened to and encouraged.
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Second, the idea o f respecting "rights" is rooted in a liberal conception o f the
person that sees morality as aiming for non-interference with, rather than
connection with, other persons.

But physicians are expectated to engage with

patients, and thus cannot have as their overarching principle the ideal o f non
interference. K atz and others have shown that the adversarial legal paradigm is illsuited to capturing the moral dimensions o f the physician-patient

relationship.

The relevance o f the Kantian ideal o f treating persons as ends-in-themselves for
medical practice depends upon seeing the sense in which this ideal captures more
than the principle o f non-interference.
W hile K ant did not directly address the issue o f "rights" in the Groundwork
o f the M etaphysics o f M orals, (hereafter the GMM),90 much o f his discussion o f
the form ula of universal law (FUL) does embody a liberal conception o f moral
obligation as a negative constraint (non-interference): one is not to will in such a
way that what one wills would prevent others from willing the same. However,
the form ula o f treating humanity as an end-in-itself (FEI) pictures moral obligation
from a different perspective than the perspective which generates the FUL. Onora
O'Neil points out that the FUL is a response to the question o f what rational
agency itself commits the moral agent to; the FEI is a response to the question o f
what rational agents are committed to, given that their acts condition the agency
o f other persons.91 O'Neil equates the conception o f non-interference represented
by the FUL with one aspect o f the FEI: the ideal o f never treating others merely
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as a means. To will a maxim that others could not also will would be to act under
a conception that omits the rational agency o f others, and thus treats others merely
as a m eans to one's own agency.

O'Neil argues that the FEI has an additional,

positive sense: one is to promote the concrete ends o f other persons, so that
rational agency can flourish. I agree with O'Neil, given that Kant does explicitly
distinguish between a negative and a positive sense o f the FEI:
N ow humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to
the happiness o f others but at the sam e time refrained from deliberately
impairing their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and
not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavors
also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends o f others. For the end o f a
subject who is an end in him self must, if this conception is to have its full
effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends," (G M M , 430).
Third, whereas "rights" language is better suited for the bureaucratic
interactions o f strangers, the Kantian ideal o f respect for persons is m eant to guide
one's personal relationships as well as one's impersonal obligations as a citizen.
The Kantian project aims at isolating the moral commitm ent that is to be at the
heart o f private as well as public morality.

Further, in contrast to utilitarian

thought experiments, Kant's examples are not framed from the view point o f the
detached policy-maker who expresses a generalized commitm ent to "humanity", but
from the standpoint o f ordinary individuals faced with personal dilemmas: whether
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to steal, to help someone, to commit suicide.

Through such examples, Kant

focuses on such personal obligations as the obligation one has to oneself to
preserve one's own life (the suicide example). In fact, the Kantian conception does
not divide the moral sphere into personal versus impersonal com m itm ents; and this
fact m akes Kantian morality relevant to physicians, whose special obligation to
take-up the ends o f patients cannot be so divided. In summary, the usefulness o f
the Kantian picture o f moral agency for physicians depends upon a richer
translation o f Kant's ideal o f respect for persons than the present version o f not
interfering with patient's rights.

II The Conflation o f Impartiality and Impersonality in a Traditional Reading o f
Kant

I turn now to a traditional reading o f Kant to consider how the impartial
standpoint o f morality comes to be equated with the impersonal standpoint o f the
pure rational agent.

In this section I consider the core arguments that support the

traditional Kantian view that detachment is necessary for moral agency, to show
that there is a gap between the requirement o f impartiality and the requirem ent o f
autonomy that leaves room for revisionist readings. I then consider the idea that
pure reason alone is "sufficient" for moral agency, to show that this idea is what
leads to the impersonality o f the Kantian moral agent.
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In the GMM, Kant contrasts the case in which a man helps people out of
sympathetic emotion with the case in which the man lacks all sympathetic emotion,
yet helps others out o f a sense o f duty (GMM 398).

Kant says that only in the

latter case does the action have moral worth. This contrast is traditionally taken
to show that acts from sympathy cannot have moral worth. The traditional reading
gains support from Kant's claim that sympathetic feelings cannot be the basis of
the

duty

o f beneficence towards

others.

Kant

says that

"sympathetic

sadness...would ... be an insulting kind o f beneficence, since it expresses
benevolence with regard to the unworthy, called pity, which has no place in men's
relations with one another" (Doctrine o f Virtue, section 34)92. And Kant's claims
that morality is "not the mouthpiece o f laws whispered to her by some implanted
sense," and that empirical motives are "highly injurious to the purity o f morals"
(GM M 426) are traditionally interpreted to mean that sympathy is at odds with
morality.
Some interpreters take Kant to see sympathy and duty as essentially
incompatible because o f his anthropological assumptions. In The Anthropology
K ant portrays emotions as selfish, corrupting forces that impede one from reflecting
on one's acts and hence from taking other persons into account.93 According to
Robin Schott94, Kant's stoic conception o f emotions leads him to equate all emotion
w ith hedonistic passions that are narrowly self-interested; given this picture o f
emotions, the sympathetic man is as partial and selfish as the greediest hedonist,
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seeking pleasure rather than acting from duty.

According to Schott, Kant's

preoccupation with pure practical reason follows from his rejection o f the temporal,
bodily aspects o f human nature.

The value o f Schott's reading is that Kant's

preoccupation with finding a secure, unchangeable, apriori foundation for morality
is explained in terms o f his own aversive response to bodily experience — thus
deconstructing the purity o f the Kantian project.
Kant's remarks that sympathy "stands on the same footing as other inclinations"
(GM M 398), and

that "sympathia moralis [is] really sensuous feelings o f a

pleasure or pain at another's state o f happiness or sadness" (DOV, sec.34) show
that his views of sympathy are rooted in his larger view o f sensuous input.
Schott's reading brings into relief one major tendency in Kant's writing: his idea
that sensibility, including perception and affect, is "like a mob o f people since it
does not think" (Anthropology, sec.8), which must stand before the tribunal o f the
understanding. At times K ant seems to see the non-judgmentalness he attributes
to sensibility as dangerous in practical matters and as requiring not only
"processing" by the understanding, but also stern control.

In the GM M . Kant

conceives o f duty as a constraint against unruly forces. Kant portrays the motive
o f duty as a counterweight opposing all o f man's "needs and inclinations, whose
total satisfaction he grasps under the name o f 'happiness'." M orality requires that
Reason "enjoins its commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with
disregard and neglect o f these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims" o f
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em otion.(GM M 405). Yet in The Anthropology as well as in the moral writings,
K ant also argues that because sensibility is, by definition, non-judgm ental, it cannot
be responsible for confusing, compelling or deceiving the understanding (sec.'s 9,10
and 11). He cites Cartesian type examples o f sensory illusion to show that it is not
sensibility that disrupts the understanding, but the understanding which confuses
itself, by m istaking "the subjective for the objective" (sec.l 1).

In the G M M . Kant

is not indicting sym pathetic emotion, as Schott suggests, but indicting the
understanding for failing to see in its own sole responsibility for judgm ents the sole
source o f justification for morality.
An additional problem with Schott's reading is that Kant did not take the stoic
dichotom y between sympathetic emotions and moral action to be self-evident to the
audience he addressed.

In Kant's social world, and in the w orks o f his

philosophical predecessors including Hume and the moral sense theorists, the
com m itm ent to value the ends o f others was presumed to come from sympathetic
emotions.

Kant him self was quite influenced by this view, as is shown by the

passage follow ing his discussion of beneficence in the Doctrine o f Virtue, where
K ant discusses the practice o f impartial morality in concrete experience:

Kant

urges that one visit poorhouses and hospitals to develop one's sense o f sympathy
in order to be better disposed to do one's duty (D O V .sec.35).

In the G M M . Kant

argues against "common sense" in challenging the notion that the moral obligation
to take-up the ends o f other persons is rooted in em otion. Like D escartes in The
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M editations. Kant attempts to purify "common sense" by rationally reconstructing
ordinary concepts, like duty and respect.
In the GM M . Kant's equation o f impartiality with detachm ent com es in his
argum ents that only acts done from duty are morally worthy, and that acting from
duty cannot be heteronomous. Kant's argument is not that sympathy necessarily
blinds one or disables the person from doing

what duty com mands, but that

sym pathy is itself blind or indifferent to considerations o f duty.

There are two

senses in which sympathy may be considered indifferent to duty. The man who
acts because o f sympathetic emotions might help someone whom he should not
help, if he considered his act from the perspective o f universal law; for example,
he m ight assist a m urderer escaping from prison.

Thus the general motive o f

sympathy is only contingently related to actions that accord with duty. The second
sense in which sympathy may be considered indifferent to duty is that one's
intentional object in a sympathetic act is usually the suffering o f others and not the
rightness o f one's actions. The traditional reading o f Kant seems to require that the
moral agent acts because o f her intention to do her duty, and the sym pathetic man
may not have such an intention.
The idea that morally worthy acts m ust be done from the m otive o f duty alone
depends upon the Kantian claim that the moral standpoint is the standpoint o f
"autonomy," where "autonomy" is taken to require that one have no empirical
m otive to do what one does. According to a traditional reading, th e agent's only
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subjective motive for acting morally is "reverence," which Kant calls a "practical,"
as opposed to a pathological emotion, because it follows upon the moral motive,
or expresses the moral motive in the empirical world, but does not m ove the agent
to act.95 But Kant's definition o f reverence rules out the essential features o f
sympathetic emotion: reverence is self-willed, rather than something that moves the
agent, either in the sense o f causing the agent to act, or in the sense o f being
experienced as an involuntary occurrence; reverence is independent o f empirical
sensation, including ordinary feelings o f pleasure or pain; reverence cannot have
as its object the weal or woe o f another person, but only considers the person
insofar as they exemplify a law.

So despite Kant's use o f the term "emotion,"

reverence is an attitude which lacks the three criteria o f altruistic emotions: first,
they have motivational force; second, they are felt occurrences, either via bodily
disturbances, or shifts in consciousness; third, they take as their formal object the
weal and woe o f other persons.
U nder this conception, Kant's definition o f duty as involving the ruling o f pure
reason over empirical inclinations is taken to require the replacement o f empirical
inclination with a pure interest in morality. This reading is supported by Kant's
footnote at GMM 413:
the human will can take an interest in something w ithout therefore acting
from interest. The

first

expression

signifies practical

interest in the

action; the second pathological interest in the object o f the action. The first
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indicates only dependence o f the will on principles o f reason by itself; the
second its dependence on principles o f reason at the service o f inclination - that is to say, where reason merely supplies a practical rule for meeting
the need o f inclination.
A ccording to a traditional reading, the sympathetic man acts heteronomously
because he acts from his empirical interest in the well-being o f other people. This
m eans that, by definition,

acting from sympathy could not be morally worthy.

H ow ever, it does not mean that sympathy is necessarily partial, and thus that
feeling sympathy is incompatible with acting impartially. This distinction depends
upon seeing that since Kant calls all acts with empirical m otives "interested" acts,
he im plies a distinction between narrowly self-interested, or partial acts, and
"interested acts."

Narrowly self-interested acts, like stealing, taking one's life,

failing to be beneficent, will fail the universalizability test; they are ruled out by
the impartial tribunal o f morality.

But many "interested" acts could pass a

universalizability test, even if they are not autonomous according to a traditional
reading. For example, acting because one is moved by the ideal o f perfection is
heteronom ous because one is moved by an empirical concept; but this does not
entail that acting from the ideal o f perfection is narrowly self-interested and could
not be com patible with impartial morality.

The principle "strive for perfection"

is not like the principle "seek one's own narrow self-interest"; it could pass the
universalizability test.

That is, I could imagine m yself as a legislator in a
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Kingdom o f Ends for which the perfection principle holds; in fact, Kant defends
such a principle as an im perfect duty to oneself. The point is, K ant does not argue
either that all empirical m otives are partial, or that sym pathetic emotions are
alw ays partial; he only argues that all empirical motives are heteronom ous sources
o f m otivation because they are not "derived" from reason alone. There is nothing
in this argum ent that rules out the possibility that sym pathetic em otions could
(even if K ant didn't think they did) pass the test o f universalizability.

Thus it is

the traditional conception o f autonomy and not some picture o f emotions as
essentially partial, that supports the traditional equation o f the moral standpoint
w ith detachment.

I ll Current Argum ents A gainst the Claim that Moral Agency Requires Impartiality

B ernard W illiams, Lawrence Blum, M ichael Stocker96 and others argue against
the traditional Kantian view that morality excludes acts that are motivated by one's
direct interest in the w ell-being o f another person. Their common tactic has been
to show that the detached Kantian agent seriously lacks the kind o f comm itment
to others that moral theory is meant to describe.

They use exam ples that involve

personal relationships to show how unsatisfactory it is to equate morality with
caring about rules or doing one's duty rather than caring about persons.

One often

discussed exam ple is the "drowning wife case" (herein the drowning spouse case)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

104
in which the moral agent is pictured as a bizarre rule-fetishist who deliberates
coolly about w hether she ought to save her spouse because it instantiates a
universalizable principle to do so.

As Bernard W illiams puts it, this person seems

to have one thought too many. W e expect a fully developed moral person to be
moved by concern for his or her spouse rather than by the idea o f following a rule,
Yet it is m isleading to say that what is wrong with the rule-fetishist is that she
has "one thought too many," as if the very act o f thinking or being reflective rather
than acting automatically is what is amiss.

Although it does seem odd that the

agent needs to reflect about saving the spouse, the full context K antians have in
m ind in such exam ples makes it less strange: usually the choice is between saving
the spouse and doing some other compelling thing like saving five unknown
schoolchildren. It is apparent that the alternatives to rescuing one's spouse can be
m ade so com pelling that some kind o f deliberation js in order if one is to act
m orally, w here the standpoint o f morality requires some com m itm ent to the ends
o f other persons in general. And not just in thought experiments, but in everyday
living, including medical practice, acts done from compassion and love often
require reflection. Parents must deliberate about how to help an especially needy
child w ithout deviating from their commitment to care for all o f their children
impartially. Physicians deliberate on a daily basis about how to give their time and
energy to their patients in an equitable manner. The problem with the rule-fetishist
is not the fact that she reflects, but the nature o f her reflection.
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W hat is so unsatisfactory about the rule-fetishist is the standpoint from which
she deliberates; given the traditional reading, the moral agent needs to leave all
affective ties to her spouse aside in order to engage in impersonal calculations.
H er intentional object in considering what to do cannot be the drowning spouse,
viewed affectionately, "poor Richard, whom I love", because this w ould make her
act an interested and hence heteronomous act. Rather, she m ust have in mind the
rules themselves, and a rationalistic reconstruction o f her choice: should I save one
spouse who I have promised to care for, versus five children who have hardly lived
yet, etc.
The traditional reading takes any case in which the agent is moved directly by
the suffering o f another person to be a case o f heteronomous action, o f no moral
worth; but there are at least two senses o f being moved directly by another that are
being conflated here. One sense in which one is moved immediately by another,
which Kant clearly takes to have no moral worth, is for one to be caused to act
because

o f one's

psychological

response to

another,

one's

feeling state,

straightaway, w ithout any reflection. But another sense o f being moved directly
by another's suffering seems to be compatible with at least ordinary moral
reflection: one deliberates about what to do in light of one's direct concern for
another's well-being.

For example, in the case where one's action may involve

tragic consequences for others, one may not just save one's spouse instinctively or
automatically, but may instead consider one's obligation to the drow ning group of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

106
children, etc. However, the intentional object o f such consideration is never the
rules them selves, but the threatened situation o f one's spouse, and the threatened
situation o f the children, etc. One thinks: Richard, my love, needs help — but so
do these children, poor souls -- what do I do immediately?

O f course, the fact

that the parties involved are drowning sets an immediate practical limit on how
long any "normal" agent would then reflect.

In contrast, when one deliberates

about w hether to tell a friend a secret that would relieve her anxiety greatly, but perhaps harm another friend, one might reflect for quite awhile. The point is that
it is possible to express a commitment to duty and to be moved directly by
another's suffering in one reflective moment.

One need not set aside one's

feelings to consider what one ought to do. The reason for invoking this possibility
here is to point out that what is wrong with the rule-fetishist is not that she has one
thought too many, nor the fact that her act is rule-governed. Rather, what is wrong
is that her intentional object, in considering a suffering spouse, is stripped o f all
affective qualities that express the importance o f one particular person to another.
It is not w hat the rule-fetishist has (a commitment to rules), but what she lacks
that is important.
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IV.

The Core Kantian Ideal o f Impartiality as Residing in the Autonom y o f the
W ill

T he equation o f impartial morality with detachment in Kant is based on a
picture o f "autonomy" as involving freedom from all empirical interests.

This

conception presupposes as its complementary concept the idea o f "pure practical
reason": the idea that reason alone is "sufficient" for morality.

A ccording to a

traditional reading o f the GM M . reason not only justifies the principles o f morality,
but can actually move an agent to act as morality commands. K ant's exam ples in
the G M M accentuate the practical independence o f the moral m otive from all
affective m otives for action. In the suicide example at GMM 429, Kant shows that
the idea o f duty can lead one to preserve one's life even when one lacks any
affectively based will to live. And in the case o f the unsym pathetic man (GMM
398) who no longer has the goal o f helping others out o f compassion, the idea of
duty alone is sufficient to supply him with the goal o f helping others.

The idea

that reason alone is "sufficient" in these cases depends upon the idea that pure
reason can m otivate one to view one's own existence impartially, and to take up
the concrete ends o f others.
There are several steps in Kant's argument for the "sufficiency" o f pure reason
for m orality, spanning discussions in all three sections o f the G M M . At GM M 400
K ant m oves from the idea o f a will that is unconditionally good, to the idea o f a
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will determined by "reverence for the law", an attitude that depends upon reason
alone.

This discussion is based on three propositions. The first is that the only

unconditional good is a good will.

A good will is an unconditional good in two

senses. It is good in all circumstances, whereas good actions and things may be
bad in some circumstances.

Second, it is good in itself, independently o f its

relation to other things. W hether or not anyone ever valued a good will, it would
still be good. This claim about the radical independence o f the good will, which
stretches

the idea of something being "good", perhaps beyond recognition, is

reinvoked in Kant's discussion o f the formula o f treating humanity as an end-initself at GMM 438. Kant calls rational agency an end-in-itself because it is a "selfexistent" end. The German term here, "selbstandig" m eans "standing on it's own
feet," independent o f all else, o f a context, like a "self-standing" lamp that relies
on no other furnishings for a ground. Kant's "argument" here comes down to the
apparently analytic claim that whatever is the source o f moral worth must be
radically "selbstandig", and that only a good will is independent in this sense.
Kant collapses here the "goodness" o f the good will with the independence o f that
goodness.
Kant's next two propositions at GMM 400 specify the structure o f a will that
is independent and hence morally worthy.

Kant's second proposition is that an

action done from duty has its moral worth, not in its end, but in its maxim. He
defines the concept of duty as applying to a good will "exposed ... to certain
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subjective limitations and obstacles" (GMM 397). Kant argues that since all moral
w orth comes from the worth o f a good will (he equates moral worth with absolute
moral worth), and since all inclinations and objects o f the will lack the
independence o f the "selbstandig" good will, only the principle o f the will is a
candidate for moral worth. The second proposition focuses on the independence
o f the will with regard to it's structure: willing can be characterized in term s o f its
principles alone and thus can be abstracted from and hence made independent of,
an agent's particular aims (intentional objects).
The third proposition outlines the only remaining possible commitment that
could characterize the good will, given its independence from empirical principles,
w hich are held because o f empirical attachments. Kant claims that "duty is the
necessity to act out o f reverence for the law," (GMM 400). Kant's argument for
this claim is that "an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence
o f inclination, and along with inclination every object o f the will; so there is
nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the jaw and subjectively
pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim o f obeying this law
even to the detriment o f all my inclinations," (GMM 400). (It is puzzling why
K ant does not see subjective reverence for this law as itself a threat to the purity
o f the will).
Kant's conclusion at GMM 400 is that acting from duty means acting from
reverence for the law. This claim does not yet entail the claim that rational agents
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could act against all inclinations, from reverence for the law alone.

This claim

about the capacity o f rational agents requires a conception o f practical reasoning.
K ant specifies his conception o f practical reasoning as the source from which
the concept o f duty "springs" at GMM 412. Kant defines the will as the power to
act in accordance w ith the idea o f laws. Rational beings w ork in the phenomenal
world, ju st like things; they are subsumable under causal descriptions, as things
are.

Yet, in addition, rational beings w ork not only in a way that can be described

by law; they work in a way that is derived from law. But what can this mean?
H ere Kant is imputing causal efficacy to the inferential capacity o f reason; reason
can move the agent from having certain ends to implementing the means necessary
to achieve those ends, just as it can move thought in an argument from premises
to conclusions. By guiding the agent to follow what the laws o f nature dictate to
be necessary for accomplishing her goals, reason can generate a commitment to
new goals. In the case o f impure practical reasoning, this end-generating capacity
o f reason begins with given affective motives. One desires X, and then reasons
that X requires Y, and this reasoning itself can motivate one to will Y. Kant is
indebted to Aristotle for this conception o f practical reasoning,97 despite his
rejection o f Aristotelian ethics.
But K ant then invokes a picture o f pure practical reason that is not implied by
this [Aristotelian] conception o f practical reasoning: Kant claim s that in the case
o f a good will, reason "solely by itself' is "sufficient" to determine the will (GMM
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412).

This claim goes beyond the claim that the "good will" is o f "selbstandig"

worth (G M M 400). Rather, Kant is making a claim about the efficacy o f reason
in the case o f the good will.
absolutely good wills,
worthy acts.

In the case o f God and the angels, who have

their practical reasoning necessarily generates morally

The term "sufficiency" here is a translation into the practical sphere

o f the idea o f "entailment" in logic.

Kant seems to picture the case o f perfect

willing as entailing good action in the way correct premises and correct reasoning
entail the correct conclusion o f an argument. This presupposes not only that the
pure rational agent's inference capacity would be perfect, but also that she would
always start with the correct initial premises o f a practical syllogism because she
would alw ays have the correct ends or goals. The case o f pure practical reasoning
is distinguished from the case o f impure practical reasoning by the fact that in the
form er case reason sets the agent's ends, independently o f all empirical motives.
K ant extends his picture o f the "sufficiency" o f reason in the case o f the
absolutely good will to the case o f human beings, with imperfect wills. Kant uses
the term "sufficiency" in two senses in GMM 412, implying that in the case o f
human beings reason is and is not "sufficient" for morality.

He writes: "But if

reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determ ine the will; if the will is exposed
also to subjective conditions (certain impulsions) which do not always harmonize
with the objective ones" only then does necessitation, and duty arise (GM M 412).
The point here is that humans beings are subject to necessitation precisely because
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the human will is capable o f being moved by inclination, and hence not wholly in
accord with reason.

U nlike perfectly rational beings, human beings, and other

finite rational agents, do not necessarily aim for the correct end or goal. This point
reveals K ant's presupposition that the correct end o f moral action is an end that is
not only endorsed by pure reason, but generated by pure reason: it is reason's own
goal o f universality. Kant soon specifies this end as the goal of willing only those
m axim s that are universalizable (the categorical im perative).

Human reason is

capable o f generating this goal, even if human beings can also generate other goals.
Thus, the sense in which human reason is "sufficient" is that human reason alone,
independent o f all affects or empirical objects, is capable o f generating the good
end w hich the Godly reason necessarily aims for. Human Reason can follow the
same practical syllogism God follows, even though it may not.
A t GM M 448, Kant argues that rational agents m ust think o f themselves as
exercising pure practical reason:
And I m aintain that to every rational being possessed o f a will w e m ust also
lend the Idea o f freedom as the only one under which he can act. For in
such a being we conceive a reason which is practical — that is, which
exercises causality in regard to its objects. But we cannot possibly conceive
o f a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its
judgm ents; for in that case the subject would attribute the determination o f
his pow er o f judgm ent, not to his reason, but to an impulsion. Reason must
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look upon itself as the author o f its own principles independently o f alien
influences (GMM 448).
This passage reveals that Kant's idea that reason, independently o f all input, can
generate its own ends in the practical sphere, depends upon his presupposition that
practical reason and theoretical reason are one and the same reason.

In the

Critique o f Pure Reason Kant argues that theoretical reason is capable o f going
beyond "sensible" input.98 For Kant, the "sensible" includes affectivity, feelings
o f pleasure and pain, as well as sensation.99 Kant claims that reason can think
what it cannot know, that it can have ideas without the corresponding intuitions
necessary for knowledge.

Reason is not only capable o f going beyond the

sensible, but driven to do so by its own commitment to unity and its unlimited
inference capacity.

Theoretical reason is thus spontaneous in two senses: it

organizes sensible intuition into concepts "spontaneously" (via the understanding);
and it pushes beyond given input, toward its own goal o f unification.

Kant's

picture o f pure reason as capable o f setting its own ends is an extension into the
practical sphere o f his picture o f theoretical reason's "spontaneity" in the second
sense.
But the Kantian idea that reason can move the agent in virtue o f its radical
spontaneity presupposes that practical reason can work independently o f empirical
causation.

This metaphysical presupposition follows from the divorce o f all

empirical ends from the ends o f reason.

Kant seems to have conceived o f all
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psychological motives as operating deterministically in the way that physical causes
operate deterministically. Thus, the independence o f reason in the practical sphere
requires that reason be capable not only o f justifying moral action, but o f actually
causing the agent to do the right act. But K ant takes the idea that reason alone
actually moves the agent to be incomprehensible if one considers the agent as a
phenomenal being, since there can be no gap in the causal chains o f nature.
Rather, he argues that the idea o f an intelligible cause only makes sense when the
agent is considered as a noumenal being (GM M 452).
Thus, according to a traditional reading, the idea that reason alone is
"sufficient" for morality is ultimately based in Kantian metaphysical assumptions.
The "autonomy" o f the moral agent has both a practical and a metaphysical sense:
practically, the agent sets aside all empirical motives to act from the motive o f duty
alone.

This is possible because, metaphysically, the agent is not merely an

empirical being subject to natural causation, but also a noumenal being, who can
initiate causal chains de novo (Critique o f Pure Reason. B566-586).

But this

metaphysical assumption is notoriously problematic. Given the Kantian picture o f
causality as a category o f the understanding, and o f noumenal reality as, by
definition, w hat cannot be grasped by the understanding, it would seem to be
illegitim ate to speak o f "noumenal causality." Kant says that while such causality
cannot be understood by human beings in the way the laws o f nature can be
understood, it can be thought (GMM 458). H is discussion o f practical reasoning
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is m eant to allow us to "think" this idea o f moral agency. But we cannot have an
idea o f an agent abstracted of all the phenomenal aspects o f the self. As Brian
O 'Shaughnessey, Donald Davidson100 and others have argued, the very concept o f
agency presupposes given desires, beliefs and intentions that are related in the right
w ay to a person's movements in the world. A cts are intentional; they do not ju st
happen to the agent, but follow from the agent's desires and expectations about the
world. If one w ere not aiming for an empirical object, if one had no desire to do
anything, than one's movements could not be grasped as actions rather than mere
occurrences.
The noumenal self, stripped o f all desires and intentions, cannot even be
thought o f as an agent.

Thus the Kantian idea o f pure practical reason leads not

only to the "impersonality" o f the rule-fetishist, but to an ontological condition o f
"impersonality."

The fully detached "agent" cannot be understood as generating

her own projects and pursuits.

If the "person" is understood as the locus o f a

unified set o f projects, then the categorical exclusion o f such projects entails the
exclusion o f the possibility o f being a person.

IV.

A Revisionist Reading of K ant that Does N ot Equate Impartiality with
D etachm ent

In response to these problematic metaphysical assumptions and the picture o f
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the Kantian moral agent in the m om ent o f acting from duty as a rule fetishist who
lacks all affectivity, a revisionist reading o f Kant has sprung up.

Three

philosophers who represent aspects o f this view are M arcia Baron, Barbara Herman
and O nora O'Neil. All three argue that morally worthy acts can be overdetermined:
one can act w ith m ore than one motive, so that one can act from duty and yet be
moved by sympathy. T he revisionist reading depends upon m aking a distinction
between the moral principles that guide action and what the agent is aiming for in
acting. A ccording to a traditional reading, the maxim or "subjective principle of
action" includes a com plete description o f the agent's intentions. In contrast, the
revisionists take the agent's maxims to describe only those aspects o f the agent's
m otives that are relevant to the justification o f her act.

O 'N eil101 pictures maxims

to be general principles, like "help a friend when one can without undue struggle,"
which one decides upon or commits oneself to out o f a com m itm ent to morality.
O ne uses the categorical imperative as a standard by which to judge the suitability
o f one's maxims.

O'Neil implies that the agent need not actually go through this

procedure to derive every maxim, but that it must be the case that her commitment
to certain maxims in some way tracks her com m itm ent to the standard o f
universalizability. O'Neil takes these maxims to be guiding principles, an almanac
or road map, which the agent follows in particular cases, by aim ing for things that
are com patible with these principles. The agent would have no reason for using
the road map if she did not have ordinary motives, like sympathy, that lead her to
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act in the first place. I take O'Neil's point in using the metaphor o f a road map to
include the idea that the maxims genuinely direct, rather than simply endorse, what
the agent does.

Perhaps the kinds o f maps O'Neil is familiar with are more like

travel guides, because she implies that moral principles lead the agent to pursue
ends which she would not necessarily pursue otherwise.
This interpretation o f O'Neil's is slightly different from, but compatible with
Barbara H erm an's picture o f the relationship between maxims and motives in moral
action.

In "Rules, M otives and Helping Actions"102 Herman argues that while

"motive" and "end" are sometimes merely reciprocal concepts, this need not be the
case. According to Herman:
the end, or object o f an action, is that state o f affairs the agent intends his
actions to bring about. The motive o f an action, what moves the agent to
act for a certain object, is the interest he has in the object.103
By the "interest" the agent has in the action, Herman means a principle or
commitment that directs the person to do what she does. One can have a variety
o f concrete ends, like buying an efficient car, going to a simple, self-service
restaurant, etc. that express one's interest in being economical. Herman gives the
exam ple o f altering eating habits out o f concern with one's future health (one's
end), which is a case o f acting from principles of prudence (one's motive).
Prudence m ight also direct one to visit the dentist regularly, etc. The motives o f
economy and prudence are "second-order" commitments which serve as filters and
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sources o f first order motives like buying an efficient car and eating healthily.
Herm an applies the distinction between one's motive for acting, and one's end
in acting to the case o f beneficence from the motive o f duty. In the case o f helping
another person, one's end may be to provide help, rather than to instantiate a rule.
But one may have such an end because one is directed by moral rules that tell one
to provide help: "The rules direct that in certain circumstances, actions o f a certain
sort are to be done. A moral rule requires us to help, to provide help, not to follow
rules".104 Herm an can thus distinguish the case in which one acts from duty but
not as a rule-fetishist, from the case o f the rule-fetishist: in the former case "the
object [end] o f the action is to save this person; the motive is to provide morally
called for help"; in the latter case "the object o f the action is to do what the moral
principle (the duty to help)

requires; the motive is to act in conformity with

duty."105
Herman is able to distinguish a case o f acting from duty that is not rulefetishism, by rejecting w hat she calls an "externalist" view o f moral rules. In such
a picture, the acting person aims to instantiate rules, because she is attached to
such rules as one m ight be attached to an external authority, out o f a commitment
to being obedient. She contrasts this picture with:
the fact (and the way) moral rules are learned. W e acquire knowledge of
how, morally speaking, things work, and w e employ our knowledge in
determining w hat we should do. Moral rules are internalized; when learned
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in the right way, they are a constitutive part o f the agent's conception o f
him self as a person. They are neither memorized (as Ryle pointed out, they
are not the sort o f thing that can be forgotten), nor are they present as mere
habits o f response. In knowing such rules, w e know how to go on.106
The distinction between the maxim and/or second-order commitment under
which one acts and the intentional object o f one's action makes it possible to argue
that affective interest in the object o f one's action does not entail that one is acting
from interest, or heteronomously.

This leads to a reinterpretation o f Kant's

statement at GMM, 426, that "the proper worth of an absolutely good will ... lies
precisely in this — that the principle o f action is free from all influence by
contingent grounds, the only kind that experience can supply."

According to a

traditional reading, this means that if human acts are to be morally worthy the
agent m ust be free o f all empirical interests.

But according to a Hermanian

reading, K ant is only saying that the moral worth o f the maxim, not the agent's
actions under the m axim , is independent o f all empirical interest. It cannot be that
the maxim has moral worth because it goes along with one's sympathetic
inclinations, since sympathetic inclinations can be indifferent to morality.

But

neither is the moral worth o f the maxim ruled out by the fact the agent who
belongs to it has sympathetic inclinations.
It w ould seem that Herman and O'Neil have given sufficient ammunition to
argue against the equation of morality with detachment. The distinction between
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acting because one is trying to obey rules, and acting in a way that expresses one's
com m itm ent to duty, will permit acting from emotion as long as such action
expresses a com m itm ent to duty. The caricature o f the rule-fetishist pictures the
agent as segmented between a purely rational will that seeks only the end o f being
rational, and an ordinary will that seeks ordinary ends; the agent acts morally only
when reason invades and occupies the whole person, putting its own ends o f
consistency and universality in the place o f ordinary affective goals. The appeal
o f the revisionist conception is that acting from duty is pictured as ordinary
affective activity, which is somehow rule "governed." The comm itment to rational
reflection is taken to be an integrated aspect o f the agent's personality. However,
the problem is in understanding the sense in which acts may be both ordinary
affectively motivated acts, and yet rule governed in a Kantian sense.
The core o f the Kantian conception that Herman and Baron attempt to preserve
is the idea that the rules of morality do not ju st describe what the moral agent
does; they direct w hat she does.

This requirement has two aspects.

First, the

moral agent must know that she is acting from maxims that are universalizable.
Second, she must be motivated by the idea that what she does expresses her
com m itm ent to duty. I f she happens to have been brought up to act according to
rules which all pass the test o f universalizability, but has no commitment to doing
her duty, than her act has no moral worth. And her commitment to acting dutifully
cannot be merely an after the fact endorsement o f her actions; rather this

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

121

commitment to acting dutifully must be what actually causes her to do what she
does. This idea distinguishes the Kantian conception from an Aristotelian picture
o f moral agency.

Even if one has been brought up well, and one has virtuous

attitudes like bravery and kindness that ordinarily lead to good acts, and one
endorses such attitudes reflectively, one is not yet acting from duty.
Herman and Baron both take Kant to assert that only acts done from the
m otive o f duty have moral worth, where acting from refers to the causal efficacy
o f one's sense o f duty.

But then we must ask how the moral agent's commitment

to the rules that ground rational agency can actually direct her action, if the model
o f the obedient rule-fetishist is to be rejected?

Herman and Baron characterize

the person acting from duty as having a counterfactual commitment, such that if
w hat she does out o f sympathy were not in accordance with duty, she would not
do it, and if duty commands what she would not otherwise do, she would do it.107
I will refer to this counterfactual description o f how duty could preempt other
m otives as "pre-emptive overdetermination."
The revisionist concept o f "pre-emptive overdetermination" provides for a
deflationary reading o f the Kantian notion o f autonomy, which avoids the
problem atic concepts of transcendental freedom and noumenal causation.

The

appeal o f the notion o f "pre-emptive overdetermination" is that the agent's freedom
com es down to an empirically specifiable freedom to do otherwise; the agent acts
autonomously if she does what she does because she believes it is morally
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required. However, the picture o f agency embodied in the concept o f "pre-emptive
overdetermination" is far from transparent. The idea that the agent's sense o f duty
can pre-em pt her other motives can be interpreted in two ways, one o f which
retains, in deflationary form, the Kantian idea o f pure practical reason (Herman's
reading), the other o f which does not.
In "On the Value o f Acting from the M otive o f D uty"108 Herman pictures the
m otive o f duty as a commitment o f the agents which can move her against all o f
her ordinary affective motives. Herman says that while one's sense o f duty can be
a second-order commitment that expresses itself through primary m otives like
sym pathy, one's sense o f duty is also capable o f being a primary first-order motive,
which is "sufficient" to lead to moral action all by itself409. She reads the case o f
the unsym pathetic man as a case in which the motive o f duty alone moves the
agent toward beneficence. And Herman takes the agent's sense o f duty in this case
to be based solely on his impersonal commitment to act in a way that is
universalizable. She notes that it is only because the unsympathetic man lacks any
personal reason to do what he does that his action is a case o f beneficence in the
sense that Kant uses that term in the DOV: "it [an action] is beneficent only if the
agent conceives o f w hat he is doing as an instance o f what any moral agent is
required to do when he can help another, and acts to help for that reason.

For

Kant, only the motive o f duty [alone] could prompt someone to act on a maxim
w ith such content —for no other motive responds to a conception o f action that
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regards the agent him self impersonally or is impartial in its application."110 It
seem s that Herm an envisions the apathetic man as generating his beneficent motive
solely from detached reflection about what universal morality commands. But this
reinvokes the traditional idea that reason alone is "sufficient" for moral action.
H erm an concludes this article with the statement that "at the heart o f Kant's
account o f moral worth" is the idea that the moral motive "expresses a kind of
independence from circumstances and need, such that in acting from the motive o f
duty, w e are, as Kant saw it, free"111.
Herm an never explains how rational reflection alone could m ove the apathetic
agent to help others. In the absence o f any new picture o f what rational reflection
involves, Herman seems to rely on the traditional Kantian picture o f the
"sufficiency" o f practical reason as grounded in the spontaneity o f theoretical
reason, but w ithout the traditional assumption o f noumenal causality. But Bernard
W illiam s points out the problem in presupposing that ordinary (ie. phenomenal)
rational reflection is "sufficient" for generating a com m itm ent to valuing the ends
o f others. A ccording to W illiam s112, reflection about truth brings in an impartial
standpoint because it is concerned with how the world really is, and how the world
really is presupposes convergence o f all knowledge about the world. But reflection
about how to act does not presuppose any such convergence. Even if reflection
takes me from seeing that my own ends should be prom oted to seeing that you too
will be com m itted to the idea that your ends should be prom oted, it cannot move
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m e to prom ote your ends. The additional step o f reciprocity is not a bare logical
inference.
The force o f W illiams argument against Kant depends upon seeing that the
"drive" tow ard unity and consistency o f theoretical reason is insufficient for the
m oral commitment to universalizability o f practical reason.

One can recognize

that one's ends are rooted in some general feature o f one's make-up and that other
tokens o f one's type have the same ends; but this cognitive grasp o f analogous ends
cannot move one to value the other's ends as-if they were one's own.
I f one holds on to the core Kantian idea that impartiality requires the agent to
be "free" of all affective motives in the sense that she can act in the absence of all
affective motives, than one winds up w ith the following reading o f the case o f the
apathetic man:

His aim in helping cannot be to relieve so and so's suffering,

because this would mean he was moved directly by the suffering o f another person,
and thus in Kantian terms moved by pathological emotion rather than practical
reverence for the moral law. Rather, his aim must be to help a person because it
is w hat duty commands.

But his commitment to duty in this case cannot be

derived from his own reasoning, because, as W illiam s has shown, detached
reflection cannot commit one to take-up the ends o f other persons.

But if his

com m itm ent to help others does not arise from within his own reasoning processes
or from within his own ordinary motives, then it rests on no reason o f his own.
It is simply an arbitrary choice. But this leads to a picture o f the apathetic man
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as arbitrarily following an external authority; he has become the rule-fetishist.
The revisionists must leave behind the Kantian idea o f pure reason's
"sufficiency" in order to develop an account o f how the agent's commitment to
reflection is internally related to, and capable o f directing, her other commitments
and motives. In their more recent articles, both Herman and Baron do seem to be
m oving away from the core Kantian presupposition that one kind o f reflection is
"sufficient" for both theoretical and practical reasoning. In "The Practice o f Moral
Judgm ent"113 Herman discusses the importance o f "perceptions o f moral salience,"
which may include affective responses, for the practice o f morality.

She argues

that the ideal of treating persons as ends in themselves commits moral agents to
discerning who are persons, and what is owed to such persons, and that such
discerning may involve affectivity.
H erman strives to balance her conception o f morality as a situated practice
with affective, historical components, with the demands o f Kantian theory for an
ahistorical, unsituated reflective consciousness as the source o f moral commitment.
H er solution is to conceive o f the "fact o f reason,"

which is the agent's

consciousness of her moral independence, or autonomy, as the source o f the agent's
com m itm ent to take-up the ends o f other persons. But the kind o f reflection that
gives rise to a commitment to others involves role-reversal, in which one sees
oneself as-if in the position o f others. This implies that Herman takes the fact o f
reason to already involve role-reversal.

But how could consciousness o f one's
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radical independence from one's own affective situation motivate one to put oneself
in another's position? In the next chapter, I will address this question in light o f
the related phenomenological concept o f empathy as projection from one's own
situation imaginatively into someone else's, thus "freeing" oneself from one's own
situation.

I will argue that radical detachment from one's own situation is

incom patible with empathy, and that awareness o f one's own affective ties and
needs is constitutive o f understanding other persons. At this point it is sufficient
to note that if Herman reads the "fact o f reason" as involving em pathic projection,
she has already left behind the Kantian picture o f the unity o f practical and
theoretical reason.
M arcia Baron conceives o f the power o f duty to pre-empt other motives as
rooted in the agent's capacity to redirect her ordinary, affective m otives from
within. In "The Alleged Moral Repugnance o f Acting from D uty"114 she argues,
as Herman does, that one's sense o f duty is "sufficient" ground for moral action;
but Baron does not see this sense o f duty as ultimately grounded in pure practical
reason.

It is not the agent's ahistorical, unsituated rationality or "freedom" that

Baron appeals to as an explanation o f how a commitment to duty alone can
generate beneficence.
necessarily

Rather, Baron argues that the com m itm ent to duty is

historical and affectively situated.

Rather than

picturing the

com m itm ent to duty as immediately efficacious in a discrete m om ent o f action,
Baron sees the efficacy o f duty as mediated by the deliberate re-education o f one's
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character over time. She writes that acting from duty "must be thought o f not in
term s o f isolated actions, but as conduct viewed over a stretch o f time, and
governed by a com m itm ent which unifies and directs the self."115
B aron's emphasis on "conduct" rather than discrete acts, represents an
im portant difference between her conception o f duty and Herman's conception.
H erm an explicitly states that only a small subset o f an agent's acts will be done
from duty, because only acts that are morally required can be done from duty;
helping acts that are not strictly required are not credited to the agent's sense o f
duty, except in the tenuous sense that if such acts w ere impermissible, the agent
w ould not do them. In contrast, Baron sees one's sense o f duty as "a concern to
do th e morally recommended as well as the morally required."116 Her view o f a
sense o f duty as informing one's conduct over time identifies the agent's sense o f
duty w ith the unity o f the agent's projects, and the developm ent o f the agent's
character, rather than just with the performing o f right action. The identification
o f the sense o f duty with the agent's capacity to develop her own character implies
that the agent's feelings and ideas, and not ju st her behavior, will be influenced by
her sense o f duty.
T his

leads to the question

o f what kind o f reflection

constitutes a

developm ental com m itm ent to acting from duty, and how does such reflection
generate a commitment to role-reversal? Baron says she cannot yet give a full
account o f such reflection, but she gives the following suggestion:
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One who acts from duty will reflect on her conduct and not be left cold by
thoughts about how she acted — nor will she feel only the retrospective
emotions (e.g. regret, unlike remorse) which enable one to evade moral
responsibility for the conduct in question.117
Baron thus envisions a non-detached kind o f practical reasoning, which relies on
the agent's capacity to feel remorse, among other things.
Extrapolating from Baron's comments, I picture the unsympathetic man not as
a rule-fetishist, but as a depressed person o f good character who feels remorse over
his failure to care much about others. His sense o f duty includes a commitment
to taking-up the ends o f others, even when he lacks spontaneous feelings of
sympathy. In order to make the ends o f others "as far as possible, [his] own" he
reflects on the situation o f others to find elements o f their situations which are able
to m ove him, perhaps because he feels that these problems are like his own in
som e way.

There is a sense in which this reflection involves consciousness of

"freedom." This man will have to struggle to free him self from the pathology of
his depression, the pervasiveness of his feelings o f hopelessness, to adequately
grasp w hat is salient about another person's situation. The personal insights that
enable him to recover from his depression sufficiently to care for others can be
pictured as "freeing" him from the pathology o f his own situation;

but these

insights them selves will not follow from detached reasoning, but only from
em otionally engaged reflection. This man's sense o f duty expresses itself in his
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painstaking commitment to recover from his apathy, in order to adequately care for
other persons. In the final chapter o f this thesis I give an account o f what such
emotional self-regulation without detachment involves.
The model o f "detached concern" in medical practice presupposes that a
detached commitment to rational reflection is sufficient for the physician's moral
responses to patients. This presupposition is rooted in a Kantian conception o f
morality that is m ost often expressed in medicine as the duty-based commitment
to respect patients as "ends-in-themselves." The professional commitment o f the
physician to respect all patients, regardless o f her own personal preferences,
requires striving for impartiality. Yet this chapter has shown the inadequacy o f the
Kantian conception o f pure rational reflection as the ground o f the impartial
com m itm ent to respect the ends o f other persons. The traditional presupposition
that impartiality requires detachment from one's affective, historical situation
reduces the moral agent to a rule-fetishist who lacks the moral sensitivity that
m edicine requires.
The revisionist reading o f Kant shows that one can act from duty and also be
affectively engaged. Yet the revisionist reading has retained in part the traditional
idea that one's commitment to respect others as ends is rooted in one's ahistorical,
unsituated rationality alone. But, as Bernard W illiams points out, there is nothing
about reflection so conceived that could generate a commitment to take up the ends
o f others. Rather, the kind of reflection that grounds one's sense o f duty to others
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m ust involve "role-reversal."

Having used Descartes and Kant to show the

inadequacy o f detachment for understanding and valuing the subjective experiences
o f patients, we can now explore the affective basis o f "role-reversal" by rethinking
the concept o f clinical empathy.
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Chapter Four: The Concept o f Clinical Empathy

There are num erous articles by doctors claiming that empathy is essential for
diagnosis and for developing a therapeutic alliance with patients that facilitates
treatm ent.118 Y et despite this agreement over the need for empathy, physicians
have varied, even contradictory conceptions o f what the term "empathy" means.
M ichael Basch describes the widespread disagreement by clinicians over whether
empathy should be considered...
An end result, a tool, a skill, a kind o f communication, a listening stance,
a type o f introspection, a capacity, a power, a form o f perception or
observation, a disposition, an activity, or a feeling.119
The confusion over what "clinical empathy" involves is in part a result o f the
am biguity and vagueness that adheres to the general concept o f "empathy." The
O.E.D . defines

"empathy"

exactly

as Theodor Lipps120 defined the term

"Einfiihlung" in 1903: "The pow er o f projecting one's personality into (and so fully
com prehending) the object o f contem plation."121
Lipps' em phasis is not quite right for physicians in that physicians are not
seeking to contem plate their own personalities in their patients, but rather to learn
som ething about their patients' experiences.

(The term contemplation reflects

L ipps' interest in aesthetics). However Lipps' description o f "projecting" oneself
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into an object to more fully comprehend it is central to the concept o f empathy
used in clinical discussions, even though there is little clarity about what such
"projection" involves.
D espite the confusion over the definition o f empathy, there are certain
observations that any conception o f clinical empathy must fit. First, although the
original concept o f empathy as "feeling into" another person's experience has led
some theorists to equate empathy with direct perception or telepathy,122 physicians
today reject this view. There is no organ for empathy, and no discrete form of
energy transmission involved in communicating emotion, as there is in the case of
visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile perception.

Rather, most clinicians take

empathy to be like but not identical with sense perception in that empathic
understanding involves pre-reflective receptivity to messages that another person
com m unicates, voluntarily and involuntarily.
Second, while many physicians note that there are momentary "flashes" of
empathy, they also note that the accuracy o f empathy increases with time, effort,
and increasing familiarity with the patient.123 Such flashes may be sim ilar to the
flashes o f discovery one has after long periods o f w orking through one's ideas.
They do not in and o f them selves contradict the claim that empathic understanding
requires reflection and effort.
Third, physicians have observed that empathic understanding depends not only
on their own capacities, which will be the focus o f much o f this chapter, but upon
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interpersonal dynamics, including the degree to which physicians and patients can
understand each other's language, style and values. Given that such understanding
depends upon communication, empathy is both an intrapsychic and an interpersonal
activity.124
Fourth, clinical empathy involves building a conception o f another's situationas-lived.

H ence there is a sense in which empathy is best understood as

constructing a model o f the patient's situation, as Buie describes it.125 However,
the term "model" is misleading in that it implies that the physician's imaginative
creation is an entity that can stand apart from the physician's experiences. This
reification o f the content o f empathic imagining is perhaps invited by the fact that
historically the concept of empathy originally referred to contemplation o f a work
o f art. But I will argue that in the case o f clinical empathy, there is no separable
mental model o f the patient's world that the physician holds in mind without
participating emotionally in the patient's experience.

Rather than mistakenly

searching for a product of empathy, it is better to think o f empathy as a capacity
to follow the patient's story affectively and imaginatively.126
However, even though empathy does not yield an "inner model" o f the patient
that can be extracted from the empathizer, one can generate descriptions about the
information one has gathered through empathic imagining, and these descriptions
can be used to build models that can be contemplated theoretically. For example,
the empathic discovery that a patient with anorexia nervosa actually sees herself
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as fat, can be conveyed (I have just done so), and used in a description o f what
anorexia is like.

The reader can understand and use the idea that the anoretic

patient sees herself as fat without empathizing. Alternatively, one could convey,
in a concrete case history rich with the affective imagery o f the real patient, how
it feels to be anoretic, inviting the reader to empathize.
The observations that empathy involves communication, im proves with
increasing familiarity with the patient, and involves both pre-reflective receptivity
and conceptualization, must all be accounted for by an adequate conception o f
clinical empathy. These observations suggest that empathy cannot be easily fit into
a faculty psychology that divorces cognition from affect. Our account o f empathy
m ust explain how the interaction o f cognition and affect enables the physician to
learn something new about the patient's experience, which cannot be provided by
the physician's other ways o f understanding the patient.
In the first part o f this essay I argue against the predominant medical model o f
clinical empathy as detached insight. In part two I return to Lipps' definition o f
"Einfiihlung" as a kind o f cognition that is essentially affective. In part three I turn
to some psychoanalytic models o f empathy that take affective engagem ent to be
essential, but still do not explain how the physician can learn something new about
the patient via affective engagement. In the final part o f this essay I give my own
non-inferential account o f how the physician's emotions can be informative about
the patient's situation.
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I

T he Conception o f Empathy as Detached "Insight"

T he definition o f empathy as "feeling into" suggests a conflict between the
standpoint o f empathy and the standpoint o f detachment.

Yet many physicians

today presuppose that the detached standpoint is sufficient for empathy.

For

exam ple, Renee Fox and Howard L ief state that it is only after medical students
go through a period o f alienation in which they overcom e their personal responses
to patients in the way they overcome their fear and disgust at dissecting a cadaver,
that they can develop the skill to listen empathically to patients w ithout becoming
em otionally involved.127
C harles A ring's "Sympathy and Empathy," Journal o f the American Medical
A ssociation. 1958, and Herrman Blumgart's "Caring for the Patient," N ew England
Journal o f Medicine. 1964 are two classic articles by physicians about "detached"
em pathy.128 Aring and Blumgart argue that empathy involves m aking correct
inferences about the patient's condition rather than feeling anything in response to
the patient. Both physicians argue that for the physician to respond affectively to
the patient's situation would not only make the physician unhappy, but would also
prevent him from making correct diagnoses, and ham per his judgm ents about
therapy.

Aring conceives o f "detached" empathy as the use o f one's own

know ledge o f emotional experience to make inferences about the patient's
condition. Blumgart conceives o f "neutral empathy" as the careful observation o f

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

136

the habits, and attitudes o f the patient so that one can predict how the patient will
respond to her illness and to treatment.
The core thesis put forth by Aring and adopted by Blumgart is that empathy
can be and should be fully distinguished from sympathy. Their point is not just
that one can best empathize with the patient if one does not "sympathize" with her
in the sense o f pitying her.

Rather, they claim that the physician can best

em pathize with the patient if he refrains from "feeling with" the patient in any way.
A ring defines the term "sympathy" as "an affinity, association or relation between
things so that w hatever affects one similarly affects the other. The act or capacity
o f entering into or sharing the feelings o f another..."129 And Blum gart adopts
A ring's definition o f "sympathy."
A ring argues that the emotionally moved physician will become hostile in
response to a patient who is very dependent.130

And Blum gart argues that

sympathy is destructive because the sympathetic physician will grieve for patients,
and regret his limitations, whereas the "neutral empathetic" physician will simply
do w hat needs to be done w ithout such reactions.131 These exam ples suggest that
A ring and Blum gart picture sympathetic feeling as stirring up the physician's (often
unconscious) personal conflicts. But this shows that Aring and Blumgart take the
notion o f "participating in another's situation" quite literally to mean taking on
another's problem s as burdens o f one's own.
A ring and Blumgart show that when the physician reacts to the patient's
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situation by taking on the patient's conflicts, this disturbs her capacity to listen well
to the patient. But such reactivity, in which one actually experiences a need to
solve another's problems as if they were one's own, is only one form o f emotional
responsivity.132

It is the way an older sibling m ight respond to the problem s of

a younger1sibling -- by wanting to fight by their side against the bully in the
schoolyard.

In contrast, a parent interested in guiding her child's development,

m ight experience the child's fear empathically, but with a concurrent awareness that
the bully is not really such a threat. By not taking on her child's need to fight the
bully the parent might then enable the child to deal with the bully from an entirely
different emotional standpoint, using humor or curiosity.133 But while I reject
A ring and Blumgart's assumption that responding emotionally coincides with
reactivity, I accept their observation that the former can invite the latter. It takes
w ork for the mother not to respond childishly to the bully. In chapter five I show
how the physician caught in emotional conflict can, like the parent, learn to
regulate her emotional reactivity while maintaining emotional involvement with the
patient.
I also agree with Aring and Blumgart that empathy can be utterly devoid of
sym pathetic advocacy. Consider how one can say something particularly hurtful
to someone w hose vulnerability one grasps empathically.

But this difference

between empathy and sympathy does not show that empathy can occur in the
absence o f "feeling with" another. For it is not unimaginable that in one's cruelty
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one vicariously experiences the suffering o f another, and yet enjoys this experience.
(There are compelling psychoanalytic theories about how one could develop an
eroticized response to the experience o f suffering, either in others or oneself).134
The idea that empathy is independent o f emotional engagem ent involves
additional assum ptions beyond the observation that empathy does not require
advocacy. Empathy is pictured as an ordinary form o f inferential reasoning that
simply has a special subject matter.

Recall the words o f Osier: the physician

capacity to neutralize his emotions allows him to "see into" and hence "study" the
patient's "inner life."135 This claim presupposes that the physician can "project"
before his "mind's eye" the patient's "inner life" as if it were "an image, as from
a transparent slide, upon a screen."136 A related assumption by O sier is that the
physician can also "see into" his own "inner life," in order to recognize what he
has in common with the patient.

Osier thinks that imagining how another feels

depends upon producing relevant images from one's knowledge o f what typical
em otions are like, and then applying this knowledge to the patient inferentially.
Osier, Aring and Blumgart presuppose that "knowing how" the patient feels
depends on the w orking o f the same cognitive faculty involved in knowing how
the patient's body is functioning.

When used to refer to third personal or

impersonal knowledge about a state o f affairs, such as the workings o f bodies, the
term "knowing how" is interchangeable with the term "knowing that."

That is,

knowing how the stomach puts out gastric acid is a matter o f knowing that the
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histam ine cells stimulate the release o f certain hormones.

According to the

paradigm o f "detached concern," knowing how the patient feels also is a matter
o f knowing that the patient is depressed, or reexperiencing a childhood fear. Such
knowledge depends on careful observation and making correct inferences.
B ut while careful observation o f another's w ords and gestures contributes to
em pathic understanding, it is not another's observable movements, but what they
signify that is the "object" o f empathy.

And one cannot directly inspect the

patient's feelings toward the world in the way one can directly inspect an entity.
In observing an entity o f complex structure, one encounters hidden aspects that
cannot all be presented at once; but these aspects can in some form be made
present to sense perception, either through dissection, magnification, radioisotope
labeling, etc. But, as we discussed in chapter two, one cannot make the person's
inner feelings apparent, and measurable, in this sense.137
To m ake sense o f the concept o f empathy, knowing how a depressed patient
feels m ust differ in some way from knowing that, as a matter o f fact, the patient
m eets the statistical criteria for depression given in The Diagnostic and Statistical
M anual o f M ental D isorders.138 Lipps introduced the term "Einfiihlung" to describe
a way o f understanding experientially what it is like to be in another person's
position, as opposed to observing another person's responses as "matters o f fact."
Eric Cassel points out that in order to understand illness as it is lived, the
physician must get beyond objectifying the patient's condition:
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Injuries to the integrity o f the person may be expressed by sadness, anger,
loneliness, depression, grief, unhappiness, melancholy, rage, withdrawal, or
yearning.

W e acknowledge the person's right to have and express such

feelings.

But w e often forget that the affect is merely the outward

expression o f the injury, not the injury itself.139
Cassel's point is that the damage a person experiences includes an entire way
o f being in the world which cannot be grasped only by considering the attitudes
the person displays. For example, the depressed person is not only visibly sad (and
not always visibly sad), but also experiences loss o f confidence, feelings of guilt,
difficulty thinking about things. And each individual will be guilty, worried, and
confused about different concrete issues, and these concrete issues will be what
largely characterizes her personal experience. The personal and concrete is not yet
understood when one simply recognizes that the patient is depressed. For example,
the physician needs to know how difficult it is for the patient to walk with this
cane, w hether suggesting another treatment o f chemotherapy makes this patient feel
hopeless, etc.

In empathy, one is directed toward another person's particular

intentional objects.
I take it that Aring and Blumgart, and Fox and Lief, would not be opposed to
C assell's portrayal o f the goal o f empathy as understanding the particular aspects
o f the patient's emotional experience. Nor do they entirely reject the idea that the
physician m ust make use o f her own past emotional experiences to come to such
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an understanding. Their thesis is that it is possible to come to a cognitive grasp
o f the patient's position by making use o f one's knowledge o f past emotional
experience, without actually re-experiencing occurrent emotional resonance with
the patient.
But what kind o f cognition allows us to use our past emotional experiences to
understand another's particular emotional experiences? Can w e make literal sense
o f the idea that the physician has a capacity to "introspect" and then apply her
emotional knowledge to the patient inferentially, without actually experiencing
shared emotion?

The term "introspection," which literally m eans "to look into

one's own mind,"140 has a narrower and wider use. The narrow er use refers to firstpersonal

awareness

o f bodily

feelings,

sense

perception,

and

states

of

consciousness. However, the information gained from introspection in the narrow
sense could not provide an adequate basis for empathy, given that the focus of
empathy is the patient's attitudes towards her situation. Rather, w hat is needed is
a model o f a kind o f "introspection" and inference-making that would yield
awareness o f motives and judgm ents as well as 'interior' feelings.
One influential model o f empathy as detached insight comes from the picture
o f the psychoanalyst as able to grasp the analysand's internal world while
rem aining emotionally neutral. But it is a mistake to posit that the insight that
enables the psychoanalyst to make inferences about the analysand involves a
discrete act o f "detached" "introspection."

First of all, psychoanalysis uses
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heterogeneous methods to lead to increased self-knowledge, including freeassociation, reliving of past experiences, transference, and dialogue.

And these

m ethods rely on heterogeneous modes o f response from the patient, including
strong feeling, recollection, and fantasy. And although there is active controversy
among psychoanalysts about the level o f emotional engagem ent that is appropriate
for the analyst, there is consensus that the analyst's own free associations will
involve experiencing affects.141
Further, the term "introspection" suggests a privileged first-personal awareness
o f one's condition, in which the reflecting subject and the object o f reflection are
identical.

But there is no such identity in psychoanalytic introspection.

As

Tugendhat has shown, w e can only attribute motives to ourselves in the way we
attribute such attitudes to others — by considering our own actions, retrospectively,
as they fit into relevant patterns.142 And, as Edith Stein argues, when we consider
ourselves retrospectively, through recollection, the 'I' that is recollecting is non
identical w ith the 'I' that is remembered.143 She gives as an example the case in
which I can recollect my past fear over something I then believed, without feeling
afraid anymore given that I now no longer hold that belief. Thus when the term
"introspection" is used to indicate awareness o f one's own complex emotional
attitudes, it cannot be understood as referring to a discrete mental act o f an T
turning in upon itself reflectively. But since the term "introspection" is used as a
m etaphor for some unspecified reflective experience, it does not help us give a
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specific explanation o f how empathy is possible.
The m odel o f empathy based on introspection and inference lacks an adequate
conception o f how the physician can detach herself emotionally and yet "see into"
her own m ind to produce the relevant images.

But even if we allow that such

insight is som ehow obtainable, we face the deeper problem o f explaining how the
physician can use such insight to infer something new about the patient.144
D iagnosing disease usually involves making predictions about som ething not
present and observable, for example, the causes o f and future course o f a
pulmonary infection, based on something present and observable, for example, the
chest X-ray and sputum sample o f the patient. The idea that empathy involves
m aking inferences is modeled on this picture o f inference in science: one "predicts"
the qualitative experience o f the patient, based upon one's insight about emotional
experiences in general and one's careful observation o f the patient's words and
gestures.
The idea that the empathic physician is like a w eather forecaster noting the
changing conditions o f the patient and predicting the shifts in "weather" is so
appealing because it captures part o f the truth. Empathic understanding involves
trial and error, in that the physician needs to test her grasp o f the patient's feelings
out and modify her views according to the patient's feedback. But all knowledge
m ust be susceptible to confirmation or rejection by some criteria, in order to be
m eaningful in the first place. This includes practical knowledge, like knowing how
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to folk dance. Folk dancers can learn by trial and error because only certain kinds
o f gestures count as proper folk-dancing. But knowing how to folk dance is not
a m atter o f making inferences -- a dancer whose knowledge is based on predicting
w here her feet m ight go next would certainly be a sight to see! Hence the fact that
empathy involves trial and error does not entail that the work the empathizer does
involves m aking predictions.145
T he error involved in equating empathy with prediction can be seen by taking
a slight detour: Consider the two very different attitudes one can take up toward
an action. One can either take up the attitude o f the agent, or the attitude o f an
observer.

In the first case, one intends to do something, call it Y. W hen one

com m ences to will Y, one is committed to the proposition: "I will do Y now." At
this point, one has a special grasp o f the fact that Y is about to occur. One already
lives in the world in which Y is on the way, in the sense that events are organized
in one's field o f interests around the happening o f Y. In contrast, an observer can
only predict that Y may occur, based on inferences from prior events, theory, etc.
Now, the difference between the observer and the agent is not that the agent is
right m ore often. It may be that the agent thinks she can lift 1,000 pounds, and
the observer finds this extremely unlikely, so that the agent is less likely to be right
than the observer about the actual lifting. The point is that the observer can only
make predictions about the agent. But the agent does not need to make predictions
to anticipate her own acts. She can anticipate her acts directly through forming
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intentions that lead to striving and, when physically possible, successful action.
The picture o f empathy as detached inference likens the empathizer to an
observer, whose only way to anticipate the other's acts is through prediction.

This

w ould involve remaining equidistant from various possibilities in a field of
unrealized possibilities.

If the empathizer were like the observer in this sense,

then she could simultaneously entertain the possibilities that the patient's tears
express excited joy or hopeless despair. But the empathizer cannot simultaneously
grasp despair and joy from a quasi first-personal perspective.

The object of

em pathy — the features o f emotional experience from a first-personal perspective - sets constraints on the mode o f empathic understanding. To understand another
person's despair empathically is to grasp their despair, not as a possibility, but as-if
it is actually present. (The "as-if' aspect o f empathy will be analyzed later in this
chapter).

Empathic understanding is more like the first-personal experiential

know ledge o f the agent anticipating her own acts than it is like the third-personal
predictions o f the observer.

Therefore, it is mistaken to picture empathy as ju st

another use the physician makes o f her capacity to make scientific inferences about
the patient.
So far my argument against equating empathy with observation, introspection,
and inference has focused on the intrapsychic component o f empathy.

But the

"cognitive insight" model of empathy is especially inadequate at explaining the
interpersonal, or communicative aspect o f clinical empathy. If the physician relies
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strictly on detached observation and conceptual generalizations about affective
experience she will disserve the patient in several ways.

First, she will miss

im portant features o f the patient's individual experience that are not contained in
her previous generalizations; and she will expect typical reactions that may not be
this person's reactions.

Second, like the awkward folk-dancer relying on

predictions , she will be unable to follow the patient's story experientially, and not
know when or how to say or do the right thing.

The clinician would be like

som eone who goes to the theater but only notices those aspects o f the drama that
correspond to w hat is in the written program synopsis. She would have no clue
about how to gasp, sigh, and cry appropriately with the audience.

Third, the

patient is likely to notice that she is alone in her dramatic m oments, and that her
situation is being seen as a typical instance o f such and such. M ost likely this will
m ake the patient feel that the physician is not really sufficiently interested in or
open to her experiences to merit the trust needed to openly reveal her history, and
to build a therapeutic alliance.
It impoverishes the concept o f clinical empathy to reduce it, as Osier, Aring
and Blum gart do, to weather forecasting.

Rather, the em pathizer must be

sufficiently involved in the patient's "weather" to be able to recognize and
appreciate in some quasi first-personal way, how the rain and sun feel. And we
have seen that Osier's hope that by detaching him self emotionally the physician
could clearly introspect and infer what such experiences are like is untenable.
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Sawyier, a philosopher o f science, notes that: "When we fill in the concept o f
em pathy, part o f what we imply is that the empathizer has him self had something
happen to him right then; it is not ju st that he has thought hard, or tried to figure
som ething out."146 This leads us to reject the insight modelo f empathy because
it denies the tw o experiential poles o f empathic understanding: in empathy one
grasps, more or less, how the other person experiences her situation; and at the
sam e tim e the empathizer herself experiences the other's attitudes as presences,
rather than as mere possibilities.147

II

The Original M eaning o f the Concept o f Empathy

To clarify the sense in which knowing how another feels necessarily involves
the know er as an experiencing subject, and hence precludes detachment, let us
return to the origin o f the concept o f empathy.148

First, it is notable that Lipps'

concern is primarily with aesthetics, although at that time aesthetics was considered
a branch o f psychology.

He invokes the concept o f Einfiihlung primarily to

describe a mode o f comprehending works o f art, and secondarily to refer to a way
o f com prehending the psychological life o f other persons. He says, for example,
that the appreciation o f music is the paradigm o f Einfiihlung. Lipps defines this
form o f aesthetic comprehension as follows:
Einfiihlung is inherent in something perceived by me or in an elem ent truly
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belonging to m e and me only, i.e. something subjective, understood by me
in the subject or in the spiritually corresponding object, but in the object for
me or the object as it "looks" to the perceiving subject.149
Lipps em phasis here is on the essentially experiential nature o f Einfiihlung.
By "subjective" he means "experiential," w here experience has the sense of
"Erlebnis" or lived, first-hand experience.

The contrast term for experiencing

som ething in this sense is thinking about something. By "feeling into" Lipps has
in m ind a m ode o f perception that is essentially affective and thus different from
sense perception as conceived by traditional faculty psychology.

Einfiihlung is

characterized by the essential connection between the affective feelings o f the
em pathizer and the perceptual object o f empathy.

Thus for Lipps the phrase

"projecting one's personality" refers most generally to the experience o f a
connection between one's own affective condition and the object one is trying to
understand.
Lipps gives a m ore specific description o f Einfiihlung that is directed towards
understanding another person. He says o f the gestures and expressions o f other
persons:
These sensuous manifestations are not the "man," they are not the strange
personality w ith his psychological equipment, his ideas, his feelings, his
will, etc. All the same, to us, the man is linked to these manifestations.
The im aginative, feeling, willing, individual is immediately apparent to us
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through his sensuous appearances, i.e. his manifestations o f life.

In a

movement, grief, spite, etc. is perhaps apparent to us. This connection is
created through Einfiihlung.150
H ere Lipps further specifies a concrete sense in which Einfiihlung requires a kind
o f "projection." The experiencing subject must reach beyond what is apparent to
grasp the psychological life of another person.

And this reaching m ust direct her

attention from the start, if she is to actually perceive the movements o f another as
m eaningful expressions o f emotion. Thus her attention must be directed by certain
interpretive expectations.
But this contradicts the model o f clinical empathy as detached "insight." If an
interpretive act is necessary even to experience the other's gestures and words as
announcem ents o f affective experience, then the goal o f ridding oneself o f one's
own affects in order to receive affective input from the patient w ithout any
prejudice or distortion, is no longer comprehensible.

Rather, empathy involves

fram ing the input that one receives from another person in terms o f one's own
emotional experiences.

To receive another's experience as meaningful requires

that one have pre-reflective expectations about what it is like to be angry, sad, etc.
Hence, empathy cannot be a kind o f detached cognition free from all perspectives
and prejudice.
Lipps' view immediately resonates with Heidegger's view, discussed in chapter
tw o, that "moods" are not discrete reactions to independent input, but unified ways
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o f being in the world, which provide an organizing framework for structuring input
in the first place.151

For Heidegger, what makes it possible to understand

som ething is the prior possibility o f being in relation to that thing, where being
m eans existing — with the full range o f affective and volitional activities.

W e can

apply this to the empathizer, who recognizes the significance o f another person's
experiences because they are related to her own concerns. The point is not just
that the em pathizer must be in some mood or other, for this is true o f all being-inthe-world. For example, Heidegger takes the theoretical observer to be in a mood,
but one that excludes receiving affective input. In contrast, the empathizer must
be in a mood that is interested in the affectivity o f another.
H ow ever, by extending Heidegger's idea that all knowing involves pre-reflective
interest to the concept o f empathy, I do not mean to assert that one can only
understand emotionally that which serves one's self-interest in the narrow sense.
To see in others only what was relevant to one's own particular needs or wishes
w ould be extremely stifling and isolating; one could never learn anything new
about others if one referenced all o f their experiences in terms o f one's narrow selfinterest.152 Rather, the empathizer cares about another's particular feelings because
they are relevant to her own existence as an affective being. It is only because we
are interested, qua persons, in a broader range o f experiences than those that serve
our narrow self-interests that we can be emotionally responsive to others without
being reactive advocates, as I argued above.
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In summary, by rethinking Lipps' discussion o f Einfiihlung, we can replace
the vague phrase "projection o f one's personality" with the following description:
Einfiihlung is an essentially experiential understanding o f another person, which
involves an active, yet not necessarily voluntary, creation o f an interpretive context.
O ne's capacity to respond as another person is w hat provides content for this
interpretive act; this is the fact emphasized by the term "personality" in the O.E.D.
definition o f empathy as "projection o f one's personality."

This act o f

experiencing-interpreting allows one to understand aspects o f reality that could not
be grasped by a detached entity who could receive sensory input, but who lacked
personality.

Ill Three M odels o f Clinical Empathy as Affective Understanding

How, specifically, can the physician's affectivity be the basis o f an interpretive
understanding o f the patient's situation?

There are various responses to this

question, but all of them share a general theme.

The em pathizer is somehow able

to grasp the subjective dimension o f the patient's situation by experiencing
som ething representative o f the patient's situation.

W hereas "projection" is taken

to refer to a pure cognitive capacity in the "insight" model o f empathy, Kohut,
B asch, and Buie take "projection o f one's personality" to refer to an affective and
im aginative capacity to feel "as-if' one were in the other person's situation.
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"as-if1 here to indicate that empathy does not require actual involvement in
another's relationships and projects, but only imaginative involvem ent.153

For

Kohut, Basch, and Buie this specifically means that the physician uses her
occurrent emotions as imaginative representations o f the patient's feelings. These
clinicians offer three different views o f how the physician's feelings serve as
im aginative representations o f the patient's feelings: K ohut presupposes that the
physician's capacity to feel what the patient feels allows her to identify with the
patient to the degree that she can momentarily experience the world as-if she and
the patient w ere one person; Basch takes the physician's emotional responses to
be direct indicators or signs o f the patient's own emotions; Buie presupposes that
the physician constructs a mental model o f the patient's attitudes by re-experiencing
her own sim ilar emotions.
The first view, which I will refer to as the "merging" model o f empathy, has
early roots in the w ork o f Freud154, Deutsch (1926)155, Fliess (1942)156, Fenichel
(1953)157, and is fully explicated by Kohut (1959).158 I consider here a generalized
picture representing the key assumptions they hold in common, without being able
to do justice to the complexity o f any one version.

These psychoanalysts

presuppose that empathy requires that the physician experience a "merging" of
herself and the patient such that she seemingly feels the patient's emotions along
with the patient. Helene Deutsch hypothesized in 1926 that empathy involves an
unconscious identification between therapist and patient in which the therapist feels
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the patient's experiences to be her own, and only on reflection recognizes that the
source o f the feeling is the patient.159

Fenichel talks about the therapist's

"narcissistic identification" with the patient which involves the "taking over by the
subject o f the object's inner state."160 Fliess talks about the therapist regressing to
a state in which he has weakened ego boundaries and can experience the patient's
inner state from within.161 Similarly, K ohut equates empathic feeling with the
bracketing from consciousness o f a distinction between self and other.

Kohut

posits that when one's critical faculties are not operative, one can experience a
boundariless continuum between another's feelings and one's ow n.162 By sharing
em otion with another in this sense, one gains access to how it feels to be in her
concrete situation.
But w hat exactly does such "merging" involve? First, the term "merging" is
a physical metaphor for a psychological experience that requires definition. Many
w riters speak o f the psychological process as one o f "identifying" with another
person.163 But the concept o f "identification" is itself in need o f clarification. The
term "identification" is not used here in the strict sense to indicate a phenomenon
in w hich one actually develops structural features o f one's personality as a result
o f im itating an admired (or feared) other. The most ubiquitous example o f strict
identification is the child's identification with the parent. Rather, the claim is that
in em pathy one identifies "not with the other person per se, but with w hat he is
experiencing."164 The "merging model" presupposes that the physician identifies
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not with the patient's character, but with the experience of being in the patient's
situation.
The idea that emotions could be shared in this sense depends upon a conception
o f em otions as intentional attitudes with corresponding typical objects.

That is,

there m ust be typical ways of seeing, and typical images, that go along with
particular emotional attitudes. Only if this is the case can it make sense to think
that in taking on an attitude, one can also take on a way o f "perceiving" a
situation. However, this conception o f emotions, which we argued for in chapter
one, does not lend particular support to the merging model; as we will see, the
typicality o f emotional objects underlies the other models o f affectivity that we
consider next.
In addition to this background conception o f emotions, the merging model o f
empathy involves at least three specific presuppositions: first, that there is a kind
o f affective communication in which one responds to another's emotions with
sim ilar emotions; second, one's feelings will be similar not only in the sense o f
being the same type o f feeling, but also in being directed toward the same type o f
situation; third, that it is possible to feel the same way another feels towards her
situation because empathy involves bracketing from consciousness ordinary
awareness o f the distinction between self and other, so that one seems to be in
another's identical situation.
First, the "merging model" relies on the idea that feelings can be "contagious."
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A lm ost every account o f clinical empathy since Freud describes a component in
w hich the physician finds herself ju st feeling sad or happy with the patient
"automatically" without relying on any effort o f thought.165 Buie, following Freud
(1892) uses the term "resonance feelings" to refer to those experiences in which
one person's mood seems to be directly transmitted to another.166 Basch argues that
such responses are based on an innate capacity to respond to another's expressed
feeling w ith the corresponding affects.167 He posits that infants respond not only
to parental smiles with smiles and tears with tears, but also with the precursors o f
jo y and sadness.

Basch bases his argument on the extensive research o f the

psychologist Silvan Tom kins,168 which shows that emotional responses originate as
innate capacities, conforming to stereotypical patterns.
The idea that w e have an innate capacity for resonant proto-emotions was
foreshadow ed in chapter one, where I argued that children learn how to respond
to typical situations by having typical emotional responses. The missing piece o f
that argum ent is the idea that children must have a capacity to resonate emotionally
with their elders in order to follow their elders in attaching to paradigm scenarios
their appropriate experiential component.
But resonance occurs not only in childhood, but throughout life. The reader
has most likely experienced a situation in which he or she has responded to another
person's tears with "automatic" tears or to her laughter with laughter.
responses are referred to as "natural sympathy."

Often, such

Rhetoricians depend upon this
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phenom enon when they deliberately use exaggerated expressions o f anger and
enthusiasm to incite a crowd. The reason for calling such responses "automatic,"
"direct," or "natural" is that they do not seem to rely on recollection, imagination,
or any oth er mental act other than noticing how another person feels.

Buie

describes sitting with a patient who was sobbing out o f intense sadness and feeling
"also purely sad; tears often rolled freely down his cheeks".169 According to Buie,
this response differed from other experiences in which he recollected related
experiences of his own, or tried to imagine how he would feel if he were in the
patient's situation.

In this case, he felt that this "was not a sadness o f his [the

clinician's] ow n."170 I take Buie's point to be that the feelings o f sadness had no
personal referent because they were not attached to a recollected or imagined
experience o f the clinician himself.
But in affirming the existence o f resonance emotion, we need not affirm the
second assum ption o f the merging model, that one's resonant emotions will be
directed tow ards another's intentional objects. In the example above, Buie feels
resonant sadness, but his sadness does not have as its initial focus the image o f
having been abandoned by one's parents as a young child (the patient's situation).
One can have resonant feelings, without seeing the world the way another sees the
world. T he physician can experience "resonant" grief with a person whose spouse
has died, w ithout actually grieving for a spouse.

Similarly, if a patient feels

persecuted by the hospital staff, the physician does not need to feel persecuted by
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the hospital staff to "resonate" with the patient's feeling o f fear.

Consider the

classic case o f "resonance" as the spread o f feeling in a mob.

Even if, for

example, an angry mob shares a general scapegoat (blacks, Jews, etc.) the
individual m embers o f the mob will be angry at different, individual fictional or
real blacks or Jews, rather than directed towards one object. One person may be
thinking o f the boss she hates, another o f the lover who rejected her. I f they have
been m anipulated by the same hate literature, their intentional objects may happen
to share some o f the same general features (such as shiftlessness or pushiness), but
this is certainly not necessary.

So resonance is insufficient for merging, in the

sense o f sharing the same attitude towards the same typical object.

But then

resonant feelings in and of themselves cannot be the basis o f grasping how, in
particular, another person feels about her situation.
Third, the "merging model" presupposes that resonance must occur in the
context o f setting aside one's critical awareness o f the distinction between oneself
and another.

This idea has its roots in Lipps' account o f empathy.

Lipps

associated the capacity to forget oneself with the ability to take on the concrete
feelings o f the "object" o f contemplation. For example, Lipps says that one can
be so absorbed in w atching an acrobat that one actually feels his excitement as one
im aginatively goes through his moves with him .171 Deutsch, Fliess, Fenichel, and
K ohut are using the concept o f empathy in the way Lipps intended when they posit
that the physician can actually experience the patient's concrete feelings through
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an attitude o f emotional absorption characterized by the suppression o f the
distinction between herself and the patient.
These psychoanalysts are aware that the concept o f empathy as "feeling into"
another's situation includes awareness o f the distinction between self and other.
But the issue is not w hether the physician is aware that she is not actually the
patient, but whether this awareness is internal or external to the experiential
m om ent o f feeling with the patient. Kohut's claim is that empathy involves tw o
steps: First, in order to directly experience what the patient's concrete feelings are
like, one must set aside awareness o f the distinction between oneself and the
patient; second, the clinician must reflectively distance herself from the patient to
consider w hether her experiential grasp o f the patient fits with other data, including
the patient's responses to her empathic communication.172
W e emphasized earlier that empathy cannot be divided into a pre-interpretative
experiential moment and a subsequent meaning bestowing reflective act: the
experiential pole o f empathy is itself an interpretive act.
consistent with this idea.

Kohut's contention is

I take his point to be that in empathy one's own

feelings are pre-reflectively informed by the project o f understanding another, so
that they actually seem to have as their source a "we" subject that unites oneself
w ith another.

But it is mistaken to presuppose that one must seemingly m erge

w ith another in this experiential sense in order to understand w hat her feelings are
like.

Edith Stein offers a persuasive criticism against this idea as it was presented
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by Lipps.

She questions Lipps claim that in the experiential moment o f empathy

"there is no distinction between our own and the foreign 'I,' that they are one. For
exam ple, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions innerly.

A

distinction only arises when I step out o f complete empathy and reflect on my "real
'I'." 173

Stein agrees w ith Lipps that actually experiencing the foreign 'I' as a

subject, rather, than ju st thinking about the 'I' as an object, is essential to empathy.
But unlike Lipps, she emphasizes that this experience is an imaginative
"announcement" and fulfilling explication o f another 'I' rather than an imaginative
m erging with another 'I.'
Stein's point is that even within the moment o f feeling with another, one does
not take oneself to be in another's here and now situation.

Following Husserl,

Stein refers to the "here and now" situation as the "primordial" situation.

Stein

com pares empathy with recollection, given that both are imaginative experiences
that "announce" the presence o f a real 'I' that is not actually "primordial." Thus,
these experiences differ from pure fantasy, in which one creates an unreal subject.
She describes recollection o f a past experience as a detailed imaginative reliving
o f the past. Recollection thus differs from mere recall in that in recollection, one
re-experiences an im aginative connection to the past event rather than ju st positing
that a certain event occurred which is causally related to one's present experience.
But, Stein says, this filling-out experience o f the past...
does not make the remembered experience primordial.

The present
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view point o f the remembered state o f affairs is completely independent o f
the remembered viewpoint.

I can remember a perception and now be

convinced that I was formerly under a delusion. I remember my discom fort
in an embarrassing situation and now think it was very funny. In this case
the memory is no more incomplete than if I again take the former
view point.174
The sam e gap exists between the 'I' who is the subject o f the im aginative act
o f em pathy, and the 'I ' who is being empathized with. Stein points out that even
i f I am so absorbed in empathizing with the acrobat that I entirely forget myself,
and pick up a dropped program without even "knowing" I did so, this does not
show that I have merged with the acrobat. F or if I reflect on the experience of
dropping my program, it is apparent that this experience was given to me directly
in the here and now (this experience had the quality o f primordiality), even though
this here and now is now past, and only given non-primordially in memory.
H ow ever, i f I reflect on the acrobats acts, it is apparent that the other's action was
only announced, but never given directly, in a past here and now o f mine.
A s a result o f Stein's analysis, w e can now clarify the essential " a s -if character
o f empathy. Stein shows that the "as-if' cannot be dissolved by the listener's selfforgetfulness. W e misspeak when we describe self-forgetful empathic absorption
as a total immersion in, or merging with another, because the inner quality o f the
act o f empathy is never one o f total merging.175 That is, it is not just the fact that
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w e m ust im agine what the other feels that makes empathy an as-if, rather than a
directly intuitive experience. Even if one brackets the third-personal awareness that
one is not really in another's situation and considers only what seems to be
happening w ithin the imaginative world o f empathy, one does not get to a
"merging" experience.

It is the internal structure o f empathy that requires an

awareness that another's experiences are not actually presented within my own
sphere o f experience. This relates to a point made by Husserl, that an essential
aspect o f empathy is the awareness o f the absence o f the other in one's own
"primordial" situation.176
The kernel o f truth in the merging model o f empathy is that the physician's
capacity to resonate with the patient's feelings contributes to clinical empathy. We
will turn to this issue next. However, we saw that such resonance does not explain
how one can understand another's concrete experience.

And we have argued

against the idea that such resonance, in the context o f bracketing one's critical
faculties, leads to a merging o f self and other in which one sam ples the other's
attitudes in concreto.

Thus the "merging model" does not give an adequate

explanation o f how the physician's emotional responses can represent the patient's
concrete situation. It is interesting that Kohut, whose theory o f empathic "merging"
is w orked out m ost extensively, ultimately reinvokes the old assum ption that the
physician must use her "merging" experiences as a first step in making inferences
about the patient.177
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The conclusion that empathy cannot be explained on the basis o f a merging
identification o f physician and patient serves our project o f coming up with a
useful model for clinical distance. For medically oriented physicians who work
under the pressures described in the introduction o f this dissertation, the equation
o f empathy with merging would mean that empathy could only constitute a small
fraction o f their practice. M ost o f the time, they need m ore distance from their
patients than the merging model permits.
The importance o f maintaining an awareness that one is not actually in the
patient's situation arises not only during invasive procedures and in the operating
room, but even when the physician's primary task is to listen to and comfort a
patient.

For example, consider the physician caring for a victim o f domestic

violence. W hile it would probably help the patient for the physician to grasp the
nature o f her feelings o f fear and mistrustfulness, it would most likely be disruptive
if the physician actually felt herself to be a co-victim, surrounded by a frightening
and hostile environment.
In addition, when the physician sets aside awareness that she is not actually in
the sam e boat with the patient, there is a great risk o f imposing the physician's
preferences on the patient. Here, the act o f "projecting one's personality" into the
"object" of one's regard becomes the psychological defense mechanism o f
"projection" which is defined as "the unconscious act or process o f ascribing to
others one's own ideas or impulses or emotions."178 Consider, for example, the
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transplant surgeon Christiaan Barnard, who identified his desire to pioneer the
technology o f heart transplants with his patient's desire to survive. A fter his first
transplant patient died, he felt so disappointed that he ran to the next patient on his
list, and pressured this ill man into a procedure no one had survived. He said to
the patient: "I feel like a pilot who has ju st crashed...Now I want you, Dr. Blaiberg,
to help m e by taking up another plane as soon as possible to get back my
confidence."179

Jay Katz shows how Barnard overlooked the meaning o f

undergoing a transplant for the patient by conflating his own goals with those o f
the patient.180 Even in the cases where a merging identification does not lead to
paternalism or physical harm to the patient, it conflicts with the basic goal o f
empathy, which is to learn something about the patient's feelings.

W hen one

projects one's own feelings onto another one does not learn anything new about
her.
A second theory

o f how the physician's emotions contribute to her

understanding o f the patient's emotional situation comes from M ichael Basch, who
was trained by K ohut.181 I will briefly summarize what I take to be the key
conceptual steps o f Basch's theory: First, Basch takes the position that infants have
an inborn capacity to respond to their caregiver's feelings with "resonance"
feelings. Basch's theoretical claim is that the infant's responsive joy is a way o f
perceiving her parent's joy. Basch's second claim is that as the person develops
and learns, these originally stereotypical perceptual patterns become enriched and
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individuated by the associative context they become embedded in. That is, because
they have a psychological significance from the start, these responses can be
connected to other experiential phenomena: happy feelings may come to be
connected with being in certain places, being touched lovingly, etc. Basch's point,
w hich originates with Freud182, is that the perceptual content o f one's affective
attitudes is essentially connected to one's associations. He argues against the idea
that the physician must regress and experience a kind o f infantile resonance in
order to em pathize with the patient. Rather, as an adult, the physician responds
w ith differentiated em otions with particular foci.183
Furtherm ore, Basch claims that the physician can apply her own images to the
patient's situation through a process o f "generalization" in which one attributes
feelings to another person while maintaining awareness o f the process o f attribution
and the distance between self and other.184 But this only explains how one's own
im ages may be made relevant to the other person, not how one can receive new
inform ation from listening to the other.

Extrapolating from Basch's model, one

could argue that the physician is able to learn something new from the patient
because her associations are expanded by the story the patient tells.

But note that

this still does not explain how another person's imagery can take on experiential
im port for the listener, and become incorporated in the listener's own associative
context.

Ultimately, Basch (like Kohut) relies on the traditional model o f

introspection and inference to explain how the empathizer's affective-cognitive
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responses can be moved along from their own prior content to new content that is
inform ative about the patient. First the physician observes the patient; then she
feels resonance emotion; then she infers from her own feelings and her general
understanding o f emotional experience some tentative ideas about the patient's
experience. But this does not explain how the physician's own emotions can be
directed towards the patient's concrete situation, as they must be if they are to be
sources o f information rather than mere repetitions.

Thus, while Basch's

developm ental view o f emotional communication is quite interesting, it still does
not explain how one's feelings can be in dynamic communication with another's
experience such that they can represent her attitudes in new and informative ways.
A third view, that o f Daniel B uie185, takes heterogeneous m odes o f cognition,
including resonance feelings, recollection, fantasy and conceptual knowledge, to
contribute to empathy. These diverse experiences allow the physician to build a
progressing model o f the patient's world. Buie is not the first to describe empathy
as involving the building of a mental model o f the patient.186

However, the

innovative, feature o f Buie's conception is his emphasis on the physician's affective
responses to the patient as essential resources for the construction of this model.
The physician can only develop and fill-out a model o f the patient's situation-aslived by experiencing an affective relationship with the patient over time.
A ccording to Buie, the landmarks o f this map are the physician's imagined,
recollected, and resonance feelings, which are organized around a guiding thread
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o f conceptual know ledge about the patient.

Here is Buie's example o f how recollected feelings contribute to the therapist's
understanding o f a patient. W hile listening to a patient who discussed feeling sad
about an upcoming interruption o f her treatment, the psychotherapist...
noted feeling mildly sad also and spontaneously asked 'three-year old
sadness?1 The patient grew sadder but relaxed as she engaged in working
through her residual feelings about a traumatic separation from her m other
at age three...the therapist realized that his empathic sadness was his own,
arising from a similar enough experience in his childhood.187
In this example, the physician's capacity to imaginatively relive the sad feelings
he connects with his childhood abandonment contributes to his understanding o f
how the patient feels. Yet Buie points out that the physician's own experience o f
abandonm ent had importantly different concrete features from that o f the patient,
and it is exactly these concrete features that the physician needs to grasp in order
to understand how a particular patient is feeling.

How did reliving an emotion

from his own, only typically related experience, contribute to the physician's grasp
o f the patient's concrete situation? Buie gives a hint in this passage.

W ithout an

additional cognitive act o f inference, the psychotherapist felt that his recollected
sadness mapped on to a three-year old's experience, even though he was actually
about five when his own traumatic separation from his parents occurred.

Buie

takes this to follow from the fact that the working model o f the patient already
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included as a salient feature an upsetting separation from the m other at age three.
The physician's model o f the patient's world directed his own affective responses
to the appropriate aspect o f the patient's situation.
A sim ilar point is made in Buie's description o f the use o f imaginative
imitation to understand how a woman patient feels about her sexuality, given her
recollected experience o f being molested by some boys as a little girl. The boys,
who she had been playing with "pushed dirt and pebbles into her vagina.

Her

excitem ent and exhibitionistic pleasure turned to vengeful rage and shame when,
in the process, the boys hurt her genitally and made fun o f her."

W hile the

physician relied on some recollections from his own childhood experiences to elicit
some sim ilar feelings to those o f the patient, "he became aware that his empathic
understanding was limited."

He then imagined him self "anatomically and

emotionally as a little girl going through all the details o f her excitement, trauma,
humiliation, and rage."188 Buie tells us that this imaginative experience enabled the
physician to com m unicate better with the patient about her sexuality.
H ere Buie again illustrates the fact that the concrete features o f the patient's
situation directs the type and content o f the affective experiences the physician uses
to understand the patient. In this case, the physician made a deliberate effort to
fantasize those aspects o f the patient's experience that were not available to him
through recollection and resonance. But while the decision to imagine him self as
a little girl w as voluntary, and the result o f reflection, the fantasy that ensued was
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not reducible to a deliberate act o f thought. Rather, Buie implies that by moving
im aginatively through the experiences of humiliation and rage, he was led to
unexpected thoughts that contributed to his understanding o f the patient.
B ut how can it be possible for one to experience feelings o f abandonment as
referring to a three year old w hose mother was unavailable, when one actually felt
sim ilar feelings as a five year old whose father was rejecting?

And how can a

man evoke feelings in him self that pertain to a little girl's experience o f being
sexually molested? That is, how can one's own experiential responses be directed
by one's appreciation o f the feature's o f another person's situation?

Buie never

addresses this point directly. Instead, he too ultimately invokes the idea that the
physician connects her feelings to the patient's situation via non-affective
inferences. Thus, despite the richness o f his analysis, he still does not explain the
mode o f representation that allows the physician to see new, affective features of
th e patient's situation.

IV

A Non-Inferential Model o f Clinical Empathy

My explanation o f how one's own affects can refer to the features o f another's
situation centers around the idea that the physician's modeling o f the patient's
situation is essentially an act o f imagining how it feels to be in the patient's
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situation, rather than an act o f making inferences about the patient's situation or an
experience o f merging with the patient. I turn to some w ork by Edward Casey and
R ichard W ollheim on imagining how another feels, to bring out the key features
o f the im aginative representation of another's experience.
In Im agining.189 Casey describes "imagining how" as follows:
W e are capable not only o f imaging (objects and events) and imagining that
(states o f affairs obtain), but also o f imagining how to do, think, or feel
certain things, as well as how to move, behave, or speak in certain w ays.190
There is a sense o f personal agency, or the imaginer's own involvement in
w hat is being imagined, which is lacking or at least muted in instances o f
sheer imagining-that. To imagine how is to project not merely a state o f
affairs simpliciter (ie. one in which the imaginer is not a participant) but a
state o f affairs into which the imaginer has also projected him self (or a
surrogate)191 as an active192 being who is experiencing how it is to do, feel,
think, move. etc. in a certain manner.193
The distinguishing feature o f the "imagining-how" in the case o f empathy is
that the images and relations in the imagined world are organized from the
perspective o f an agent rather than for an external observer.

For example, Casey

says that in imagining how to lace up a boot one would imagine the kinesthetic
sensations involved in the action o f boot-lacing.194 The reader m ight challenge this
point by invoking those fantasies in which one imagines how two persons do
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som ething together; it might seem that in such cases one need not organize one's
im aginings from the viewpoint o f an agent. Consider, for example, that I imagine
how person A gives person B a flower.

I f what I im agine could be described

either from the perspective o f the flower giver or the flower receiver, then the
im aginative portrayal m ust itself be multivalent — it m ust be open to more than one
perspective rather than categorically organized from an agent's perspective. But,
as Richard W ollheim points out, it is different to imagine how A gives B a flower
than it is to imagine how B receives a flower from A .195 It may be possible to
im agine both things, but only sequentially, never in one act.

A ccording to

W ollheim , when one imagines how A experiences som ething, one "liberally and
systematically intersperses imagining his doing certain things with im agining his
feeling and thinking certain things."196 I take W ollheim 's point to be that in
imaging how A feels I follow the flow o f A's feelings and thoughts as they would
flow in life for the experiencing subject.197 If B's feelings are noticed, it is as they
are expressed for A. For example, if I imagine B scowling at A, this scowl is felt
as a rejection, which is its meaning for A, rather than as w hatever it felt like for
B.

I f more "interior" awareness o f B's feelings intervenes, then one is now

im agining how it feels for B to receive flowers from A, and A will only be noticed
as B would notice A.
From my own experience I can identify several levels o f "interiority" that
characterize imagining another's experience from the inside out rather than the
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outside in. First o f all, there is the level o f bodily experience, including kinesthetic
sensations— one imagines how it feels to walk on crutches, to try to lift one's body
out o f bed w hen one is exhausted; one imagines pains, feelings o f nausea,
dizziness, etc.

Second, there is the level o f environment-as-lived — not the

geom etric description o f a room, but the room as it surrounds one who lives in it,
how it looks, smells, sounds. Thirdly, there are the feelings and attitudes the agent
has tow ards visible and invisible others and events in her world. Some o f these
attitudes will have a concrete focus -- for example, anger at a parent. Others will
provide an overall atmosphere

— for example, being in a depressed mood.

Looking back at the definition o f empathy, we can now replace the metaphor o f
"projecting" oneself imaginatively into another's situation with the concrete activity
o f focusing one's imaginative productions on the various "interior" features o f
another person's experience.
To illustrate these levels o f "interiority" here are some first hand examples
from my experiences with clinical empathy.

The first level, imagining bodily

sensations, is one which occurred when patients were experiencing overwhelming
pain and discom fort. For example, while caring for women in labor and assisting
in deliveries, I watched women go through waves o f contractions and release. I
imagined how such contractions might feel — the pressure in one's abdomen and
pelvis, the pain that accompanies stretching o f muscle wall, as in bowel discomfort
-- and the feeling o f comfort and exhaustion as each contraction waned.
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second level o f "interiority" — the sights, sounds, smells o f the patient's immediate
environm ent — is one with which I am most familiar. During a two year period
I gave regular, primary care to a group o f patients. In retrospect I find that I have
vivid pictures o f the bedrooms, offices, etc. o f these patients, even though I never
visited these places. These pictures developed while I listened to particular stories.
For example, in the case o f Ms.D, who suffered from insomnia, I pictured her
bedroom on the top floor o f her house. I pictured the room as stifling, with no
breeze, and high hum idity, with one small window with dusty curtains, and utter
silence and darkness. I pictured how exhausting and lonely it felt to drag oneself
all the way downstairs, trying not to wake up her daughter and grandchildren, who
w ould only reprimand her. I imagined mixing a drink and sitting in front o f the
television, trying to relax. Corresponding to a time when Ms.D. was recovering
from her underlying problem (a major depression) and starting to be active and
engaged with her fam ily, I imagined her cooking macaroni and tom ato sauce in her
kitchen, with her grandchildren there. I did not actually "image" her grandchildren,
but felt a nice feeling o f having company and being part o f a lively family. I did
"image" the kitchen — it looked much like my own kitchen, and was sunny and
breezy. I even imagined the smell o f the tomato sauce.
As for the third level of "interiority" — the patient's attitudes towards others
and specific issues, or her generalized moods — the two aspects require separate
exam ples. In the case o f an attitude towards something, I will again use the patient
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M s.D . M s.D had a divorced daughter, with children, who wanted very much to
rem arry. The daughter had recently come to live with Ms.D for economic reasons,
and

Ms.D had started to recover from her depression as her loneliness was

alleviated.

W hen she told me the "good" news that her daughter had become

engaged, and was planning to move to another city, I imagined how it would feel
to receive this news. I imaginatively experienced not only the expected feelings
o f fear at being alone, but also feelings o f guilt for not feeling happy for "my"
daughter. A s an example o f taking on the generalized mood o f a patient, I recall
m y experience w ith a patient who was experiencing the rapid onset o f senility.
M r. D described recent experiences in which he got lost going to work, and could
not locate everyday objects at home. W hile listening to him I imagined how it
w ould feel to discover such gaps in one's own abilities, and experienced feelings
o f em barrassm ent and shame. In a later conversation with M r.D, he revealed that
he felt ashamed, and that a desire to cover-up his mistakes was motivating his
social withdrawal.
These examples, like Buie's examples, bring home the basic fact that the
features or images that give content to the imagined subject's world are feature's
o f the patient's situation. That is, they are features o f the patient's situation as the
physician grasps and portrays this situation. This helps explain why empathy takes
tim e, and is essentially dependent on communication. In the first encounters with
a patient, a physician will depend largely on her generalized concepts o f what
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children, or older men, or people with cancer, are like. Hopefully, these concepts
will be rich ones, derived not only from medical texts, but from personal
relationships, previous interactions with patients, reading literature, etc. But it is
only after the particular patient supplies the physician with image-laden stories that
the physician can begin to fill-in the specific features o f the im agined subject's
w orld.198
In describing the levels at which one can imagine how it feels to be the agent
in the patient's drama, I stumbled over the difficulty o f identifying our imaginary
protagonist — for example, did I imagine that I now had a daughter, or that I was
em barrassed, or was the subject o f my imagining-how some representation o f the
patient, and not myself? It is not insignificant that I was able to say "she" or "I"
or to leave this unspecified in the above examples.

C asey199 points out that in

im agining how an experience feels, the imagined subject can easily be left
unspecified. W ollheim and Casey both argue that just because the features of an
imagined situation are features o f a real person's experience, it does not follow that
one must imagine the experience as happening to that real individual.200 Both
authors also imply that just because the affective elem ents o f the imaginative
experience have as their source the person who is doing the imagining, this does
not entail that the imaginer must imagine that she herself is the agent. The general
point here is that the knowledge one has o f someone's concrete situation need not
enter into the imaginative portrayal as descriptive aspects o f the imagined subject
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to provide the content o f that subject's experience. One need not specify that the
imagined agent is a three-year old to imagine the world as viewed from a threeyear old's perspective. The "spontaneity" o f imaginative experience seems to rest
on ju s t this power to landscape the scene with images from disparate sources
w ithout having to explain their occurrence, or apparent unity, by the ordinary rules
o f empirical experience.
This helps us see more clearly the error in the "merging" model o f empathy.
The "merging" model presupposes that the fact that empathy involves an
integration o f the physician's own affects and the patient's images entails that the
physician must imagine herself in the patient's situation.201 But the exam ples above
show that one need not specify that it is oneself that is in the imagined situation
in order to imagine from an agent-centered perspective.
But this leads us back to a more precise form o f the question that we asked
previously: How can the physician's own affects refer to the concrete features of
the patient's situation in an informative way, via imagining how? That is, how can
one's know ledge o f the concrete features o f another's situation — for example, the
fact that another w as three when her mother left -- lead one to feel emotions that
are appropriate to these concrete circumstances? And, going in the other direction,
how can these feelings lead one to understand and perceive new concrete aspects
o f her situation that one has no prior first-hand experience of?
The difficulty w e face in answering these questions is that our models of
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cognition

presuppose that the event o f imaginatively

portraying another's

experience is in principle independent o f the event o f responding affectively to
another's experience.

The assumption is that the spontaneity to see things

differently resides in a cognitive act o f imagining, which is somehow causally
related to, but independent of, the emotional experience o f feeling with another
person.

The underlying assumption here is that emotions are generalized pre

program m ed reactions to typical situations that cannot in and o f themselves
incorporate new features.
If em otions are ingrained responses, as Descartes thought, then we need to find
a m ediating pure cognitive act that explains how a non-specific experience can be
m ade into material for building a mental model o f another's world. But this forces
us (like Basch and Kohut) to reinvoke the same problematic conception o f empathy
as inference that we rejected earlier.

For what is to guarantee that one's

im aginative portrayal and one's affective responses will be appropriately linked?
W e must posit an additional act o f inner cognition that attunes the picture thought
has painted in the imagination to one's typical emotional responses. But this search
for an inner translator leads to an endless regress.202
The feelings that contribute to one's understanding o f another are not
independent events that result from imagining another's situation. Rather, they are
an essential aspect o f the event o f imagining how another feels. This distinction
is elaborated by Wollheim.

He says that there are cases in which an event o f
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im agining how something feels causes an independent event o f affective response:
F or example, imagining how some forbidden sexual act feels, when I reflect on it
from outside the fantasy experience, causes me to feel shame.

But Wollheim

contrasts this with the kind o f feeling th at characterizes the act o f fantasizing itself:
w hile imagining how the act feels, I feel erotic pleasure. W ollheim 's point is that
there are affective experiences that occur in imagining how this or that feels.
These feelings are an integral part o f imagining how something feels. Given that
the affect is an aspect o f the event o f imagining how, it makes no sense to ask for
a chain o f causes between the event o f imagining and the event o f feeling. Since
they are not separate events, they can have no mediating causes.
Returning to our problem, we see th at it makes no sense to look for a mediator
between the imaginative portrayal o f another's experience and the emotional
response to that portrayal.

Rather, one's feelings are constitutive o f the

im aginative portrayal of another person's experience. In empathy the physician's
concepts and feelings work together as they do in her own first-hand experience.
In one's first-hand experience, one's thoughts and feelings are aspects o f a unified
"totality" that comprises the experience o f being in a "world" (Heidegger's
concept). In empathy one uses one's imagination to produce a world that also has
the character o f an experiential "totality."
The picture of the empathizer as m oving "from" perceptual im ages created by
active mind to passive affective responses, and from passive affective responses to
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the creation o f new perceptual images, is misleading. The "from" does not pertain
to m oving through tim e in the sense o f a chain o f efficient causes, but to moving
through depths o f experience, in which one fills in the affective elem ents implicit
in the patient's story via one's own affective responses.

But this shows that

em pathic "imagining how" is radically different from other cognitive acts that
depend upon m oving from one idea to another via inference.

There is no

com prehensible chain o f ideas that can be detached from the affective experience
o f the empathizer, and presented as a logically com plete chain of ideas.

The

m ovem ent o f ideas in empathic understanding is essentially affective and
experiential.

In this sense the thinking involved in empathy is more like the

thinking involved in dreaming, in that one image is often connected to the next
because both images, however different they might appear to a detached observer,
express sim ilar feelings.203 Hence the standpoint o f detachment is incompatible
with empathic imagining how.
The idea that emotional resonance is possible because humans share typical
emotional responses, need not be taken to imply that em otions lack the spontaneity
to take on new objects.

In chapter two we argued against Descartes that the

typicality o f emotions does not imply that they are like blind reflexes.

Rather,

em otions are typical because humans share not only biological traits, but
paradigm atic ways o f encapsulating the dramatic features o f experience. W e can
respond with the appropriate affect to another's concrete situation because we share
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com m on paradigm scenarios.

But, on the other hand, we can imagine new

concrete aspects o f another's situation because each emotional experience o f our
own spontaneously incorporates new features o f experience. If emotional learning
did not occur continuously throughout our lives, then we could only love others
who w ere exactly like our first love objects, only be interested in activities exactly
like our first activities, etc. But even in cases o f psychological disturbance such
rigidity can only be approximated, given the natural mutability o f the foci o f
em otions (hence the instability o f the fetishist who can never really relive the
fantasized scenario). Normally, the paradigm scenarios defining emotion types are
general and flexible enough to allow for the incorporation o f new emotional
experiences as somehow already familiar. (As we mentioned earlier, one example
o f this kind o f mutability without an awareness o f strangeness is the "primary
process" associations that occur in dreams).
T he normal mutability o f emotional objects explains much o f the spontaneity
o f clinical empathy, but not all o f it. As Osier and H ooker recognize, physicians
are often asked to understand experiences that are normally kept out o f awareness.
In order to empathize with "abnormal" experiences physicians need a way to
cultivate unusual emotional flexibility. Buie shows the flexibility to go beyond his
"natural" scope when he imagines what it would feel like to have the body o f a
young girl. Once started on this new path, the images o f being molested as a little
girl becom e the target o f Buie's own familiar (presumably childhood) fears of
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bodily harm by strong, cruel others. I hypothesize that the variance in physicians'
capacities for empathy relates to the degree to which different physicians are free
to expand their emotional focus beyond the range o f their previous paradigm
scenarios. This would support the notion that empathy can be enhanced over time,
since

processes

like

consciousness-raising

and

psychoanalytic

exploration

(including in time efficient intensive seminars and groups) seem to greatly enhance
this kind o f flexibility. In chapter five I will focus on the capacity for moving
oneself beyond fam iliar experience, which I see as rooted in the affect o f curiosity.

V

Som e Limitations o f Clinical Empathy

The capacity to understand the patient experientially enables the physician to
take a better history, to communicate with the patient more accurately, and to form
the kind o f alliance with the patient that is needed for treatment to be efficacious.
In the next chapter I begin with a clinical case to illustrate some o f the practical
features o f clinical empathy. However, there are several limits to clinical empathy
that we also need to consider in chapter five.
First, given that the physician's goal is to accurately understand the patient's
situation for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment, what she learns about the
patient m ust lead to working hypotheses that can be refined, rejected or approved
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through dialogue with the patient; and her imaginings must be guided by concepts
and even abstract theories. Hence whereas the activity o f "imagining how" cannot
be reduced to an act of reflective thought, this activity must be responsive to the
physician's reflective thought about the patient.204
Second, the fact that in empathy the physician can never actually experience
the patient's here and now situation, but can only grasp it approximately sets
im portant limits on the accuracy, completeness, and efficacy o f her imaginative
understanding o f the patient. As a result, physicians need to be aw are o f the gap
between their empathic creations and their patients' experiences, and to recognize
their patients' expertise with regard to their own attitudes.

And they need to be

aware that empathy is only one mode o f understanding a patient, and that even
with regard to emotional matters it may not be the best source o f diagnostic and
prognostic information.

For example, psychiatrists assessing patients for the

seriousness o f their suicidal or homicidal intentions are sometimes mislead by their
em pathic grasp o f the patient's attitudes, and would find a better source o f
information in looking at the patient epidemiologically.
Finally, empathy does invite strong emotions at times that may influence the
physician to behave out o f role.

But less empathic physicians also experience

many other invitations to react emotionally to patients at the expense o f their
doctoring. Consider, for example, how lust or anger can disturb one's capacity to
listen and express ideas.

W ith these issues in mind, I now give, in the final
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chapter, an account o f emotional regulation that is compatible with emotional
involvem ent and aims for empathy and respect for patients.

By criticizing the

pictures o f clinical empathy as detached insight and sympathetic merging, I have
laid the foundation for a more realistic account o f emotional regulation necessary
for medical practice. W e can leave behind the demand that the physician split off
her cognitive capacities from her affective capacities, and consider how she can
better serve patients by using all o f the elements o f her personality.
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Chapter Five: Regulating Emotions in Caring for Patients

I disliked him immediately. He was one o f the last patients I worked
up during my internship, a seemingly interminable year that w as finally
com ing to a close. His diagnosis was inoperable lung cancer, the deadly
seed o f which had already blossomed in his liver and bones. He had
refused chemotherapy in the past, consenting only to local radiation therapy.
Concerned about his increasing confusion, hostility, and disorientation, his
fam ily had brought him that night to the emergency room for evaluation.
A s I approached him, I could sense his hostility. He looked older than
his 72 years; the ravages o f cancer were obvious in his pasty complexion
and marked muscle wasting. His eyes sat deep in their sockets, and the
sparse w hite tufts o f hair on his head reminded me o f dead trees on a
m ountain ridge.
"I don't like doctors and I don't want to stay," he began. "Who are you
anyw ay? You'd better not be a medical student! The last time, a student
tried for an hour just to get some blood from me!"
[So begins an
interaction in which the patient continually vents anger towards the
physician, but submits to an evaluation which shows no physical cause of
his agitation and combativeness.]
I decided to look for emotional or psychological reasons for his
hostility. W ith trepidation I approached his bed, sat down beside him, and
asked, "W ould you mind telling me a bit more about what you've got wrong
with you?" He said he knew he had metastatic lung cancer, that it was
going to kill him, and that he was willing to accept his fate; it was his
family that kept bringing him for evaluation "at the drop o f a hat."
"M akes you sort o f mad, doesn't it?"
"I just want to die at home," he said. "Save your fancy technology
for som eone else. I don't w ant your tubes and catheters; I w ant to go while
I'm still in charge o f my life."
W hen I admitted that tubes and catheters wouldn't help him get well,
he relaxed and much o f his hostility disappeared.
"When I first found out I had cancer," he said, "I denied it, like
anyone would. Then I became angry — with my family, my friends, my
doctor; I blamed them all for what was happening to me...I was mad as
hell, too, because they were all telling me what to do. I was the one with
the cancer, they were the ones making the decisions. I read up on cancer
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and talked with people who had had chemotherapy. I decided I had lived
a good life and the doctors could keep their chemotherapy and its side
effects. I had done all I wanted to do in this world and it was tim e to leave
it my way." A certain belligerent set came back to his jaw, and he said, "I
can honestly say I'm at peace with m yself and my decision. Tell my family
that," he said, tapping my chest with his finger. "Tell them there's nothing
you can do -- and nothing I would let you do even if you could!"
W e spoke for a while longer ..."I'm in pain most o f the time now, but
I w as brought up not to show suffering -- to be stoic. Lord knows if my
family learns about the pain, they'll hover over me like I'm a helpless baby.
I know I'm giving them a hard time, but fighting is all I have left — all I
have to remind them that I'm still capable o f running my life." I asked if
he could talk about all this with his family, and he said, "No, it's my
problem, and I'm going to stay in control."
I admired his courage, and I wondered if I would be as brave in the
same situation. I learned more about the complexities o f cancer from him
than from any textbook I had read. And when I left that day, I found that
my hostility, like his, had disappeared.
I had mixed emotions when he was discharged the next morning. He
had his w ish to go home. For that I was glad and I hoped that he wouldn't
have to come back, but I knew that I would miss a man I had come to
like.205
In this final chapter I offer an account o f how physicians can regulate their
em otions in order to meet the demands o f medical practice for objectivity and
efficacy as well as for empathy and respect for patients. In this clinical vignette,
Dr. Linett (herein Dr. L) faces the double task o f regulating his anger and disdain,
as w ell as developing empathy and respect. One result o f my analyses o f empathy
and respect is that I no longer find the phrase "clinical distance" adequate for what
physicians need to develop.

Being too distant (i.e. failing to respond affectively

to patients, and thus failing to understand them and to have adequate moral
relationships with them) is as problematic as failing to contain difficult emotions.
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I choose instead to talk about "regulating" emotions to refer to the process of
responding appropriately to patients.
This vignette brings to the fore the following philosophical problems. First,
how can physicians' emotions involve being genuinely moved by circumstances
and still be in some sense under their control?206 Dr. L is moved by the patient's
threats, sadness, and courage, sequentially. Once the patient is seen as scary, or
pathetic, or brave, Dr. L's emotions are already part o f these portrayals, in the way
fear is already part o f the portrayal o f the scary tiger.

B ut if Dr. L cannot choose

how to feel about the scary, pathetic or brave patient at any mom ent in time, how
can he steer his own emotional course?
Second, as we concluded in chapter two, detached thought alone is insufficient
to direct attention, so Dr. L's shifts in attention must themselves be affectively
m ediated.

D oes this mean that the shifts in emotion that Dr. L undergoes are

determ ined by the situation Dr. L happens to find him self in and how things in that
situation happen to m ove him?

If so, there would be no room for freedom or

control o f the sort Dr. L apparently demonstrates.
The error in taking Dr. L to be passively moved by external circumstances from
one emotion to another is to conflate the idea o f the focus o f an emotion, which
logically determines the emotion one is in, with the actual situation o f the agent
in the world, which plays an important but not all determining causal role in what
em otion the agent will experience. The focus o f the emotion does logically define
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the emotion one is in, but a focus is not ju st what is happening in the w orld -- the
person's actual situation as viewable from multiple perspectives. Rather a focus
portrays an aspect o f being in the world that the person holds in m ind in a
concernful manner.207 W hat is deceptive about examples like seeing a scary tiger,
is that the agent's situation appears to determine the focus o f her emotion because
alm ost anyone being charged by a tiger will focus on the tiger as scary. But this
is an empirical fact, not a logical argument linking situation and foci o f emotions
in general. W e can contrast this with a case o f sitting next to someone on a bus,
w here the situation so little constrains one's focus that different people will have
very different responses.

One person may be curious about the person's book,

another lustful towards the person qua sexual object, another annoyed at his taking
up so much o f the seat. In general what moves us in any situation we are in is not
predictable by describing the "external" situation —the view that ignores our
biography— without saying something about us, our thoughts and values.
The real difficulty we have in seeing how Dr. L's emotional shifts could be
determined by his own agency is that we lack a picture o f how Dr. L could
"reflect" on and deliberately shift his own emotions w ithout taking "time o f f from
being genuinely moved by circumstances. I will argue that such time o ff is not
needed, by showing that the agent's shifts in emotion are them selves emotionally
mediated, yet directed by the agent's deliberately m aintained role.
My account o f the kind o f "practical reasoning" involved in emotional control
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has four parts. In the first part I trace the shifts in emotions that Dr. L undergoes
in this clinical encounter. In the second part o f this chapter I develop a causal
account o f how physicians can make themselves shift emotions on the model o f
interpersonal persuasion. In the third part, I argue that in addition to acting on
them selves persuasively, physicians need curiosity, which provides imaginative
freedom to invoke alternative conceptions o f their situation. In the fourth part, I
consider w hether or not physicians need to forsake a realistic appreciation o f
patient's suffering for their other goals o f respecting patients and maintaining
therapeutic efficacy; this leads to an account o f courage as an emotion that allows
physicians to face suffering without detachment.

I

Em otional Transitions in a Clinical Encounter

L et us begin by tracing Dr. L's shifts in emotion. In the first paragraph Dr.
L show s that he is immediately aware o f his dislike for the patient, and o f how this
dislike is fanned into hateful feelings in the context o f his exhaustion and
resentm ent at the end o f a long year o f overwork (his internship). In describing
the focus o f his dislike he mentions first not the patient's orneriness, but the fact
that his lung cancer is "inoperable" and that the patient refused chemotherapy. The
nature o f the patient's illness and the patient's reactions are viewed together as a
threat to Dr. L's own confidence in medicine. Dr. L then them atizes the patient's
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provoking behavior, his "hostility" as the "chief complaint," the initial description
o f the problem that brings the patient to need medical attention. This makes it
clear that Dr. L sees it as essential to his role as a physician to address and manage
the patient's hostility.
In the next paragraph Dr. L meets the patient for the first time with a
reluctance based on his preconception that this will be a difficult man to encounter
—"as I approached him, I could sense his hostility."

He first attempts to focus on

the aesthetic presentation o f the patient, rather than on how disturbed the patient's
m orbid appearance makes him feel.

He does not feel chilled at seeing the wasted

face o f this m an but rather experiences a kind o f aesthetic pleasure, like a painter
or poet, in noticing the "sparse white tufts o f hair" like "dead trees on a mountain
ridge."
However, the patient resists this distancing, aesthetic view o f his situation, and
im m ediately engages Dr. L humanly by telling him that he doesn't like doctors,
doesn't w ant to stay, and further that he senses the youth and inexperience o f Dr.
L and doubts he is an adequate physician.

Dr. L carefully plays down his

inexperience (omitted section), suggesting that he feels inadequate before this
patient.

Through the night he attempts to curtail arguments with the patient by

keeping their discussions short, aware o f his own increasing hostility towards this
angry patient and towards his responsibilities as a physician. He does a brain scan
to look for physical causes o f the "problem" (the patient's hostility) and then rather
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than attempting to engage in further discussion with the patient, given his own
condition, he catches the few available hours left for sleep.
In the morning Dr.L feels ready to try to do his job, which includes
understanding the emotional causes o f the patient's hostility from the patient's point
o f view . Despite his trepidation he makes him self sit down beside the patient, a
literal enactm ent o f his verbal invitation to the patient to tell his doctor about his
first-hand experience o f his illness. The patient rises to the occasion, and conveys
his understanding of his illness and his sense o f being abandoned by his family.
Dr. L is sufficiently affectively attuned to the patient at this point to see how being
dumped in the emergency room "at the drop of a hat" would be angering, and to
acknowledge honestly and without the insecurity he felt the night before, that no
medical interventions could really help the patient get well at this point.

I infer

that this kind o f confession on Linett's part follows from an empathic appreciation
o f the patient's longing to have someone else face with him the hopelessness o f
medical treatm ent and the inevitability o f his death, rather than warding o ff such
experiences with optimistic therapeutic statements. Dr. L's deliberate act o f sitting
and listening to this disliked patient, as well as the patient's gift o f sharing his
experience, make it possible for Dr. L to shift into an em pathic stance.
The patient becomes much less hostile in response to this shift in Dr. L. He
shows for the first time an eagerness to communicate. He identifies his anger and
owns it, finding increasing vitality in affirming his need to be in charge o f his own
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care. His sense o f him self is solidified by being able to reprimand his family via
reprim anding his non-abandoning, non-judgmental doctor "tell them there's nothing
you can do — and nothing I would let you do even if you could!"
W e see in this vignette that empathic listening can be directly therapeutic. The
patient is able to speak at a level that goes beyond ordinary conversation, involving
the articulation o f feelings and concerns that he was probably not even aware of.
He identifies as the cause o f his fighting with his family the need to protect
him self from being a helpless baby.

His recognition o f his own denial is apparent

when he says "fighting is all I have left."

This is an ironic statem ent infused not

with defensive anger but with g rief and pathos, which however, are still partially
disavowed. If Dr. L w ere doing psychotherapy he would have the opportunity here
for a m utative interpretation, a statement addressed to the patient's unconscious that
would attempt to unlink the idea that to fight is to protect against feelings o f
helplessness; such an interpretation might radically alter the patient's assumption
that he needs to keep his family at a distance.

Instead, under the pressure o f time

and also with an impending feeling o f grief that this patient will soon die, Dr. L
does not them atize for the patient the ironic use o f his orneriness, but rather
accepts the need for it with admiration for the patient's courage.
Dr.L shifts here from an empathic stance to a feeling o f admiration which has
as its focus not w hat the world feels like to the patient (it feels threatening) but the
patient as viewed from outside as the hero o f a narrative. H e talks about admiring
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the patient's courage and wondering if he could be as brave.

In chapter four, I

argued that this kind o f identification in which one thinks about one's actual self
in another's situation is not empathy, although it certainly builds attachment.

Dr.

L's felt reverence for the patient is also revealed in his statement that he learned
m ore from this patient then from any textbook about cancer.

M oved by

adm iration, Dr. L does not interfere with the patient's decision to leave the hospital
and refuse further care, nor does he pressure the patient to talk more openly with
his family. Dr. L thus apparently fulfills his moral obligation to respect the patient
in the context o f a feeling o f admiration for the patient as a particular person who
has a particular way o f coping with his illness. I will consider later in this chapter
w hether such admiration is a necessary aspect o f respecting the patient, and also
how such admiration interferes with understanding the patient's situation fully.
Finally, Dr. L notes that he will miss the patient, whose discharge represents
to Dr. L his ultimate parting.

This brief but intense encounter touched Dr. L at

a personal level; he feels a kinship with this patient. W e could easily imagine Dr.
L feeling emotional pain if the patient were to break down his defenses and show
terror or a dissolution o f self, or if he were to be mistreated by his family. By the
end o f their encounter, Dr. L's natural reactions to "bad" news about this patient
w ould probably be more sim ilar to those o f a friend or family member than they
w ould be to the deliberately non-judgmental listener who sat next to the patient on
his bed and got him to start talking.

In part three I consider what kind o f
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emotional perspective is needed for physicians to face the suffering and loss o f
patients who, as Dr. L puts it, they have "come to like" over time.

II Em otional Regulation Involves Self-Persuasion

Dr. L regulates his emotions in this encounter by shifting his affective focus
in a way that enables him to be a better physician. He begins with a sense o f the
patient in the emergency room as an enormous burden to the overworked, abused
intern he feels him self to be, and ends with a view o f the patient as a kind o f
spiritual teacher to the receptive, maturing physician he feels him self to be.

This

does not necessarily imply a shift in beliefs, as our discussion o f emotional inertia
in chapter tw o made clear. Dr. L may have throughout the entire interaction the
unw avering belief that he is a dedicated doctor trying to help an ornery man whose
orneriness is a defense against his fear o f helplessness.

How can w e make sense

o f the observation that Dr. L directs his emotions by directing what he focuses on,
given that w e have argued earlier that the focus is itself not a detached thought but
a construct with built-in affect?

How can Dr. L deliberately move towards the

affective experience o f feeling admiration for the courageous aspect o f the patient?
R obert Roberts208 gives an account o f shifts in how one construes something
that allow for emotional control and redirection.

He defines "construing" as

"bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or thought to
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bear,"209 His point is that construing is "noticing an aspect" o f one's situation by
seeing the current scenario in terms o f some other thought or image.

Roberts

gives the following example. He imagines standing on a tall, wobbly ladder in
order to rescue his daughter from a fire.
I do not need to cease judging the situation to be dangerous to cease feeling
afraid. To cease feeling afraid (or start feeling less afraid), I need to refocus
the situation in some appropriate way...Instead o f construing the situation
as a threat to mv well-being -- say in terms o f an image o f m yself
plummeting 25 feet to the pavement — I construe it as a rescue task — say
in term s of an image o f walking down that ladder with my daughter safely
in my arms.201
T he point of Roberts' example is to show that even in the heat o f a very strong
em otion like fear o f falling to one's death, one has the capacity to imaginatively
invoke alternative images that will change one's occurrent emotions.

But what

R oberts assumes but does not explain, is first, that one has the freedom to imagine
another portrayal o f one's situation, and second, that one can m ake the alternative
affectively charged images -- about saving one's daughter -- efficacious in
dam pening (or exacerbating) the pre-existing emotion.

In the third part o f this

chapter I show how the affective attitude o f curiosity allows one the freedom to
im agine things otherwise. B ut the discussion o f curiosity presupposes that we can
make sense o f the causal claim that an imaginative reconstrual o f one's situation
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could be efficacious in redirecting one's emotions.

I therefore begin by analyzing

the idea that one can move oneself, ie. that one's imaginative reconstrual could
have causal impact on an occurrent emotion.
Like the person on the wobbly ladder, Dr. L faces a situation that upsets him
by invoking an alternative construal o f his situation. He approaches the patient
with trepidation, and sits down by his bedside, asking him to tell his story.

At

that m om ent Dr. L was still feeling a kind o f frustrated anger tow ards this
devaluing patient (emotion A), and did not yet feel sufficient empathy or respect
for the patient. Yet, he was motivated to be a good listener, out o f a duty to be
a caring and thorough physician.

In part three o f this chapter w e will consider

w hat enabled Dr. L to imagine his situation otherwise and to invoke his goal o f
being a good physician.

But our present question is how an imaginative

reconstrual o f one's situation, whether o f being a good physician, or o f rescuing
one's daughter, can cause one to shift away from anger or fear?
Given the holistic model o f affect, image and motive that w e argued for in
chapter one, let us assume that the tacit thought about being a good physician was
em bedded in a particular emotion, such as pride, guilt or some other self-relational
emotion.

W e do not know enough details from the vignette to say which o f these

em otions w as in fact strongest for Dr. L, but let us say that it was pride that
imbued his construal, so that he was happily m otivated tow ards his idealizing
thought o f him self as an excellent physician w ho listens well even to difficult
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patients.

Let us call this prideful construal o f his interaction with the patient

emotion B.

W ith this reconstrual o f his situation, and an actual shift in his

situation brought on by sitting down next to the patient,202 the patient begins to talk
to Dr. L. From the vantage point o f pridefully construing him self as a composed
listener who can get into the patient's world, he is able to be moved by what it
feels like to be impotent and abandoned by a worn-out family; he experiences the
patient's sadness empathically (emotion C).
The Dr. L example brings out a point about the causality o f emotions that is
not obvious in the wobbly ladder example, but that I take to be crucial for showing
how reconstruals can be efficacious. In this example it is not ju st an image or a
thought, but a full fledged emotion B (pride) that is brought to bear on pre-existing
emotion A (anger), and that shifts the agent out o f A, so that he can go on to
em otion C (empathic sadness), rather then A' (ongoing anger). The fact that B has
causal efficacy can be expressed by a counterfactual statement — w ithout B acting
on emotion A, Dr. L would have responded otherwise, with A'.
W hat Roberts fails to explain, and what we must explain, is what meaning of
"cause" w e have in mind in positing that one emotional construal has causal impact
on another. If we cannot make sense o f Dr. L's pride as causing the remission of
his anger,

then we cannot say that Dr. L is steering his own emotional

transitions 203 But how does emotion B move the agent out o f A?
In particular, what we need is a conception o f B as a "psychological cause"
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since it is in virtue o f the psychological event o f B that the agent moves from A
to C.

Donald Davidson says that to say that one mental event causes another

involves the linking of two events under a reason explanation in which event A
provides a justification o f the occurrence o f event B; in addition the two events
m ust also fit under some type-type physical description (inaccessible by translation
from the psychological) that explains how the former can be a physical cause of
the latter.204
Fam iliar models o f practical reasoning involving beliefs, desires and actions, fit
this conception o f psychological causation.

Beliefs and desires are reasons for the

beliefs and desires they cause, and beliefs and desire complexes are reasons for the
actions they cause. However, while Dr. L's prideful thoughts about being a good
physician may explain why he doesn't want to be angry, they are not reasons
against his angry construal of the patient.
W e are thus faced with the particular problem o f accounting for how a mental
occurrence can be a psychological cause without being a reason for what it causes.
D onald Davidson considers this problem, which on the face o f it presents a
contradiction, in his article "Paradoxes o f Irrationality."205 He is trying to explain
akratic action, in which an agent's desires/beliefs can be mental causes o f her
action w ithout rationalizing her action. He concludes that in such cases there must
be a kind o f boundary between the cause and the effect o f the sort that occurs
when one person's desires/beliefs influence anothe. person's action. The idea o f
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a boundary presupposes that there will be more rationality or internal consistency
to separating the aspects o f the agents behavior and explaining them as causally
interacting sub-systems than there is to unifying all aspects o f the agent's behavior.
Such a separation allows one to invoke dual perspectives on the reason explanation
o f the action.

As Davidson explains, using the example o f someone whose wish

to have a well-turned calf causes his belief that he has a well-turned calf: "What
his w ish to have this belief m akes rational is that this proposition should be true:
He believes that he has a well-turned calf. This does not rationalize his believing:
I have a well-turned calf."206
The idea that Dr. L's construal o f the world via emotion B acts as an external,
persuasive influence on his pre-existing emotion A takes an explanatory step
beyond our observation that B is a reason for the remission o f A that is not
included in the agent's first personal reasons for/against A. Consider how a person
may be moved by another's interested approval from an angry to a listening stance.
Dr. L is moved by his own pride in the same way, as a persuasive conception o f
him self that invites certain attitudes and makes others unlikely.

The idea o f an

intrapsychic equivalent o f interpersonal persuasion does not depend upon the idea
o f an unconscious influence, in that one may be quite aware that one is being
affected by a non-reason and still be affected.207 Rather, the key point is that
within one person there can be two independent form s o f thought determining
attention, which influence each other in the way that two separate persons may
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influence each other.
I f the breakdown o f reason-relations defines the boundary o f a subdivision o f
em otions, there is a close link between the possibility o f emotional irrationality and
em otional self-control. In chapter one w e discussed how emotions can be wishfulfilling —the agent can construe situations in ways that serve her yearnings. This
possibility is inherent in the idea that emotions are not just responses to the
situation one is in, but rather involve the agent's construing her situation in one
way rather than another. W hat is not obvious in our discussion o f wish-fulfilling
em otion is w here the locus o f the capacity to be irrational lies. Given that there
is no "space" between the emotion and the construal that is its focus, there is no
sense in asking w hether it is rational or irrational for the agent in love, in fear, in
anger, to see things as they do.

Rather, what such questions presuppose is a

perspective that is on the other side o f a boundary o f the sort Davidson describes.
To ask (as I did in chapter two) if a physician's fear o f the schizophrenic patient
is rational, is to ask whether we can place a w edge between the psychological
cause o f the fear and what rationalizes the fear. If we can place such a wedge then
the possibility that the fear is irrational must be considered.
By positing a boundary between emotion B and emotions A and C so that
em otion B serves as a mental cause o f the ending o f A and contributes to the
occurrence o f C, we raise the possibility o f emotional irrationality.

The same

capacity to influence ourselves irrationally makes it possible to influence ourselves
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in a role-directed fashion.208
H ow ever, the model o f interpersonal persuasion being invoked here excludes
the idea that the link between the causally interacting emotions will be arational.
That is, there is an important difference between pride causing a shift from anger
to em pathy, and a toothache causing a shift from empathy to anger.

The

toothache, w hich has a psychological component because it includes the experience
o f pain, does not meet the criteria o f "psychological cause" that we have in mind.
Bodily feelings like pain, cold, or fatigue acting on one's occurrent emotions
cannot be analogized to another person deliberately influencing one's imagination.
The way they cause feeling states is more like the way physical events like being
rained on, or hit over the head, cause feeling states.

W e cannot say that a

toothache persuades one to feel angry, even though toothache's make people angry,
and o f course, someone may give a particular symbolic meaning to having a
toothache.
In summary, we can now explain how the idea that emotions involve being
moved by circum stances is compatible with the idea that the agent can reconstrue
circum stances and hence direct her emotions.

The idea o f a partitioning o f

emotional experience allows us to posit that Dr. L's prideful reconstrual o f his
situation (em otion B) acts on him from the outside in the way that other people act
on him emotionally. This could lead to irrational, wish-fulfilling emotions, but it
need not necessarily do so.

The causal connection between particular emotion
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instances is itself insufficient to determine whether an agent is deceiving herself
or directing her emotional responses towards greater understanding o f things as
they really are.

Ill Curiosity and the Freedom to Imaginatively Reconstrue One's Situation

R eturning to our clinical vignette, consider how Dr. L's shift from anger to
empathy is revealing o f the patient's situation, whereas his shift into admiration is
concealing. From the standpoint o f admiration, Dr. L does not him self see, never
mind point out to the patient, that the patient's attempt to keep his family from
recognizing his pain by fighting with them about his care is futile. That is, the
patient is vulnerable and suffering, and his family is bound to recognize this. Yet
Dr. L's response is so strongly admiring that he is not cognizant o f the pitiable
aspect o f the patient, o f the way in which the patient is not brave but cowardly, in
his inability to face the pain in his family's eyes.
Ironically, having persuaded him self into the standpoint o f admiration, Dr. L
seems to lack something like "freedom" to imagine the patient's situation otherwise.
The idea o f such a "freedom" includes more than the capacity to act on oneself
persuasively that we have ju st accounted for by positing a boundary within mental
life. For one can act on oneself in a way that shifts one to an idealizing emotion
that invites no further imaginative exploration.

For example, it is probable that
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during the risky exit, the man on the wobbly ladder fixed his imagination on the
idealized image of rescuing his daughter to the exclusion o f subsequent
reconstruals.
In such cases o f holding in mind an idealized image in order to keep out other
images, the lack o f freedom does not reside simply in the agent's inflexibility. We
can im agine a situation in which one carefully maintains a prideful feeling about
one's work, or an affectionate feeling towards a friend, despite experiences that
might lead a more "flexible" person to feel differently.
emotions may require acting on oneself persuasively.

M aintaining these

For example, one may

tem per one's anger at an inconsiderate act by a friend by invoking loving thoughts
about how caring she was in some other circumstances.

In such cases of

m aintaining a chosen emotional attitude over time we speak o f the agent as
committed.

But in the case o f Dr. L's admiring view o f the patient, it is not his

com m itm ent to finding something admirable about the patient (an issue we turn to
later) that is problematic.

Rather, it is the observation that Dr. L's admiration

involves m issing important aspects o f the patient's situation.

H is idealizing

admiration is thus more like pride in work that overlooks the shoddy or weak
aspects o f the work, or blind loyalty that leads one not to see that one's friend is
disappointing one.

These cases involve boot-strapping, or wish-fulfilling

emotions, in which one "whistles a happy tune" to avoid shifting into other
perspectives that would involve less comfortable emotions.

These examples
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suggest that the idea o f an agent being free to imaginatively reconstrue her
situation already includes in it the idea that one can shift one's em otions in ways
that reveal rather than conceal things as they really are.
W hat standpoint allows physicians to move them selves out o f realityconcealing emotions like some instances o f admiration, fear and anger? Given our
argum ents against the concept o f the detached observer, we need to avoid
reinvoking a model o f "reflection" that detaches judgm ent about one's emotions
from the realm o f emotional experience.

Thus I begin with the question o f what

kind o f affective attitude helps one's regulate one's other emotions tow ards the goal
o f being realistic? I think the attitude o f the physician necessary to enhance her
openness to things as they really are is curiosity about her own and her patient's
emotional reactions.

The term "curious" comes from the latin "curiosus" which

means careful, diligent; this term is akin to "cura", which means care, concern, and
is closest in english to the word "cure."209 However, I take it that the physician's
curiosity acts also as a way o f distancing her from an overly involved concern. To
show how, paradoxically, curiosity involves carefulness that can be therapeutic or
curative, precisely because it is an emotion that liberates one's affective focus, I
w ant to consider an example o f the use o f curiosity in clinical practice in some
depth.
Because the physician needs to be curious about conflicting em otions, whether
w ithin herself or between herself and the patient, or within the patient, the clinical
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exam ple I choose is o f a couple therapist functioning as a participant-observer.210
The efficacy o f the couple therapist resides in her capacity to combine an empathic
grasp o f both partners positions with imaginative reconstruals o f their situation that
are outside o f their joint view o f reality. For example, consider a case in which
a husband feels he must bear the responsibility for the finances and feels used by
his w ife, and the wife feels guilty but also resents not having a say in their
decisions because the husband is so controlling.

The therapist's empathic

participation in each o f their points o f view, invites each o f them to get
em pathically involved with each other.

Once the husband and wife can recognize

each other's independent emotional construals o f their shared situation, they are
liberated to manage conflict safely for the first time because they have the tools to
make-up after an argument.

For example, the husband can then genuinely

understand why his wife feels controlled by his making the budget decisions, while
still feeling his own concern that she would put her needs first and take advantage
o f him if she did the budget.
H ow ever, this em pathic recognition in no way challenges the couple's shared
assum ptions about their situation. The more difficult, subtle and powerful aspect
o f the therapist's job is to recognize the collusive way the two m em bers o f the
couple construe reality so that both o f them can avoid certain risks and
responsibilities in the relationship. (Often, it is not what the couple argues about,
but what they are compelled to agree about that most constricts their relationship).
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In this example it may be that both husband and wife construe their gender roles
as requiring a conception o f him as strong and able and o f her as weak and
dependent, and both members may believe that if she earned money, this
interaction would be threatened.

The therapist must be able to raise their

consciousness about the way their joint affective construals o f reality creates a kind
o f ideology that conceals as well as reveals what is at stake in their relationship.
In order to challenge their collusive construal o f reality the therapist needs to
m ove from an empathic grasp o f their emotions to a non-empathic curiosity about
th e taken-for-granted scenarios that are the foci o f their emotions. As we argued
in chapter four, empathic portrayals are not hypothetical. In contrast, curiosity is
hypothetical — the therapist becomes curious about whether or not it makes sense
fo r the husband to see his wife as frivolous, when she may be capable o f more
responsibility than he gives her credit for.
The therapist's curiosity differs from empathy not only in that it takes up the
couple's emotional judgm ents hypothetically, but also in that it considers the way
th eir em otions function instrumentally.

The curious therapist sees the couple's

em otions from "outside," and posits teleological causal connections between their
em otions.

For example, the therapist will begin to w onder about how the

husband's view o f his wife as irresponsible and helpless relates to his own self
esteem .

In chapter one, we argued (against Sartre and Solomon) that emotions

can function strategically and still represent things as they really are.

This is
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because emotions are always partial grasps o f things as they really are that conceal
as w ell as reveal. In considering the strategic interplay o f the couple's emotions,
the therapist need not consider the couple's emotional construals to be lies or
illusions. Rather, she abstains from taking any particular emotional construal to
be an adequate portrayal of things as they really are.
It is only when the therapist engages the couple to becom e curious about their
own collusive em otions and how they function strategically, that the possibility
o f real emotional change arises.

I think there are two forces that effect change.

First, by negating the all or nothing quality o f their emotional construals, and
accepting that there are new, as yet unknown ways o f responding to their situation,
the couple is freed to experim ent with trial reconstruals o f their situation.

This

openness is necessary but not sufficient for change, since the trial reconstruals will
not move the couple unless they fit with things as they really are.

For example

the trial reconstrual o f their situation as involving a wish to rely on each other
m ore and risk overcoming sexual stereotypes would fall flat if in fact the husband
did not yearn to be taken care o f and the wife yearn for more responsibility and
respect.
A second force for change comes from recognizing the strategic nature o f
particular emotional responses, because such recognition in and o f itself shifts the
locus o f responsibility for, and control over the emotions. M uch o f the irrationality
o f em otions — their power to influence one against one's all considered judgm ents,
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and to conceal aspects o f reality — depends upon their strategic function remaining
hidden. For example, Melvin Lansky argues that flirtation and intimidation are
efficacious only insofar as they keep the seductive or threatening m essage as a kind
o f disowned backbeat to an emotionally benign foreground communication. If one
recognizes and calls the person on their disowned seductiveness or threat, they can
no longer flirt or intimidate, even if they retain their sexual longing or anger and
reexpress it in some other way. In this example o f couple therapy, consider how
the husband may use feelings o f victimization to invoke guilt in the w ife in order
to control her behavior.

By recognizing the strategic function o f the husband's

feelings o f being used, the couple loses their usual modus operandi. The wife who
recognizes that she is being made to feel guilty shifts the locus o f responsibility for
the husband's suffering from her shoulders to their interaction; this alone may
dissolve her guilt and with it her capacity to be covertly controlled by her husband.
The husband's recognition of his own covert pow er in using guilt to control his
wife contradicts his feared conception o f him self as ineffective in influencing his
wife; this recognition alone may empower him to use his influence overtly and ask
his wife to share responsibility for the finances.
These examples rely on a point made in chapter one, that ju st because
emotions involve actually being moved by circumstances does not entail that one
is by definition at the mercy o f one's emotions rather than a shaper o f one's
emotional responses.

However, from within any particular emotional response,
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which involves experiencing oneself as moved by circumstances, there is
necessarily a blindness to the way one's emotion functions strategically in
constituting one's situation. The therapist's capacity to stand outside any particular
emotional construal, and to engage the couple in imagining how their emotions
may function strategically, is her most powerful tool to effect change.
H ow can we apply all this to the example o f Dr. L?

The metaphor o f the

couple therapist is meant to relate to both Dr. L's work on his own emotional
conflicts, and to Dr. L's work with the "couple" consisting o f him self and the
patient.211 Dr. L becomes curious about the patient's particular experience of being
ill, dumped in the hospital, and faced with one doctor after another. Yet Dr. L's
curiosity involves a distinct shift away from a purely em pathic standpoint in that
he keeps one foot outside the construals that the patient takes to coincide with
reality. Dr. L wonders w hether it is really the case that the patient will inevitably
be dehum anized by the medical situation, and wonders w hether the patient is
unaw are of, or has not yet been offered, the opportunity to connect with a caring
physician, and to feel like an active participant in his medical care.

Dr. L is

curious about what particular meaning seeing him self as the passive victim of
medical interventions has for this patient.
Dr. L also turns his curious gaze onto his own threatening emotions.

He

notices that his initial aversive feeling towards the patient, which includes a
concrete sense that the patient is impossible to communicate with, is a defense
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against underlying feelings o f helplessness about the patient's illness. Apparently
this aw areness lessens his sense that it is hopeless to try to talk with the patient,
and m akes it possible for him to invoke a prideful and hopeful reconstrual o f
him self as a dedicated physician who can help this man. W ith hope, pride and
courage, he sits with the patient and asks him to tell his story.212
In Dr. L's case, the use o f curiosity to decenter from his own hopelessness and
anger facilitates his capacity to listen to the patient empathically.213 Dr. L no
longer focuses on his own experience as the object o f the patient's hostility, as he
decenters his attention from responding to the patients accusatory remarks to
considering w hat it feels like to be this particular patient.

This focusing o f his

attention on the patient's emotions invites, but cannot guarantee, empathic
resonance. 214
A lthough his curiosity about the patient's hostility decenters Dr. L from his
own anger and helplessness, and enables him to move him self with pride and
courage to listen to the patient, there is a danger in such decentering.

Dr. L

focuses on the patient's anger and the response it invokes in others as itself a
"curiosity" — a reified problem requiring the attention o f a physician who can
transcend such reactions.

In saying: "I decided to look for emotional or

psychological reasons for his hostility," Dr. L is using a kind o f role-legitimized
curiosity to avoid looking at an intense human encounter that implicates him self
as well as the patient.

This would be patronizing and incomplete if it did not
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include attention to his own vulnerability to overreacting to such a patient.

That

he is also curious about his own reasons for reacting to such a patient is clear from
his writing a story about his interaction with the patient in which he m ust portray
his own character as well as the patients.

He describes him self in the story as

tired, overworked and insecure about his own role.

One way to teach medical

students to become curious about their own emotional responses to patients is to
invite them to write stories about th eir interactions with "difficult" patients.
How is the affective standpoint o f curiosity different from the standpoint o f the
detached observer?

First, there is no affective "truth" that is the object o f the

curious physician on the model o f aperspectival truth for the detached observer.
That is why, for example, couple therapy requires behavioral interventions in which
the therapist asks the couple to try out some new behaviors to see w hat new ways
they can relate. The therapist cannot know from some process o f "reflection" that
the husband's and wife's construals of each other are "wrong."

Rather, the

therapist can only question their conviction that their construals coincide with
reality.

The basis o f this skepticism is not a concern for truth, which is irrelevant

here, but an interest in seeing what is concealed behind the sincerity o f their
emotions.

This is not to say that th e therapist thinks they are lying, but rather,

that she questions their apparent lack of ambivalence, and their conviction that
their being fully coincides with their assigned roles in the relationship.215
Sim ilarly, Dr. L gives his patient and himself the opportunity to "try on" a new
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interaction, after a night's sleep, given his awareness that his original, angry
reaction to the patient's hostility conceals other reactions the two might have
towards each other.
The second way the curiosity o f the physician differs from a detached
standpoint is that curiosity is not disinterested; it is profoundly interested but not
driven by the need to secure oneself. The affect o f curiosity is characterized by
an unburdened or playful absorption in one's thoughts that allows one to forget
oneself;

one is not worried or concerned about securing oneself.

Plato's and

A ristotle's image for curiosity is the stargazer, w hose mind is on the heavens rather
than his own steps.216
However, the image o f the stargazer, which is the origin o f the theoretical
standpoint o f the scientist as well as the philosopher, is not quite proper for the
curiosity o f the physician, because the doctor is not contem plating something
distant, but something close to home, which he is suddenly able to see as strange,
uncanny. Just as the family therapist must experience an empathic resonance with
each member o f the couple to be effective, the physician must have as the focus
o f his curiosity the particular emotional construals that he and the patient have.
And as w e argued in the empathy chapter, there is no road to understanding the
particular affective construals o f others except through empathic imaginative
involvement.
However, there is an important way in which curiosity about em otions
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dam pens emotions.

The physician's curiosity about the patient's and his own

reactions decreases the compelling quality o f their construals; it decreases the
degree to which he will be actually moved by their plight, since part o f what is
m oving is the idea that what is being depicted is exactly how things really are.
But the physician wonders if this is the case. The standpoint o f wondering, o f
entertaining hypothetical construals o f their situation, involves a departure from an
em pathic to a non-empathic stance.

Curiosity require suspending judgm ent in

order to allow oneself to be uncertain about how things are; this standpoint departs
sharply from the engaged believing quality o f empathy, in which one is for
example, saddened by that which saddens the patient.217
Dr. L's awareness that the patient's occurrent emotions do not capture every
aspect o f reality does not lead to the kind o f skepticism about the patient's
subjective experience inherent in the disease model o f medicine. Dr. L is not like
the accusatory detective who knows the suspect will kill again. This is because Dr.
L refrains from reducing the patient's emotions to a causal explanation which seeks
to predict the patient's future. He respects the patient's capacity to author his own
future. By acknowledging his uncertainty about the patient's future, he gives the
patient a kind o f unconditional or non-judgmental regard.218
However, the fact that curiosity lessens one's ties to any particular construal
o f one's situation is what is behind the ubiquitous association o f curiosity with
danger. W e say "curiosity killed the cat," and Thales' star-gazing ends with him
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falling into a well, injured and subject to scorn. The point is not that curiosity is
in and o f itself destructive, but rather that it involves the risk o f setting out to sea
w ithout guarantee o f a safe journey.

We can imagine how dangerous a physician

w ould be if she were moved only by endless curiosity, untempered by empathy.
In part four o f this chapter I consider what overarching attitudes serve as the
physician's road-map over time and assure that her curiosity will be tethered and
put to good use.
This image o f curiosity as involving a non-collusive, freely moving interest in
the patient is resonant with Freud's image o f the ideal analyst as having "evenly
suspended attention."219 Freud tells the analyst to teach his patient how to associate
freely by invoking the image o f being on a train looking out the window.220 I
think this image is meant not only for the analysand, but for the analyst, since the
source o f data in analysis is the patient's free associations, and the therapist's
attunem ent with the movement o f these associations requires freedom to move with
the patient from one focus to the next. When riding a train, one's gaze is not on
one place but moves with the landscape.

It is this kind o f freedom, and not

affective detachment, that I have in mind by invoking the affect o f curiosity.221
In summary, we have seen that Dr. L's capacity for emotional self-regulation
is complex. The capacity to act on him self persuasively is a necessary condition
for directing his affects. This is illustrated by the man on the wobbly ladder who
dam pens his fear by holding in mind a courageous construal o f his task. But if
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self-regulation depended only on the degree to which one could move oneself
persuasively, then there would be no distinction between Dr. L's use o f pride to
shift from anger into empathy, and his use o f admiration to cover over his feelings
o f disappointment. The difference between these two instances is that only in the
form er case does Dr. L show an ongoing capacity to imaginatively invoke
alternative construals o f his situation that broaden his understanding o f reality.
This capacity resides in an overarching affective stance o f curiosity.
So far, our account o f emotional self-regulation has two tiers. Dr. L's curiosity
enables him to decenter from his own anger and hopelessness about the patient.
This decentering creates the opportunity for him to alight upon a prideful
reconstrual o f his situation. H is pride then moves him further from his anger, by
focusing him on his goal o f being a good physician who listens to the patient. All
o f this m ade it possible for him to sit and listen to the patient, which made possible
but did not guarantee, his subsequent empathic response to the patient.
I have used the contrast between curiosity and idealizing admiration to identify
a kind o f "freedom" to invoke alternative construals o f one's situation that get
beyond w ish-fulfilling depictions o f reality. Yet I would still maintain that Dr. L
is moved to wonder about the patient early in his encounter, and yet moved to
idealize the patient later.

This suggests that the freedom to imaginatively shift

gears is not radical. The view o f emotions we have defended, as involving being
m oved by circum stances and determining salience prior to any act o f will, entails
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that Dr. L's capacity for self-regulation will itself be subject to the conditions o f
his situation, his bodily condition and habits. For example, Dr. L regulates him self
by getting som e sleep prior to continuing his discussion with the patient. Dr. L's
emotional dispositions will also depend a great deal on his acculturation into the
"world" o f medicine over time, so that directing his own emotional course will
require indirect action via transforming that "world".

For example, Dr. L

influences the conditions o f his socialization into his professional role by sharing
stories with other physicians about emotional interactions with patients, rather than
ju s t reporting statistics about procedures.222

IV W hat Affective Standpoint is Needed for Physicians to M aintain Their Integrity
O ver Time?

O ur account o f how Dr. L acts on him self persuasively has left us with two
questions about what is required for such self-regulation to be in the service o f Dr.
L's goals as a physician.

First, does respecting the patient require idealizing

adm iration? Second, does the goal o f understanding the patient accurately cohere
with the goals o f respecting the patient and being an efficacious healer?
First o f all, it might be argued that Dr. L needs to admire his patients in order
to respect them as persons. In this vignette, it may appear that pitying the patient
w ould be devaluing, and would therefore do harm to the patient. Further, if one
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favors the Kantian value o f respecting patients as end-setters over beneficently
protecting the well-being o f patients, than admiration might appear to be more
appropriate than pity.

Dr. L's admiration for the patient leads him to see the

patient's choice o f refusing care and refusing discussion with his family as rightful.
In contrast, a pitying view o f the patient as fighting a futile battle to deny his pain
and

his

need

for familial

support might have

lead

to

questioning

the

appropriateness o f the patient's decision. Does this mean that in order to honor the
patient's own preferences with regard to his health care the physician needs to
adm ire som e aspect o f the patient and to avoid seeing the patient as pathetic? That
is, does respecting the patient as an end-setter depend upon feeling admiration for
the patient, so that what one is obligated to do is to drum up admiration in every
case?
The idea that the proper Kantian physician has an obligation to reconstrue until
she can adm ire all patients is in fact a perversion o f our attempt to root Kantian
morality in affectivity.

The core o f the Kantian conception is the idea that the

moral value o f actions is independent from the particular affects that motivate the
actions.

The revisionist version we argued for in chapter three suggests that

affective ties are needed to draw one's attention to actions that are capable of being
morally valuable; if one then acts according to maxims that are universalizable, one
is acting morally.

W hat may not have been obvious in our discussion o f Kantian

ethics is that the claim that affects are necessary to perceive what is morally salient

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

216

is not a defense o f a kind o f moral relativism in which the feeling o f respect,
w herever it can be generated, bestows moral value on the situation. I f this were
true, than the moral value o f a situation could be amplified by self-deceptive
admiration.

W hat is morally valuable is not having a certain experience o f

sentim ent, but rather being genuinely moved by worthy aspects o f another person's
situation. Only the agent who is sensitive to what situations actually are morally
salient, and then acts in such instances in a way that is generalizable, can be a
moral agent.
Further, being sensitive to what is morally relevant in human life depends upon
seeing things as they really are.

The claim that an adequate moral perspective

requires perceptiveness and judgm ent about what is more or less significant in the
hum an w orld, entails that the moral agent ought to strive to see things as they
really are. In our example, Dr. L's final admiring view o f the patient prevents
several morally relevant connections from occurring. Dr. L misses the chance o f
caring for the patient without idealizing him, recognizing his cowardice as well as
his bravery and still maintaining his connection to the patient.

And the patient

m isses the opportunity of having his feelings acknowledged by a realistic, caring
physician.

Such recognition from another might have enabled the patient to

recognize that his unspeakable fear about exposing him self to his family could be
dealt w ith as a manageable problem.

This might have led to a third moral

opportunity, the opportunity for the patient to value honest self-disclosure at the
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risk o f disappointing his family.
Finally, there is no reason to assume that either experiencing the affect o f
respect, nor following the rule o f respecting the capacity o f others to determine
their fate should require idealizing their actions. One can feel respect for someone
in light o f his or her foibles as well as his or her strengths; Dr. L could respect
the patient for trying his best given his particular fears.

Consider, for example,

how women involved in consciousness-raising in the seventies and eighties found
that it was only when their m ale companions removed them from the pedestal o f
fem inine goodness and acknowledged them realistically in light o f their strengths
and w eaknesses that they felt respected as peers. Finally, the Kantian commitment
to respect the patient as an end-setter involves supporting the patient's capacity for
self-determination, even when the patient's choices are not admired by the
physician.

(In the last section o f this chapter I argue against the idea that

physicians ought to direct patients to make choices that physicans consider
admirable). In summary, respecting the patient as a person does not require selfdeceptive admiration for the patient, nor does it require coerceing the patient to
behave admirably.
But this problem is part o f a more general problem o f w hether the functioning
o f physicians over time is best served by emotions that are revealing or concealing
o f things as they really are, given that much o f the reality o f medical practice is
painful and depressing.

For example is it better for physicians to feel realistic
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worry about their patient's outcomes so that their hopefulness is guarded, or would
they have a more hope-generating effect on patients by feeling unqualifiedly
hopeful and optimistic even in situations where there is a low probability o f
recovery? Is it better for physicians to realistically feel grief at the loss o f a patient
and to feel realistically guarded at attaching to the next patient, or would a selfdeluding feeling o f buoyancy leading to an intense interest in attaching to each and
every patient be better for meeting the goals o f medical practice?
R ene Fox describes the way physicians use magical thinking, which covers
over things as they really are, to defend them selves in the face o f therapeutic
lim itation, uncertainty, and existential concerns about the m eaningfulness o f their
work.

Fox quotes the anthropologist M alinowski, who said that physicians

"ritualize their optimism."

They maintain confidence about the effectiveness o f

their procedures even in the face o f strong evidence to the contrary. T his helps
them to endure and persist and to encourage patients to do so, and thus helps
stabilize some patients who otherwise would never have made it, yet also leads to
"the nonrational inability to desist, at great physical and psychic, as well as
econom ic, cost to both health professionals and those for whom they care."223 Fox
wrote this in 1980, but in 1993, with the overriding impact o f econom ic concerns
on m edical practice leading to rationing, I think physicians are ju st as likely to use
magical thinking to ritualize their pessim ism , and predict the futility o f care in
order to desist from care without experiencing their uncertainty.
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W hile we cannot address here these empirical questions about how magical
thinking effects medical care, we can return to our clinical example to see how
idealizing the patient effects the physician's efficacy over time. Certainly Dr. L's
adm iration for the patient made the patient feel special, and made Dr. L feel special
about his interaction with this otherwise very demoralizing patient. But consider
w hat w ould happen if the patient returned to Dr. L's service in some overtly
regressed condition, with a decline in his health related to non-adherence to
m edications, and with uncontrollable rage at his family and at Dr. L for his
condition.

M ost likely Dr. L's idealization would be crushed and he would

experience disappointment. Often it is just this repetitive feeling o f disappointment
in patients who do not fare well, that motivates an attitude o f detachment in
physicians who cannot bear feeling their efforts to be futile. In this vignette, we
m ight speculate that the nurse and others who have repetitively cared for this
patient treat him with avoidance and resentment out o f such disappointment, which
is the flip side o f idealization.
This suggests that where there is a continuing physician-patient relationship
over time, the efficacy o f the physician is best served by a realistic rather than a
deceptive appraisal o f the patient. However, this needs to be fit into an emotional
perspective that allows physicians to endure the losses and disappointments
inherent in medical practice over time.
A fter an intense, but only two day interaction, Dr. L says that he felt attached
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to the patient, and that he would miss him. Imagine how much more intense this
attachm ent is, and how much more pressure there is to idealize, when one grows
close to a chronically ill patient over many years? We have already mentioned
above one risk o f such idealization, which is the subsequent devaluation that occurs
when the patient disappoints the physician. But an equally big risk is that in order
to maintain an idealized relationship with a patient unto the tim e o f her death, the
physician simply does not notice the fears, anger, or worry o f the patient
undergoing heroic therapies. This not noticing guarantees that opportunities to be
em pathic, efficacious and genuinely respectful of the real individual will be lost.
The affective attitude o f facing the pain of another, or o f one's own loss
unflinchingly, is courage. Aristotle writes "it is for facing what is painful... that
men are called 'courageous.'"224 It may at first seem that what "facing" pain means
for Aristotle can have little relevance to my model o f the emotionally courageous
physician, since Aristotle's courageous man is not psychologically minded but
oriented tow ards action on the battlefield.

And I have in mind a courage that is

apparently much more passive, which involves not physical action but an emotional
alignm ent with the suffering o f the patient. But there is an essential link between
A ristotle's conception o f courage in action and my conception o f the courage to
endure emotions honestly.

In both types o f courage, one knows that what one

faces in the pain and loss o f another is the possibility o f one's own pain and loss.
A ristotle's courageous man has an unflinching sense o f his own mortality that
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gives the character o f courage to his risking his own body to save other bodies.
Courage thus contains in it a kind o f grief, a sobering realization o f one's own
finitude.

W hen D r.L sits down by the bedside o f his patient, and experiences

trepidation, he is poignantly aware o f his own vulnerability and yet committed to
taking on the pain o f the patient; this double awareness, in which one knows that
one is afraid but does not thematize one's fear out o f concern for another, is a
courageous stance.
In current discussions o f medical ethics the issue of w hether a good physician
needs to be courageous is raised in discussions o f risk in caring for patients whose
illnesses may

physically

endanger physicians, most notably,

hepatitis

B,

tuberculosis and HIV infection. M ost often courage is seen as a supererogatory
virtue that is not necessary for providing good day to day medical care.

This

ignores the im portance of courage in the day to day enduring of the most tragic
aspects o f hum an life. Idealization and detachment are strategies for facing these
tragedies when courage fails or w ears thin, as it inevitably does.
The question o f how, practically, to cultivate courage in physicians is a topic
for another work, but a few points follow directly from the idea that courage
requires a capacity for grief. First o f all, one needs time off from the battlefield
in order to grieve and repair oneself, and most physicians do not get the time o ff
to grieve and renew themselves in a way that will allow them to face rather than
shrink from, each and every patient's suffering.

One wonders, for example,
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w hether another night's rest m ight have enabled Dr. L to face his patient's
discharge with a realistic appreciation o f both the patient's fear and o f his own fear
for the patient's future.
Second, one needs rituals that acknowledge death and renewal in the context
o f a community. But physicians are extraordinarily emotionally isolated and do
not have rituals to grieve. The closest physicians come to breaking their isolation
and sharing their painful emotions w ith each other is through the use o f "black
humor," which I think is analogous to the use o f humor at a w ake.225 Im agine if
physicians had communal gatherings to acknowledge the uncanniness o f such
routine experiences as turning o ff the respirator o f a patient in a com a.226 M ost
importantly, physicians often lack any system o f faith that might place in
perspective their hubristic belief that they are responsible for w hether patients live
or die, so that deaths, especially unexplained deaths, are personal failures.
In summary, the physician's goals o f understanding the patient realistically,
treating the patient efficaciously, and respecting the patient as a person require
emotional self-regulation.

In this chapter, I presented a three tiered model o f

emotional self-regulation: first, one uses concurrent emotional attitudes to m ove
oneself persuasively out o f other emotions; second, curiosity frees one to imagine
alternative construals o f one's own and the patient's situation, so that one can play
a creative role in generating the attitudes that will move one persuasively; third,
courage allows one to face the suffering o f one's fellow human beings w ithout
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having to split-off awareness o f one's own vulnerability, thus allowing for maximal
aw areness o f one's emotional attitudes.

The "tiers" here are not necessarily

consciously experienced as at different levels o f reflection. And there is no reason
to call curiosity or courage "second-order" emotions, since they have as their focus
an aspect o f the agent's situation in the world. Rather, these three attitudes work
together in apparently simple emotional experiences. W hen Dr. L sits down beside
his patient, despite his trepidation, and asks him to tell in his own words what is
w rong with him, he displays all three aspects o f emotional self-regulation.

V Prospective Conclusions for Future W ork on the Physician-Patient Relationship

H ow does this model o f emotional self-regulation change our reading o f Osier's
description o f the physician striving for "equanimity?"

Osier says that the

physician's recognition that he has something essential in common with the patient
is intolerable, and moves him to forgetfulness. Given our account o f emotions as
determ ining salience, it becomes clear that Osier's physician is suffering along with
the patient; for to experience something as intolerable, and yet unavoidable, and
to desire to flee it, is to suffer. We have come full circle to find that it is not by
detaching him self but by resonating in his own being with the patient's suffering
that O sier's physician "sees" the "weakness" he has in common with the patient.227
Yet Osier says that the physician's recognition o f the pathos o f his own being
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is resisted by a "happy egotism" that drives him to forgetfulness.
forgetfulness distinguishes his standpoint from that o f Dr. L.

This

Osier's physician

does not become curious about his own or the patient's suffering, or invoke pride
to dampen his pain, or face the patient's pain with courage. Rather, he forgets the
patient's suffering by forgetting its significance for his own being. H e strives to
segregate his emotional responses from his conscious thought processes, so that he
is unaware o f any feelings, including compassion for the patient.
This kind o f splitting o f the self, in which the mind does not consider what the
feelings recognize, is commonly experienced by physicians who justify their
experience under the ideal o f "detached concern."

But to treat patients in a rote

fashion, w ithout consulting one's compassion, makes all kinds o f cruelty possible.
T his dangerous side o f detachment explains why Osier says that the forgetful
physician needs self-control and charity. He is like the Kantian rule-fetishist who
acts out o f an external commitment to behave charitably towards the patient, but
is not moved to genuinely respect the patient. If, instead, he could use curiosity
and courage to remain affectively engaged, he would be less likely to treat the
patient as a thing rather than as a person.228

In concluding this dissertation it is notable that once the "happy egotism"
expressed in the ideal o f "detached concern" is seen through, physicians face
inevitable conflict.

The goals o f understanding and respecting patients require
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affective connections that are endangered by the structure o f current medical
practice.

This leads to some final questions about the implications o f this

dissertation fo r the future o f the doctor-patient relationship in a time o f massive
change in the institutional practice o f medicine.
Although analyzing the socioeconomic structure o f medical practice is beyond
the scope of this work, this dissertation has socioeconomic implications given that
it argues for enriching rather than impoverishing the affective ties between
physicians and patients.

Currently the physician-patient relationship is severely

fragmented. Few er Americans have one primary internist coordinating their care.
Physicians are increasingly expected to take on a gate-keeper function in which
they have a primary obligation to distributing limited health care goods in an
economically feasible way, which competes with their obligation to care for the
best interests o f patients.

Given these two factors, as well as the increasing

bureaucratic pressure to spend less tim e with patients noted in the introduction,
physicians are often not sufficiently available and unencumbered to engage with
patients in making serious health care decisions.
The idea that physicians are guided by a "detached concern" for their patients
provides security to those who do not want to consider the impact o f the
fragmentation o f medical care on patients. The results o f this dissertation disturb
that security, and provide guidance for reconsidering these issues.

First, the issue

o f w hether patients benefit from a primary, continuing relationship with an internist
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is clarified by our arguments. W e have shown that understanding the patient's
illness requires empathy, and that empathy requires building a w orking model o f
the patient's world over time and multiple interactions. Thus continuity o f care is
important not ju st for comforting patients but for m aking accurate diagnoses and
treating the patient efficaciously.
Second, we have provided an argum ent against using physicians simultaneously
as care providers and gate-keepers by arguing against the picture o f Kantian
impartiality as involving an impersonal interest in others segregated from one’s
affective ties.

Physicians under direct economic and professional pressures to

w ithhold m edical care as institutional gate-keepers may not be able to put the
patient's interests at the center of their attention. This would depend som ew hat on
where the locus o f responsibility for limiting care resides. If, as in increasingly
num erous health m aintenance corporations, the physician's ow n monthly bonus
depends upon not referring the patient to expensive consultants, then it seems that
the need to steel oneself from being m oved by the suffering o f the patient in order
to avoid guilt at denying him care would inhibit respect, em pathy and curiosity.
If, however, th e physician is not a directly interested party who benefits from the
patient's sacrifices, but rather is rationing care according

to guidelines that

physicians and patients have previously agreed are ethical, then perhaps the
physicians role as an advocate can be preserved.229 In such cases, the physician
w ould be m ore like a parent sharing scarce resources as fairly as possible among
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many children. However, this parental metaphor, which appeared benign when
describing the physician's fiduciary obligations to patients in an expanding health
care system, takes on a different tone when used to convey the physician's power
to control a scarce resource. A question for future work is w hat impact on the
affective and ethical nature o f the physician-patient relationship is posed by
rationing medical care?
Third, the question o f what role physicians ought to play in patients' health
care decisions looks very different once one appreciates the time and mental
freedom necessary for empathy, curiosity and respect. In a recent article, Ezekiel
and Linda Em anuel230 proposed that physicians should offer expert moral guidance
based on their professional values, regardless o f the patient's own values, rather
than striving to help patients clarify their own particular health care values. For
exam ple, the physician should use arguments to persuade patients to care about the
health o f others and to therefore volunteer to be research subjects.

The Em anuels

believe that physicians accrue moral wisdom about dealing with illness as they
carry out their other functions, and thus are appropriate moral guides.

W hat is

appealing about their view is the idea that there are professional values, such as
prom oting the well-being o f each patient, implicit in medical practice.

I argue

elsew here that it is these shared professional values that provide the essential
boundaries o f the physician's activities. W hen physicians operate outside o f certain
guidelines on their behavior -- including the principle o f being first and forem ost
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an advocate o f the individual patient -- they lose their moral mandate.
B ut the Emanuels' idea is that the physician has an obligation to influence the
patient's behavior to conform to a set o f health values that exist independently o f
the particular patient's experiences. To some degree, physicians already do this in
order to preserve the health o f other people besides the patient.

For example,

physicians are compelled to recommend that people protect their own health and
the health o f others by practicing "safe" sex. Yet, this extension o f the physician's
role when patients are likely to endanger others does not entail that it is best for
physicians to give moral advice to patients making serious decisions about their
own futures, rather than to empathically and respectfully assist the patient in
articulating his or her own values.
An important assumption o f the Emanuels' article is that physicians in current
medical practice can adequately intuit what is o f moral significance for patients.
But physicians cannot adequately perceive what is morally salient for patients from
a detached standpoint. Rather, empathy and respect are necessary to appreciate
w hat is significant for suffering patients.

In addition, sensitivity to the moral

dimension o f patients' situations depends upon a capacity to think reflectively about
difficult moral dilemmas over time.231 I picture moral reflectiveness as a kind o f
meta-curiosity that loosens the hold o f one's own and one's patients' "natural"
attitudes.

Such curiosity is essential if one is to free oneself sufficiently from

primary allegiances to both persons and principles to reconsider their value in light
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o f new experiences with patients. Finally, by involving oneself empathically in
these new experiences with patients the physician can develop moral wisdom that
is rooted in the actual practice o f medicine, rather than in abstractions. Physicians
w ho do not have the time or support to cultivate their own capacities for empathy,
respect, or curiosity are unlikely to accrue moral wisdom. Even if one favors the
kind o f paternalism supported by the Emanuel's (which I do not), one must
question w hether physicians under present conditions are suitable moral guides for
patients.
In concluding this dissertation it is apparent that the physician's situation in our
present society is a tragic one, given that to understand and respect patients
requires affective connections that are at best infrequently supported by our current
institutions.

But the ideal o f "detached concern" reifies and excuses the

socioeconom ic and political limitations o f our health care system by idealizing
affective disengagement as the truth-seeking, impartial, courageous approach to
patients. I have shown that it is none o f these, and that physicians can only fulfill
their obligations to patients by empathizing with them , and genuinely feeling
respect for them. W hen these attitudes are accompanied by curiosity and courage,
both of which require institutional support, physicians can regulate their affective
engagem ent with patients sufficiently to care for patients over a lifetime without
losing their compassion.
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certainty. For a discussion o f Lipps' view of empathy as involving a complete
m erging w ith another, see Edith Stein, On the Problem o f Em pathy. The Hague:
N ijhof, 1964, p. 16.
Schutz (and Dilthey before him) extended the idea that one could strive for
certainty in one's knowledge o f other persons to the idea that empathy could be
that basis o f a distinct form o f objective knowledge appropriate for the human
sciences.
See Schutz, Alfred, "Intersubjective U nderstanding," in The
Phenom enology o f the Social W orld. W alsh and Lehnert, trans., Chicago:
N orthw estern University Press, 1967. See Berger, op.cit., pp 62-63 for Dilthey on
empathy. In contrast, physicians have often used the term "empathy" to describe
a non-scientific understanding o f human experience. M ost o f the authors I will
consider here sit between these points of view. They are psychoanalysts who have
taken empathy to be an important source o f knowledge about patients regardless
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o f its scientific status.
Until the 1960's, much o f the w riting on empathy in
medical journals was by psychiatrists. However, with the rise o f concern about the
adequacy o f physician-patient relationships there is now increasing attention by
other specialists, especially internists and pediatricians, to the role o f empathy in
m edical practice.

121.

Oxford English Dictionary and Hunsdahl, op.cit.

122.

See Sullivan, H.S., The Interpersonal Theory o f Psychiatry. N ew York: Norton,
1953.

123. See Berger, Buie, Basch, op.cit.
124. See Buie, D.H., "Empathy: its Nature and Limitations," Journal o f the American
Psychoanalytic Association. 29:281-307, 1981. Also see Basch, op.cit.

125.

See Buie, op.cit.

126. By defining empathy as a capacity, I do not mean to imply that it is reducible to
a way o f behaving. I take the above detailed analysis o f the intrapsychic
dim ensions o f empathy to be sufficient grounds to reject a behaviorist claim that
em pathy ju st is the capacity to say and do things that make another person think
that they are being understood. Rather, I have given an explanation o f how such
behavior is possible in the first place.
127. Fox, Renee and Lief, Howard, "Training for 'D etached Concern'," in The
Psychological Basis o f Medical Practice. L ief and Lief, eds., N ew York: Harper &
R ow , 1963, pp. 12-35.
128. A ring, Charles, "Sympathy and Empathy," Journal o f the American Medical
A ssociation, vol. 167, no.4, 1958; Blumgart, Herrman, "Caring for the Patient,"
T he N ew England Journal o f M edicine, vol.270, no.9, 1964.
129. A ring, ibid., p. 449. Given Aring's definition o f "sympathy" as including any
sim ilar emotion occasioned by another's emotion, sympathy is not equivalent to
pity. Rather, one can feel sympathetic joy, anger, etc. The core idea here is that
one can resonate with another's emotional state. W hat such emotional resonance
involves is considered later in this chapter.
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130.

Aring, ibid., p.450.

131.

Blum gart, op.cit., p.451.

132.

M elvin Lansky focused my attention on the distinction between taking on another's
emotional conflicts, and remaining emotionally engaged without such reactivity.
Personal communication.

133.

In chapter five much more will be said about using curiosity to redirect one's
emotional reactions, and also about how one's empathy and curiosity can work
together to sustain an appropriate level o f emotional participation in another's
experience.

134.

See for example, Stoller, R .J.. Observing the Erotic Imagination. N ew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985. But even if one disregards psychoanalytic theory, an
appreciation o f the focus in novels, plays and films on adverse human experiences
suggests that such experiences can be in some sense vicariously enjoyed.
Convoluted attempts to say that the audience does not resonate with the suffering
o f the characters, but only with their joy at the cessation o f adversity, seem to
ignore the proportion o f time spent focusing on human hardship. And theories that
say that the audience enjoys comparing their own safe situations as spectators with
their vicarious experience o f the suffering o f the characters already presuppose the
point I am trying to make, which is that there can be multiple perspectives,
including resonant suffering and an awareness that one is not genuinely in the
adverse situation.

135.

O sier, Sir W illiam, Aeouanimitas. New York: Norton, 1963, p.29.

136.

For this definition o f "projection," see W ebster's New W orld Dictionary o f the
A m erican Language. Guralnik, ed., New York: The World Publishing Company,
1972. Osier's idea that the physician must strive for "imperturbability," or freedom
from all bodily sensations in order to attain a truthful understanding o f the patient's
situation, is rooted in the Cartesian idea that emotions are essentially like
perceptual illusions that deceive the knower about what is really there in the world.
For Osier, both "introspection" and "insight" strive for clear and distinct perception
o f affective images, in the way that observing the body requires clear and distinct
perception o f physical signs. Hence Osier's emphasis on the need for the physician
to purify him self from his own emotions, so that the mental medium constituting
the projection, like the light from a "projector," would have no interference.
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Aring and Blumgart share Osier's concern that the physician's empathic
understanding o f the patient be free from the interference o f present emotions.
They speak metaphorically o f the physician's sympathetic feelings as tying him
down to a particular way o f seeing the patient's situation, and hence restricting the
m axim al freedom o f movement that is needed for objectivity. Blumgart warns the
physician to strive for detachment in order to keep from losing "objectivity and
perspective." But what exactly can the detached physician learn about the patient
from the detached standpoint? According to Rosenberg and Towers, Blumgart's
ideal physician does not relate to the patient "as one person to another, but rather
collects 'data' from the patient's behavioral expressions for analysis and responses
within the physician's own perspective. The physician is satisfied merely to
observe the signs o f the patient's illness, rather than to comprehend its experiential
content." See Aring, op .cit, p.449, and Blumgart, op.cit., p.451. See Rosenberg,
J. and Towers, B., "The Practice o f Empathy as a Prerequisite for Informed
Consent," Theoretical M edicine. Thomasma, ed., vol.7, no.2, June 1986.
137.

This is not to suggest that nothing objective is expressed in the word and gestures
o f the patient. Rather, the patient's gestures can express sadness, fear, etc. in a way
that any normal "observer" could recognize, hence with a certain "objectivity."
Caroll Izard gives evidence o f such recognition in Human Emotions. N ew York:
Plenum Press, 1977.
The presence o f recognizable features o f emotion is a necessary condition for
the possibility o f meaningful discourse about emotion. If we could not recognize
and identify the typical expressions o f emotion, there would be no criteria for
differentiating sadness from anger, or even from any other moment in the "stream"
o f consciousness. Furthermore, in our physical world identification requires a mark
that can be perceived via the senses. But to recognize that another's gestures show
anger or fear is hardly a sufficient condition for understanding what her anger or
fear is like. The question at hand is thus: w hat in addition to recognizable marks
o f emotion, contributes to a qualitative grasp o f another person's feelings?

138.

The D iagnostic and Statistical Manual of M ental Disorders - American Psychiatric
Association. Third Edition, W ashington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1987.

139.

This quote o f Cassel's is in Rosenberg and Towers, op.cit.

140.

W ebster's D ictionary, op. cit.

141.

The kind o f emotional neutrality that Freud describes for psychoanalysis is not
equivalent to detachm ent in the Oslerian sense. Freud notes that archaic, emotional
resonance plays a role in analytic listening. And his notion o f psychoanalytic
abstinence still allows the analyst to have an emotional interest in the well-being
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o f the patient. But he urges the analyst to avoid using the clinical encounter to
gratify unconscious wishes o f his own o r o f the patients. Also, the analyst is to
refrain from taking sides in the analysand's intrapsychic conflicts, since the
analyst's involvement in such conflicts would inhibit his intellectual freedom and
non-judgm entalness (see my earlier discussion o f non-reactivity, and my discussion
o f curiosity in chapter five).
H ow ever, there has been a strong anti-affectivity strand in psychoanalysis. The
orthodox view has been that the physician's em otions are "countertransference"
phenom ena that must be attended to because otherwise they act as resistances that
impede the analytic process. Such feelings are informative only to the degree they
can be translated into conceptual models that can be used to make inferences about
the patient's condition. The underlying presupposition is that the object o f the
physician's insight is the patient's psychic condition as it is, ultimately for an
aperspectival knower.
Hence the goal o f clinical empathy is to arrive at
information that is purified o f the physician's experiential responses to the patient.
The physician strives to be aware o f countertransference phenom ena in order to
correct for the distortions such phenom ena introduce into her understanding o f the
patient. See Dorpat, T.L., "On Neutrality," International Journal o f Psychoanalytic
Psychotherapy. 6: 39-64.
142.

Tugendhat, Ernst, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determ ination, trans. Paul Stern,
Cambridge: M IT Press, 1986.

143.

Stein, op.cit.

144.

The idea that empathy involves making inferences about the patient is related to
the definition o f empathy as "projection."
"Projection" is also defined as
"prediction...based on known data or observations; extrapolation." W ebster's
D ictionary, op. cit.

145.

There are several reasons for rejecting the picture o f em pathy as detached
inference-m aking. First o f all, there is no phenomenal correlate o f this putative act
o f inference: in empathic understanding one does not independently listen to the
patient's story and then compare this information to a conceptual model o f typical
emotional attitudes in order to make predictions about the patient's inner life.
Secondly, there is no explanatory power in positing such a mental act. W hat
w ould be the criteria one would use to apply the general conceptual model o f
em otions to the case o f the particular patient? How w ould one know that these
features o f one's mental model o f emotional attitudes were relevant to this aspect
o f the patient's situation?
W ittgenstein's criticism o f the Cartesian view o f
understanding as m aking 'inner' comparisons is relevant here. The idea that the
physician could see the patient's expressions o f emotion as sim ilar to some general
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feature o f emotional experience presupposes that she already knows how to
recognize this feature o f emotional experience. To equate such recognition with
detached inference is to attribute to the physician an 'inner' mental map pairing off
particular expressions o f emotion with general features o f em otional experience.
B ut how could the physician know which aspect o f the patient's emotion should
be paired o ff with which general concept? W hat would direct her tow ards a quasi
first-personal grasp o f the dramatic quality o f the patient's experience versus thirdpersonal observation o f the patient's gestures and facial expression? The physician
w ould need a third diagram or image to make these comparisons. But even this
diagram could be understood in a variety o f different ways. So another diagram
w ould be needed, and so on, into an infinite regress. The idea o f an 'inner' act of
inference does not explain how the empathizer is able to recognize and appreciate
the emotions o f other people. See Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations.
N ew York: M acM illan, 1958.
It m ight be argued that to equate empathy with insight based on inference does
not entail making the Cartesian error o f positing a discrete act o f "inner" inferencem aking that is accessible on reflection. Even so the "inference" model o f empathy
still confuses w hat the telos, or goal o f empathic understanding is. As I argue in
the following pages, empathic understanding does not aim for prediction in the way
scientific inference aims for prediction.
146.

Saw yier, Fay, "A Conceptual
Psychoanalysis. 3:37-47.

Analysis

of

Empathy,"

The

Annual

147.

I hypothesize that the fact that empathy involves multiple m odes o f cognition,
including affective imagery, and reflective thought, contributes to the "reality" o f
the object o f empathy. This thought is based on the common observation that
using m ultiple senses contributes to the reality o f an object o f perception.

148.

A fter this chapter was already written, Stanley Jackson published "The Listening
H ealer and the History o f Psychological Healing," op. cit. In addition to providing
a thorough historical analysis o f the concept o f clinical listening, this article
includes im portant references on empathy, including an early, interesting
psychoanalytic work on empathy that is rarely referenced today: Schroeder,
Theodore, "The Psychoanalytic Method o f Observation," International Journal o f
Psvcho-A nalvsis. London, 1925, vol.vi, pp. 155-170.
Schroeder's describes
empathy as a form o f "inductive introspection" in which one puts "one's own
consciousness at the disposal of the unconscious determ inants o f another's
personality" (p. 162). He also argues that "psycho-analytic theory does not in the
least depend upon logical inference based upon the surface introspection o f a
relatively static psyche." This point interestingly anticipates my own views, but
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Schroeder does not go on to provide philosophical arguments showing the
inadequacy o f inferential reasoning for empathy (he instead uses the psychoanalytic
concepts o f projection and introjection to explain how empathy is possible). Yet
Schroeder also emphasizes the importance o f the psychoanalyses own "conscious
withdraw al o f interest" for empathy to be possible (pp. 159,162).

149.

Lipps, in Hunsdahl, op. cit., p. 182.

150.

ibid., p. 184.

151.

See H eidegger. M. Being and Time, op.cit. Heidegger offers a model for the kind
o f experiential "projection" o f meaning that is essential for empathy. H e argues
that we do not first perceive things as meaningless sense data, and then infer that
they are objects that interest us, like tools, forests and persons. Rather, the fact
that as perceivers w e attend to certain phenomena rather than others, in meaningful,
practically useful patterns, reveals our capacity to "understand" the world prereflectively. Heidegger says, referring to ordinary things we encounter, that:
The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms o f a totality o f
involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic
interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes
into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And
this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday
circum spective interpretation. In every case this interpretation is grounded
in som ething we have in advance -- in a fore-having [G 150].
Som ething very much like this can also be said o f our understanding of
persons. There are two aspects o f Heidegger's picture o f how meaning is
"projected" in the human world that I want to clarify. First, the term "totality"
does not indicate a collection o f unrelated things. Heidegger is referring to a web
o f m utually implicated things, like the totality of a painting, a workshop, or the
w orld-as-lived [G 102-105] by an individual. Heidegger's claim that the ready-tohand is alw ays understood in terms o f a totality o f involvements is the claim that
understanding always takes place in a context o f interests and projects. W e will
return to this basic presupposition later on.
A second major point o f this passage is that the cares and interests that
provide a context for understanding something must be partially pre-reflective,
unthem atized.
For Heidegger the experience o f being interested in something,
w hich he calls a "fore-having," is necessary for recognizing a gap in one's grasp
o f the thing and hence for questioning and finally conceptualizing it [G 150-152],
T he idea that our overall comportment towards things and other persons underlies
the possibility o f understanding them, lies behind Heidegger's claim that "moods"
disclose reality.
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152.

Sartre's views all emotions as aiming to sustain one's self-esteem. Thus he would
have to have som ething like this narrow conception o f the interests o f the
empathizer. See Sartre, The Emotions: Outline o f a Theory, op.cit.

153.

T he concept o f im agining has at least as complex and confused a history as the
concept o f empathy. Casey traces the term "imagine" to the latin root, "imaginari,"
which means "to copy." This root coheres with the Cartesian and later, empiricist
theses that mental images are only more or less accurate copies o f sensations. But
Casey also sees in our current concept o f imagining the earlier Greek idea o f
"phantasia" "which includes any kind of mental seeing or impression in the soul"
(Zeno). See Casey, Edward, Imagining. Bloomington : Indiana University Press,
1976.

154. Freud talks about the identification o f the analyst with the analy sand's experiences,
and (we turn to this next) about the role o f resonant emotion.
See for
exam ple,"The Unconscious,"(V. 14) and "Observations on Transference-Love"(v. 12)
in the Standard Edition, translated and edited by Strachey, London: Hogarth Press.
Also see "Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the Ego," trans. and ed. by
Strachey, N ew York: Norton, 1959.

155.

Deutsch, Helene, "Occult Processes Occurring During Psychoanalysis,"
Psychoanalysis and the Occult. Ed. Devereux, N ew York: International University
Press, 1970.

156.

Fliess. R.. "The M etapsychology o f the Analyst." Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 11:211227, 1942.

157.

Fenichel, Otto, "Identification," The Collected Papers o f Otto Fenichel. First Series.
N ew York: N orton, 1953, pp.97-112.

158. Kohut, op.cit.
159. Deutsch, op.cit.
160. Fenichel, op.cit.
161. Fliess, op.cit.
162. Kohut, op.cit.
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163. Berger, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
164. Basch, op.cit., p.105.
165. Freud, "Group Psychology," op.cit.
166. Buie, op.cit., p.297,301.
167.

Basch, op.cit.

168.

Tom kins, Silvan, A ffe c t Imagery, and Consciousness. Vols. One and Two, New
York: Springer, 1963.

169.

Buie, op.cit., p.301.

170.

ibid.

171.

Stein, op.cit., p. 16.

172.

Kohut, op.cit.

173.

Stein, op.cit., p .16.

174.

ibid., p.13.

175.

It m ight be argued that Stein's criticisms o f Lipps are not relevant
to the merging
m odel o f empathy because the physician is not like an audience to the patient's
suffering, but rather is an actual participant in the patient's trials. Some physicians
take them selves to share the patient's struggles against disease to such a degree that
they think they actually feel the sam e way the patient feels. For example, some
doctors speak o f fighting off cancer together w ith their patients as if it w as pretty
m uch the sam e battle to give chemotherapy as to receive it. But it seems highly
unlikely that the physician and the patient could genuinely feel the same way about
the patient's pain, suffering, death. It is just not the same thing to recognize that
a patient one cares about is dying as it is to recognize one's own im m inent death.
And it is even more unlikely that the physician could take each and every one o f
her patient's experiences on in this manner. B ut even if it were possible for the
physician and the patient to feel the same way about the patient's illness, this
w ould not explain how the physician could grasp the patient's feelings via her own
feelings.
Stein addresses this point by agreeing with Lipps that it is possible to have an
experience o f oneness with another person. B ut she argues that such an experience
cannot be the basis o f empathy, since it actually presupposes empathy. She points
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to the case in which two persons actually share a situation, and respond to the
same news with the same feeling, and recognize each other's feelings, hence
coming to share a response to the same object. For example, two soldiers in the
front lines, hear that the war is won. Both feel joy and relief, and recognize each
other's joy and relief. Stein says in this case the barriers separating one 'I' from
another have not entirely broken down.
"I feel my joy while I empathically grasp the others' and see it as the same.
And seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character o f the foreign joy
has vanished. Indeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respect with my
real live joy, and their's is just as live to them as mine is to me. N ow I
intuitively have before me what they feel. It comes to life in my feeling,
and from the "I" and the "you" arises the "we" as a subject o f a higher
grade."57
Stein shows here that even when two persons are actually in the sam e boat, their
experience o f m erging already presupposes a prior act o f empathy, and thus cannot
explain how empathy is possible.
See Stein, op.cit., p. 16.
176.

Husserl, Edm und, "Fifth Meditation," Cartesian M editations. The Hague: M artinus
Nijhoff, 1977. Sartre is influenced by Husserl's idea that one can intuitively
experience the absence o f the other. However, Sartre takes the more extreme
position that awareness of another creates not only a sense o f absence but a
dynam ic negation within one's own sense o f being. See "The Look," in Being and
Nothingness. Barnes, trans., N ew York: The Philosophical Library, 1956.

177.

Kohut, op.cit.

178.

W ebsters N ew W orld Dictionary, op.cit.

179.

Katz, Jay, The Silent World o f Doctor and Patient. N ew York: The Free Press,
1984, p .132.

180.

ibid.

181. Basch, op.cit. N ote that Basch takes resonance emotions at birth to be examples
o f "fixed action patterns," which are reflex arcs that involve cortical functioning.
182.

Freud, "The Unconscious," op.cit.

183. Basch's theory is Aristotelian in that it emphasizes how natural dispositions can be
educated into complex attitudes that comprise practical knowledge.
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184. Basch, op.cit., p .l 13. Basch credits his use o f term "generalization" to Novick, J.
and K elley, K., "Projection and Externalization,"
Psychoanalytic Study o f the
C hild. 25:69-95, 1970.
185. Buie, op.cit.
186.

See for exam ple, Greenson, R.R., "Empathy and its Vicissitudes," International
Journal o f Psychoanalysis. 41: 418-424.

187.

Buie, op.cit., p.300.

188.

ibid.

189.

Casey, op.cit.

190.

ibid., pp.44-45.

191. Casey describes the imagined agent as either the imaginer him self or a proxy. His
reason for leaving this open is that he wants to give an account o f all imagininghow, including fantasies that specifically pertain to oneself — imagining how I will
feel when I finish this chapter, as well as fantasies that are not necessarily selfreferential — imagining how it feels to dive into a cool swimming pool.
192. Casey, ibid., p.45 footnote 11: "By the terms 'action,' 'activity,' 'agent,' etc. I do
not m ean to imply that the content o f imagining-how is always a form o f action
in which the s u b je c t... takes the initiative. This is often so in imagining-how, but
there are also cases of imagining-how to suffer, to be imposed upon by others, etc.
T hus the central notion o f 'personal agency1 includes a broad spectrum o f ways in
w hich the im aginer becomes implicated via self-projection or by proxy in his own
im aginative presentation, and some o f these ways include adopting a passive stance
w ithin the state o f affairs contained in the presentation."
193.

Casey, ibid., p.45.

194.

ibid., p.45.

195.

W ollheim , R., "Identification and Imagination," in Philosophers on Freud.
W ollheim , ed., N ew York: Jason Aronson, 1977, p. 180.

196.

ibid.

197.

This does not contradict the point made earlier by Stein that such imagining can
only announce the presence o f another's ownness, rather than present it fully as
here and now. Rather, I take it that W ollheim's point is not that the imagined
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experiences will be as complete as actual experiences, but rather that they will be
consistently unified according to the perspective o f an experiencing subject rather
than the perspective o f an observer.
198.

H ow ard Spiro argues that attending physicians can "teach" empathy, by including
narrative accounts o f patients' lives in clinical rounds. See "What is Em pathy and
Can It Be Taught?" Annals o f Internal M edicine, vol. 116, no. 10, 1992.

199. Casey, op.cit.
200. W ollheim, op.cit. and Casey, op.cit.
201. There would seem to be an additional meaning to the physician's idea that via
empathy she is in the patient's situation. I take this additional meaning to be what
W ollheim calls a "master thought": "the way in which we conceive or in which we
represent to ourselves our mental processes, or the conception under which a
mental process occurs." According to the merging model, the physician takes her
imaginative portrayal o f the patient to project her into the patient's situation. It is
this representation o f empathic imagining as a m erging experience that is mistaken.
Rather, in imagining how it would feel to be in the patient's situation the physician
mixes her own affective repertoire with the patients in order to fill-out her
portrayal o f the patient's experience. Recall Edith Stein's (and Husserl's) point that
the guiding intention o f empathy is to grasp the situation o f another person. This
goal, with its explicit awareness o f another's separateness, is the genuine "master
thought" o f empathy. See W ollheim, op.cit., p. 192, and Stein, op. cit.
202.

To make this traditional conception o f the interaction o f thought and feeling more
explicit, I elaborate on W ollheim's (op.cit.) description o f the features o f
"imagining how" as the "inner" creation and performance o f a play for an audience.
The mistaken picture o f empathic understanding is as follows: one's cognitive
faculty writes and performs a play for an audience o f two, including a translator
w ho watches and translates the images into affective signals, and an affective
audience who responds mechanically to the signals. Given this picture, the
possibility for appreciating new aspects o f the drama cannot be explained. I f the
audience somehow gives emotional responses that translate into images that are
appropriate for the next part o f the drama, this would be have to be a matter o f
sheer luck or based on some magical, extrasensory capacity o f the translator.
This model o f the interaction o f mind and feeling in "imagining how" another
feels should be fam iliar to the reader by now. It brings back into play something
very similar to the view encapsulated in the "insight" model o f empathy:
understanding another's feelings involves "projecting" mental images that convey
the person's experience, then using these images to make inferences about another's

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

254

feelings. Except in this case, it is not strictly introspection and detached inference
that are invoked, but the ability to "observe" an imaginative portrayal o f another
person's experience, respond to it emotionally, and "apply" one's responses to
further imaginative portrayals.
203.

See Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," S.E., op.cit., vol. IV and V. I read this
after w riting an initial draft of this chapter. In addition to the structural similarity
between primary process thinking and imagining how another feels, there are other
concrete similarities. For example, Freud points out on p.534 that in dreams there
is an elision of the "perhaps" that characterizes speculative thought in waking life:
I f one is worried that som eone is, perhaps, angry at one, one does not dream that
she might be angry, but that she is angry.
The elision o f the "perhaps" in dreaming corresponds to the elision o f the
hypothetical in empathy; empathy involves experiencing the announcement o f
another's feelings, rather than positing that, hypothetically, the other might feel a
certain way.

204.

At the beginning o f this analysis o f clinical empathy, I argued that concepts must
guide empathic understanding, rather than ju st contribute to the retrospective
description o f some independent pre-conceptual act o f empathy. I pointed out that
physicians often derive much o f the content o f their initial grasp o f the patient's
w orld from their conceptual understanding o f w hat certain illnesses and certain
types o f persons are like. I now add the point that these concepts influence the
selection o f the content o f the physician's im aginative experience. For example,
if one knows that, as a matter o f fact, schizophrenics suffer from feelings o f
isolation, then one can use this information to pick-up salient features o f a new
schizophrenic patient's history. For example, one will attend to any indication the
patient gives of feeling removed from others at school.
But the richness o f empathic understanding depends not upon pre-conceived
notions but upon spontaneous communication between physician and patient. The
two m ust work together to co-narrate their imaginative production. Sometim es this
will involve a dance that is like a w altz in which the physician follow s the patient;
other tim es it is more like dancing to rock and roll in which innovation and even
completely changing directions is essential for adequate empathy. For example,
the physician might initially imagine that an elderly woman patient, w hose husband
has died in the past year, after forty years o f marriage, is feeling lonely and sad.
She m ight then ask the patient if she thinks about her husband m uch o f the time.
I f the patient than says that her marriage was not all that happy and she has more
tim e now for her service club, the physician must be able to change gears. The
physician may find herself imagining new opportunities, and independence, and
beginning to feel the excitement and fear that going it alone involves for this
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patient.

Just as there is no reified "model" o f the patient's inner life, it is incorrect to
picture the "feedback" from the patient as leading to the editing o f some already
created entity, which is cut and pasted to be made more accurate. Rather, the
patient's input must influence the physician's capacity to imagine how the patient
feels. The patient's input leads to a greater attunement on the part o f the physician
to the particular affective imagery o f the patient. One concrete manifestation o f
this process o f attunem ent is that, over the course o f time, the empathic physician
will begin to use phrasing and gestures that closer to the style o f the patient. This
seems to be the behavioral correlate o f the tuning in process that allows the
physician to utilize images that are closer and closer to the patient's own. The
physician's capacity to follow the patient's story as one follows a drama, which was
m entioned earlier as an important factor for being a good listener, can now be
explained. In order to follow the patient, the physician needs to be able not only
to im agine how the patient feels in any particular situation, but to modify and
direct her imaginings in response to what the patient communicates. W e have seen
that som etim es one strives to imagine new features o f the patient's situation, and
at other tim es the images and affects come involuntarily, and even surprise the
empathizer. An example o f this follows in the final chapter.
205.

Law rence Linett, M.D., "Last Impressions," in A Piece o f My Mind, ed. Bruce Dan
and Roxanne Young, New York: Random House, 1988,pp.162-165.

206.

Although the point that physicians are socialized into their roles argues for the
directedness o f the physician's emotions, it does not explain how it is that, like Dr.
L, an individual physician can grapple with conflicting emotions towards patients,
only some o f which are appropriate to his role. The issue we face here is
understanding how one deliberately sustains one's role-related responses over time?
W e have already argued that a detached choice to "act like a doctor" could not
account for the flow o f emotions in response to patients that is necessary for the
doctor to fulfill her role. And physicians do not consciously remind themselves
over and over — I am a doctor, not a lover or parent, so its best for me to be
moved by the patient's courage but not his animal attractiveness.
One does not become a doctor the way one becomes a real estate broker, but
rather the way one becomes a family member in one's family o f origin. One
begins as a vulnerable medical student and then intern who is totally dependent on
senior physicians to guide one, who is deprived o f sleep and family, threatened
with incompetency that could cost other people's lives and harm one's own. One
practically lives in the hospital for a period o f years during third and fourth year
o f medical school and internship and residency (surgical residencies now take on
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average eight years, medicine residencies and fellowships six years, psychiatry,
four to six years, etc.). This period of medical "training" does train one's very
responses to reality, rather than ju st offering one a fund o f knowledge. This is
perhaps most obvious when one considers the way physicians see naked bodies and
body excretions differently than other people do.
It m ight be argued that my comparison o f the role o f doctor with the role o f
parent or lover is still inaccurate, because even though doctors are raised to be
doctors, the role is still artificial, whereas being a parent or lover is doing what
com es naturally. I challenge this artificial/natural distinction. I am influenced here
by the fem inist analyses o f gender that show that not only roles like mother/father
and wife/husband but even such apparently natural phenomena as walking and
talking like a woman or a man are constituted socially through recognition and
reinforcem ent o f certain attitudes rather then others. And the social construction
o f gender never requires a conscious or deliberate taking on o f masculine or
fem inine roles. However, it is possible to become aware that one's m ost "natural"
responses are in fact directed by socially constituted roles. It is possible to
consider other ways o f responding and to find that one's potential range is larger
than one's role dictates. This is what "consciousness raising" is all about.
207.

The phrase "concernful" manner comes from Robert Roberts in "W hat an Emotion
Is: A Sketch," The Philosophical Review. Vol. XCVII, no.2, 1988

208.

Robert Roberts, op. cit., pp. 183-209.

209.

Roberts, op. cit., p. 187.

201.

Roberts, op.cit., p. 199.

202.

The actual behavior o f sitting down next to the patient may have had direct
emotional impact on Dr. L. A familiar experience to most people is the "whistle
a happy tune" phenomenon in which we can shift our own moods by changing our
behavior to something that is more conducive to another mood. Although I have
argued earlier against Sartre's view o f emotion as generally involving an activity
o f m oving oneself through a kind o f magical enactment, I agree with his
observation that we can set the stage for certain moods in ourselves, ju st as we set
the stage for moods in others. See Sartre, The Emotions, op.cit.

203.

O f course, emotions can simply remit without the agent in any way deliberately
redirecting herself, but this does not help explain how an agent can direct her own
emotions.
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204.

Davidson, "Mental Events," in Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980, pp. 207-227.

205.

"Paradoxes o f Irrationality," in Freud: a Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. R.
W ollheim, Doubleday, 1974.

206.

Davidson, op.cit., p.298.

207.

However, I do think that what is at stake in Davidson's thesis is the core concept
o f Freud's idea o f a dynamic unconscious. Davidson's argum ent relates to Freud's
idea o f essential divisions within mental life, but is general enough not to depend
upon some archeological metaphor o f the mind in which there are literal divisions
in consciousness as radical as id, ego and superego. I agree with Davidson, and
would extend his work to argue that the necessity o f alter-agency in explaining
akrasia sheds light on how
Freud's innovative conception o f the dynamic
unconscious is burdened by the archeological metaphor. W hat Freud w as trying
to account for was how there could be, in addition to rational instrumental thought
and agency, an alternative way o f structuring reality and hence an alternative way
o f causing action, codetermining one's conscious acts. W hat is not new with
Freud, and not essential to the point o f dual agencies, is that the alter-agent be
determined by a buried past that is out o f awareness. (This is not to deny the
enormous importance o f the idea o f forgotten trauma to Freud's particular
conception o f repression).
The point is that the metaphor o f the unconscious as a subterranean force that
is blind to the here and now, which occasionally erupts like a volcano into the
present, is wrong and m isses what is radical in Freud's notion o f a dynamic
unconscious. In fact, I would turn the archeological metaphor for the unconscious
on its side here, and point out what is meant by the dynamic unconscious is not
som e underlying (hence blind) force that imposes the past on the present without
attending to the here and now. This picture o f a blind unconscious mind is
inconsistent with the core empirical discovery o f psychoanalysis, which is that we
can read into the manifest content o f our utterances/gestures, a latent, primary
process message. (For this em phasis on the unconscious as living text I am
indebted to James Grotstein, personal communication). The unconscious speaks to
us in translation, using here and now events to garb itself.
But if the unconscious mind did not attend to the present aspects o f our situation,
then how could any semantic links between here and now conversation and the
unconscious be established? Our unconscious mind and our conscious mind must
co-determ ine our here and now attention. (This point is also presupposed by the
idea o f symptoms as compromises, another central tenet o f all psychoanalytic
theories).
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208. In order to see how Dr. L's invoking emotion B to act on em otion A could be roledirected. consider a fam iliar example o f self-persuasion. Think o f a situation in
which you felt very angry (emotion A) at the inconsiderateness o f som eone you
love, and tem pered that anger by conjuring up thoughts about tim es w hen that
person treated you lovingly. Such thoughts would likely be accom panied by
affectionate feelings (emotion B). Chances are that you spent some tim e in an
am bivalent state in which you genuinely felt both anger and affectionate gratitude
tow ards the sam e person, construed in two different ways. Depending on a host
o f factors including your own emotional character/ em bedded associational ties, but
also including the time and freedom o f thought available to you, and the nature o f
the rejecting and loving behaviors that you are focusing on, the impact o f B on A
could go in several different directions. You might wind up in a complex
emotional state in which a feeling o f affection coexists with subdued anger
(emotion C l). The focus o f your emotions would remain your friend, but in his
or her different aspects. Or you might wind up in a m ore self-reflexive emotional
response which takes your own ambivalence as its focus. D epending on how harsh
or accepting o f yourself you are you could wind up with any o f a host o f emotions
including the following: a feeling o f self-pitying resignation which has as its focus
the unpredictability o f your friend (emotion C2), or a feeling o f being proud of
yourself because you can tolerate the bad with the good in others (emotion C3),
or a feeling o f shame for trying to flee your angry feelings (emotion C4).
N ote that in this exam ple there is no reason to posit that the agent has to go from
em otion B to any particular emotion C. It is not that conjuring up loving feelings
is sufficient for determining any particular response from C 1-n, but rather that
because em otions determine salience, the occurrence o f B will direct the agent
tow ards certain further responses rather than others. All o f the responses C 1-n are
influenced by the affectionate construal o f one's friend; they are thus different ways
o f sustaining the role o f being a friend.
209.

W ebsters N ew W orld D ictionary, op.cit.

210.

M y discussion o f family therapy is influenced by my clinical experiences and the
ideas o f M elvin Lansky and Benahz Jalili, who teach family therapy at UCLA
N europsychiatric Institute.

211.

O f course there are important differences in how Dr. L understands a "couple" that
includes him self and the patient compared to the couple therapist's understanding
o f an independent couple. But as I argued in chapter four, the absence o f a distinct
m ental act o f introspection suggests that introspective self-awareness involves
som ething like empathizing with oneself. For this reason I believe the couple
therapist's functions can be usefully applied here, as long as the point that this is
a m etaphor is not forgotten.
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212.

Psychiatric training involves one to one supervision o f trainees with senior
psychiatrists, where the task is to teach the neophyte to become curious about her
difficult emotional responses to patients. One result o f such curiosity is an
increased ability to empathize with patients others find off-putting.

213.

The analyst Eve Schwaber writes about an analysis in which for several months
every interpretation she made was immediately rejected by her patient. She felt
incom petent and irritated, but these experiences were muted by her strong curiosity
about how the patient was experiencing her interpretations. This decentering
curiosity about the patient's subjective world allowed her to listen empathically to
the patient. She came to understand empathically that the patient was longing for
closeness and understanding, but wished to be understood non-verbally and
im m ediately, and thus found the analyst's tentative interpretations painful and
rejecting. See Evelyne Albrecht Schwaber, "On the Mode o f Therapeutic Action:
A Clinical Montage," How does Treatment Help? On the M odes o f Therapeutic
Action o f Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Workshop Series o f the American
Psychoanalytic Association, Monograph no. 4, Rothstein, ed., Connecticut:
International Universities Press, 1988.

214.

The claim that Dr. L's curiosity and prideful reconstrual o f his situation plays a
causal role in shifting him into an empathic stance raises certain surface conflicts
with my account o f empathy. In particular, I argued that for empathy to be
possible, it must be possible for shifts in one's affects to arise prior to any
deliberate construals o f another's situation. I argued that the fact that such shifts
could be directed by the other person's affects, via a kind o f pre-verbal resonance,
helped explain the magic o f empathy, the fact that the affective experience one
happened to have as a listener could direct one to a new understanding o f the other
person's situation. It would contradict the results o f my empathy discussion to
posit that Dr. L deliberately imagines the patient's world in a detailed first personal
way that conveys the helplessness o f the patient, and then feels sadness with the
patient. This would be sham empathy, which involves no genuine communication.
H ow ever, what I rejected in the empathy chapter was the idea o f being able to
infer another's mental contents, not the idea o f being able to imaginatively amplify
one's own mental contents. Dr. L shifts his construal o f his interaction with the
patient prior to resonating with the patient, so that his empathic understanding o f
the patient has multiple determinants, including his own deliberate imagination
work. Recall that in the empathy chapter we pointed out that affective resonance
alone was insufficient for empathy (argument against the "merging" hypothesis).
R ather, the physician relies upon her accumulated knowledge o f the first personal
details o f the patient's life, built into a working model o f his or her world as lived,
to steer her construals o f the patient's situation. Hence the great increase in
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accuracy one has in empathizing with familiar versus unfamiliar people. Although
this w orking model can direct one's empathic imaginings unconsciously, one often
has to consciously invoke parts o f it to gear into an empathic response to a patient.
So in this vignette Dr. L deliberately shifts his focus from his personal irritation
w ith the patient, which precludes empathic listening, to an image o f him self as a
good physician who can listen to his patient. This shift is facilitated by curiosity
about the patient's experience, which decenters him from his own irritation and
facilitates listening. The activity o f listening to the patient or o f "trying" to
em pathize, involves building an initial working model o f the patient's world
including the idea of having cancer and being alienated from others. But all o f
this imagination work does not yet include the particular affective grasp o f the
patient's fear o f showing his pain to his family that Dr. L then arrives at through
em pathic resonance with the patient.
215.

M y own view o f how therapy is effective is that within the safety o f a strong
therapeutic relationship, the patient is invited to become curious about her own
sincerity, in the Sartrean sense.
The idea that one can be for oneself only what one is, is challenged. The patient
realizes that her emotions are already appropriated by others for strategic reasons,
and that she herself has inadvertently colluded in these uses o f herself. I am
indebted here to Judith Broder, personal communication. See Sartre on sincerity
as the apparent antithesis of "bad faith," in Being and Nothingness. W ashington
Square Press, 1966, pp. 100-101.

216.

M y discussion o f curiosity and use o f the image o f the stargazer is particularly
influenced by discussions with Karsten Harries. Some o f his ideas about curiosity
are in his essay on "Truth and Freedom," in Edmund Husserl and the
Phenom enological Tradition. Essays in Phenomenology. Sokolowski. ed.,
W ashington D.C.: Catholic University o f America Press, 1988. See also Plato,
"Theaetetus," 174a-175d, Collected Dialogues. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1961.

217.

The idea that curiosity detaches one from other emotions is consistent with our
view that attention is always directed by mood, because curiosity is itself an affect.
One is moved to wonder.

218.

It w ould be interesting to empirically compare the value o f the therapist's curiosity
versus the value o f her warmth in building up a therapeutic alliance with patients,
using m easures for therapeutic alliance that correlate with outcome measures for
psychotherapy.
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219.

A lthough w e have rejected Freud's statements that the analyst should have affective
neutrality, his conception o f the analyst's cognitive stance is close to our
conception of curiosity.
Freud, Sigmund, "Recommendations to Physicians
Practicing Psychoanalysis," Standard Edition. 12: 109-120.

220.

Freud, ibid.

221.

H ow ever, I again differ with at least a traditional reading o f Freud in that I take
it that there is no single archetypal experience o f evenly hovering attention, guided
by the external landscape, free o f particular personal meaning.
The train rider's
experience of m oving away from some town will be colored by a particular attitude
— such as nostalgia, grief or relief —about the miles separating her from the town.
The image o f the moving train suggests how curiosity can attenuate one's
em otions w ithout requiring affective disengagement. Consider, for example, how
one can reflectively experience a past emotion o f one's own with combined
involvem ent and curious disengagement. I may still feel moved by the image o f
a teen-age boyfriend, but I am also aware o f the childishness o f his ways, and o f
the difference between what felt like love then and what feels like love now. This
experience is characteristic o f the sense o f ourselves as changing over time. One
relives empathically some o f the old longing or fear, but also feels that the
construal o f the loved or feared one no longer has the same value or meaning.

222.

See Spiro, "What is Em pathy and Can It Be Taught?" op.cit. Spiro em phasizes the
im portance of giving narrative accounts of illness on clinical rounds as the patient's
situation is presented. I agree with this integrated approach, which sees empathy
as essential to, rather than ornamental to, medical care.

223.

Fox, "The Human Condition o f Health Professionals," in Essays in Medical
Sociology. Transactions Press, 1988, p.582. I agree with this integrated approach,
w hich sees empathy as essential to understanding patients, rather than as
ornamental.

224.

A ristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Book 3, Chapter 9, 1117a. In The Basic W orks of
A ristotle. New York: Random House, 1941.

225.

To non-physicians, doctors' jokes appear to be cruel portraits o f the ridiculousness
o f patients -- for example, the obtunded patient with his tongue hanging out o f his
m outh is said to be showing the 'Q ' sign. See Samuel Shem, The House o f God.
N ew York: Dell, 1978, a novel about internship.
W hat is apparent from the inside is that it is usually the most pathetic
experiences of patients that inspires humor. The subtext o f these jokes is
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physicians' own feelings o f helplessness towards, and th e ir feelings o f identification
with, their patients. That is why a simple sentence from the novel H ouse o f God,
is alm ost universally amusing to physicians — "remember, the patient is the one
with the disease." M ost importantly, such jokes allow physicians to tell each other
how they feel, and thus to make empathic contact, w ithout breaking the code o f
suffering in silence — there is no apparent suffering, only laughter. H um or o f this
sort starts with one's first course in medical school— gross anatom y, where for
exam ple, my own group named our human cadaver Earnest, because we were
"working in dead Earnest." This allowed us a no-risk way to tell each other how
strange it felt to dissect a person who was dead. Like curiosity, hum or allows one
to slacken the lines o f one's identification with one's role, to note how strange the
normal practice o f medicine can be. But humor stops far short of curiosity in that
it typifies the present experience rather than liberating one to imaginatively
reconstrue and thus transform one's situation. For a discussion of the sociology o f
hum or in medicine, see Rene Fox, "The Human Condition o f Health Professionals,"
op.cit., pp.579-581.
226. Judith Ross, personal communication.
227.

See Osier, "Aequanimitas," in Aeauanimitas. N ew York: Norton, 1963.

228. Consider, for exam ple, a story told by W illiam Carlos W illiam s about the impact
o f resonance emotion on a physician's anti-semitism. The doctor was visited by
a Jewish European couple w ho asked him several anxious questions about their
apparently healthy infant, and were mistrustful o f his handling o f the baby. They
barely spoke english, and seemed in his eyes foolish and superstitious. Yet on
learning that the woman had lost her entire family in N azi-occupied Poland, the
physician says he w as "touched," and began to respect her protective attitude
tow ard the baby. This shift in his perspective allow ed him to communicate
effectively, and help them for the first time. See "A Face o f Stone."The Doctor
Stories. N ew York, N ew Directions Books, 1984.
229.

This is relevant to the current debate about how best to restructure cost-effective
medical care. The values o f medical practice are not well served by any direct
com m ercialization o f medical care. Rather, given the urgent need to restrict the
cost o f health care, the kind o f physician-patient relationship argued for in this
dissertation would be better grounded in a form o f health care, such as National
Health Insurance on the Canadian model, that emphasizes a long-term relationship
with a prim ary care physician who is not a direct beneficiary o f any limiting o f
care.
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230.

"Four M odels o f the Physician-Patient Relationship," in the Journal o f the
American M edical Association. Vol. 267, no. 16, April 1992, pp. 2221-2226.

231.

For a practical defense o f the claim that the physician's moral reasoning needs to
grow out o f her moral experience in daily medical practice, see Edw ard Hundert,
"A Model for Ethical Problem Solving in Medicine, with Practical Applications,"
American Journal o f Psychiatry. 144:7, July 1987, pp. 839-846. H undert's views
are compatible with my account o f the importance o f perceptions o f moral salience
for the Kantian moral agent.
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